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Abstract
Conceptual designs were prepared for 23SPu02, 244Cm203,
and 147pm203 radioisotope heat source systems that will pro-
vide 25 kw of thermal power to a Brayton-cycle power conver-
sion system for space applications. The conceptual designs
for all three fuels show primary containment provided by
multilayered fuel capsules, with tantalum-based alloy T-222
as the principal stress-bearing layer and platinum as the
outer corrosion-resistant layer. All the designs show the
assembly of fuel capsules contained within a single reentry
body for protection against reentry heating and subsequent
impact in the event of a mission abort. The designs are
based on containing the radioisotope fuel within the fuel
capsules for a period of time equal to ten half-lives or
longer of the radioisotope. Estimated system weights based
on the conceptual designs range from approximately 3000 to
25,000 ib, depending on the fuel and design concept.
i. INTRODUCTION
In July 1965, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory started work on pre-
liminary designs for a 25-kw radioisotope heat source that could be cou-
pled to a Brayton-cycle power-generating system to provide electric power
for use in space applications. The study is being done for the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, Lewis Research Center, under Inter-
agency Agreement C-64217-A. Valuable assistance is being given for this
study by the NASA-I_wis Research Center project manager, L. I. Shure, and
by P. R. Bobbitt of the NASA-langley Research Center.
The overall objectives of the study are to
i. provide the NASA-Lewis Research Center with preliminary designs of
the radioisotope heat source, and
*On loan from Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant.
22. define the research and development problems that require solutions
prior to undertaking the detailed design of such a heat source.
The work has been divided into two phases: conceptual designs (phase I),
which is the subject of this report, and preliminary designs (phase II).
In phase I various heat source concepts were evolved, critical problems
were identified, the feasibility of their solution was evaluated, and
estimates were madeof the physical dimensions and weights of the various
concepts. It is planned in the phase II work to select the most prom-
ising of the phase I conceptual designs and prepare a more detailed pre-
liminary design for a specific mission concept in order to minimize weight
and volume, detail development problems, and assess the safety problems
from the time of capsule fueling to postmission recovery.
A schematic diagram of a radioisotope-fueled Brayton-cycle power sys-
tem is shownin Fig. 1.1, and the operating conditions supplied by NASA-
Lewis Research Center for use in the phase I conceptual designs are given
in Table 1.1.
Table i.i. Brayton-Cycle Specifications
Working fluid Argon
Shaft power, kw 5
Turbine inlet temperature, °R 1960
Turbine inlet pressure, psia 13o2
Compressorinlet temperature, °R 536
Compressorinlet pressure, psia 6.0
Pressure drop in heat source heat 3-7
exchanger, %
Recuperator effectiveness 0.90
Weight flow, ib/sec 0.30
Thermal input (at end of one year), kw 25
Three radioisotopes, 238pu, 244Cm,and 147pm,were considered as
potential fuels for the heat source, and the primary concern in the con-
ceptual designs was to insure that the radioisotope fuel would remain con-
tained within the fuel capsules under all credible conditions. Weight
and volume considerations were kept secondary to safety in evolving the
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Fig. i.i. Schematic Diagram of Radioisotope Brayton-Cycle Power
Conversion System.
4conceptual designs. The major safety guidelines used in the conceptual
design studies were
i. The maximumsurface temperature of the fuel capsules at any time dur-
ing the prelaunch, launch, and orbital phases of the mission must not
exceed 2000°F, even if the Brayton-cycle system is inoperative.
2. The system must be designed so that heat can be transferred to either
of two completely independent Brayton-cycle systems, including two
completely independent heat exchangers.
3. The system must be designed for containment of the r_dioisotope within
the capsules for a period of time equal to ten half-lives or more of
the radioisotope under all credible conditions.
4. The radioisotope fuel must remain contained within the fuel capsules
in the event of a launch-pad fire or other emergencies during launch
and orbital injection.
5. The radioisotope fuel must remain contained within the capsules during
and after an uncontrolled reentry from space.
6. Burial with subsequent loss of containment must be avoided.
7. The assembly of a critical massof the 238puand 244Cmfuel forms must
be prevented under all credible conditions.
These goals can be approached in only a limited fashion in conceptual
and preliminary design studies° Loss of containment due to sabotage or
catastrophic explosions of fuels in orbit were not considered_ Release
mechanismsfor the reentry body were not included in the phase I studies,
and the results of release mechanismfailure during somemodesof uncon-
trolled reentry could conceivably cause burnup of containment and release
of fuel. It is planned to treat these matters in more detail in the phase
II work.
NASA-LewisResearch Center did not put any restrictions on the con-
ceptual designs with respect to weight or volume, since it is recognized
that safety, not size, is the paramount problem in the design of radio-
isotope heat sources It is recognized, however, that if safety con-
siderations are equal, light and compact heat source designs are prefera-
ble. NASA-LewisResearch Center did specify that the conceptual designs
should adhere as closely as possible to current or expected near-future
technology with regard to materials and methods of fabrication and launch
operation capabilities.
Oneof the most likely types of mission that will require multikilo-
watt levels of power will be the mannedorbiting laboratory, and there-
fore the conceptual designs include radiation shielding. The shielding
model (see Fig. 6.1) used for the phase I studies allows a dose rate of
3 mrem/hr at a 3-meter-diam circular dose plane located 3 meters from the
heat source, 60 mrem/hr at any other point within the vehicle 3 meters
from the source, and 600 mrem/hr at any point outside the spacecraft 3
meters from the source_ This model was specified by NASA-lewis Research
Center only to provide a comparison of conceptual systems on a shielded
basis, and it does not necessarily represent any particular mission re-
quirement.
The radioisotope fuel requirements for the heat source are based on
an operating life of one year_ and the rate of heat output at the end of
the one-year operational period is 25 kw. It is assumed that in a normal
mission the radioisotope fuel will be returned to earth in a separate
ferry vehicle or by a controlled deorbiting and impact in a selected area.
However_ since it is possible for an accident to occur during launch or
after some period in orbit that results in a random reentry of the heat
source, the conceptual designs are more strongly influenced by the abnormal
mission conditions than the normal mission mode.
In addition to preliminary design work_ the phase II study will in-
clude a more general investigation of weight and volume reduction. Esti-
mates of heat source weight and volume will be obtained for systems in
which the vehicle configuration, radiation tolerance limits_ safety guide-
lines_ and design stress limits are modifications of those used in the
mainline study°
62. SUMMARY
All three radioisotope fuels considered in this study, 238pii, 244Cm '
and 147pm, could probably be made available in sufficient quantities for
25-kw heat sources by the mid seventies. Plutonium-238 has already been
produced in kilogram quantities, and numerous studies suggest that it can
be made available in the much larger quantities (hundreds of kilograms)
needed for a large heat source program if the demand warrants the necessary
plant investment. Recycling of power reactor fuels may also provide a
significant amount of 238pU in the mid to late seventies. At the present
time only a couple of hundred grams of 244Cm has been separated; however,
approximately 4.5 kg for experimental work is being processed at the Atomic
Energy Commission's Savannah River Laboratory. Curium-244 could also be
produced in much larger quantities in AEC production reactors if needed
and, as is the case with 238_d, private power reactors may also be a source
of 244Cm. The Isochem plant located at AEC's Hanford Operations is pres-
ently scheduled to go on stream in late 1968 or 1969 and is expected to
separate up to 30 to 50 megacuries of 147pm annually. While this is not
a large enough production rate to make 25-kw sources, the techniques for
processing large quantities of 147pm will be developed.
The oxides of each of the radioisotopes were chosen as the most favor-
able compound form for this application. The compound 238pu_ and 147pm
metal were also considered, but they did not offer any significant advan-
tages over the oxides and there is much less information on their prop-
erties. There are also numerous gaps in the property data for the oxides
of the three radioisotopes, particularly in the area of long-term compati-
bility with potential refractory alloy encapsulating materials; however,
calculated values were used where necessary in the conceptual design work.
As noted previously, safety was the major consideration in the con-
ceptual designs, and the primary safety requirement was to keep the radio-
isotope fuel contained within the fuel capsules under all credible circum-
stances. No single encapsulating material could be suggested that had
the necessary high-temperature strength properties in combination with
acceptable corrosion and oxidation resistance, so a multicomponent capsule
7design was necessary. The tantalum-based alloys T-ill or T-222 were con-
sidered the best choice for the inner-layer stress-bearing capsule material
and platinum was chosen for the outer layer of the capsule because of its
superior all-around corrosion and oxidation resistance. Available data
suggested that platinum would probably diffuse into the tantalum-based
alloy layer over a long period of time_ so a thoria diffusion barrier was
placed between them in the conceptual designs. Free-energy calculations
indicated that there maybe problems with the long-term compatibility of
all three radioisotope fuel compounds,particularly 238Pu02_with the
hafnium in the T-ill or T-222 alloys. In the phase I conceptual capsule
designs, the fuel is contained within a thin tungsten liner to provide
more assurance of compatibility. Finally, the outer platinum layer is
coated with iron titanate to improve its emissivity because all but one
of the system design concepts employ radiant heat transfer to the Brayton-
cycle gas heat exchanger.
Probably the most important problem with respect to the 10ng-term
containment of the two alpha-emitting fuels, 238Puand 244Cm,is the in-
ternal capsule pressure resulting from the helium produced during decay.
The problem involves predicting the effect of constantly varying stress
and temperature on the long-term life of the encapsulating material with
relatively short-term creep data that were obtained at nominally constant
stress and temperature. A method of mathematically constructing tempera-
ture-compensated stress rate versus creep curves was developed that is
more representative of the conditions existing during alpha decay than
the conventional total stress versus creep curves usually found in the
literature. With this method it was found that for a T-ill capsule having
a start-of-life temperature of approximately 2000°F, creep would no longer
be a dominant factor in stress-strain relationships at approximately ii
years in the case of 2 44Cm203 and 54 years for 2381_02. Beyond these
times, the temperature would be lowered to the point where capsule strength
would be described in terms of the elastic properties of the material.
The maximum total stress in the capsule walls would occur later, at about
one and one half times the half-life of the alpha-decaying fuel. In con-
trast, 147Pm does not liberate a gas during decay, so the capsule design
is not restricted by the need to leave a void volume to keep the internal
8pressure within acceptable limits. The 147pmcapsule diameter is limited,
however, by center-line fuel temperature limitations.
All the system concepts developed in phase I have a single reentry
body which, in the event of a mission abort and impact, would not bury
itself but might rupture and release its capsules. Subsequent burial of
an individual capsule in drifting sand was judged to be credible. The
temperature that would be attained in an insulating mediumsuch as sand
is important in determining the proper wall thickness of the primary cap-
sule. In the conceptual capsule designs for the 238Puand 244Cmfuels,
the capsule surface heat flux was limited to values that would give a cap-
sule surface temperature of 2000°F or less in the event of burial. The
computer studies used to determine both the minimumweight and minimum
volume of capsules required for the Brayton-cycle heat source showedthat
a relatively minor weight penalty and a rather large volume penalty were
incurred in designing to this burial temperature limitation. In the case
of 147pmfuel capsules the burial temperature was allowed to go to 2500°F
because there would be no internal pressure problem and the fuel would
have a muchshorter half-life. The power levels in the conceptual fuel
capsule designs for the three fuels vary from 100 to 300 watts per capsule
and the capsule diameters vary from approximately 1.0 to almost 4.5 in.
The length-to-diameter ratio in all cases is 4.
All three fuels require radiation shields to meet the shielding-
model requirements. Promethium-147 requires only gammashielding; 23Spu,
only neutron shielding; and 244Cmrequires both gammaand neutron shield-
ing. Lithium hydride is used in the conceptual designs for neutron shield-
ing and tantalum for gammashielding. Significant savings in shield weight
can be madein the case of a pure 23Spu fuel by using oxygen depleted by
a factor of approximately 4 in 170 and approximately 20 in iS0 content
whenpreparing the 23SPu02fuel compoundbecause most of the neutron radia-
tion comesfrom (_,n) reactions with these two isotopes. Actually, the
extent to which the depletion of 170 and 180 is worthwhile depends on the
concentration of other contaminants in the fuel that produce neutrons by
(_,n) reactions. Comparableshield-weight savings cannot be gained by
doing the samething whenpreparing the 244Cm203fuel compoundbecause of
the muchgreater number of neutrons from spontaneous fission. Whenusing
9depleted oxygen for the 238_U02, a radiation shield is required only in
the direction of the manned compartment.
An analysis of the criticality problem showed that even under the
most idealized conditions of reflection and moderation, a critical mass
of 244Cm203 would not be present in a 25-kw heat source. There would be
more than a critical mass of 238pu; however, if it remained within the
individual fuel capsules considered in this study, it would not be possible
to get a critical array.
From the time of lift-off until the time the orbit has been estab-
lished and the Brayton-cycle power system is activated_ some means must
be provided for preventing the heat source from rising to an excessive
temperature. This can be done by incorporating in the device any one of
several possible heat sink materials, such as silicon, BeO_ or low-melting
mixed oxides. A similar, though more severe, problem exists in the case
of a launch-pad fire. Scaling up time-temperature data obtained during
an Atlas-Centaur launch-pad fire indicated that a heat sink equivalent
to approximately i00 ib of Be0 in conjunction with the mass of the device
would keep the capsule "temperature well below failure temperature long
enough to permit recovery. A substantially smaller weight of silicon
would accomplish the same thing; however_ compatibility problems make its
use doubtful.
Some means must be provided for dumping the heat from the radioisotope
fuel to space in the event the Brayton-cycle power conversion systems be-
come inoperative. This would usually be done by having emergency cooling
loops in the heat exchanger or by opening insulated doors or shutters to
let the heat source radiate directly to space. In this study, the concept
of separate emergency cooling loops was not used, not only because of
space limitations in the heat exchanger, but also it was desired to avoid
the use of separate pumping systems and a separate space radiator. Most
of the system concepts require the opening of an insulated door and/or
the mechanical movement of the heat source to dump the heat to space in
the emergency mode. However, one concept was evolved that provides a
completely passive heat-rejection system. This concept has a reservoir
of molten metal covering the back side of the Brayton-cycle heat exchangers.
lO
At normal operating temperature, the vapor pressure of the metal is very
low, and therefore very little heat is removedby vaporization. If the
Brayton cycle becameinoperative, the temperature of the heat source would
rise rapidly, and heat would be removedby vaporization of the fluid. The
vapor would condense back into the reservoir and the liquid would return
to the heated area by capillary forces. Lithium metal has about the right
characteristics for this application. The volume required by this concept
is somewhatlarger than the volume for someof the other concepts, so its
use does not provide the minimum-weight system. However, it maybe the
most reliable heat-dumping method.
The use of a single reentry body to house the radioisotope heat source
offers the following important advantages from the standpoint of maximum
reliability of containment over the emergencyrelease of individual cap-
sules: impact-velocity control, predictable impact orientation, capsule
temperature control during reentry, meansto prevent burial, and minimum
area affected by the reentering heat source. Several of these advantages
relate to meansfor providing somecontrol over the environment to which
a source capsule might be exposed, and by having this control there is
somelatitude in the design. For example, by varying the cross-sectional
area of the reentry body, the ballistic coefficient is varied and there-
fore the velocity of impact and resulting stress on the capsule. Like-
wise, by varying the terminal velocity and shape of the body, it is pos-
sible to prevent burial on impact, which is an important point because
of the effect earth burial would have on the temperature of the assembled
heat source. In a normal mission, the heat source would not return to
the earth in a randomreentry fashion. If randomreentry should occur
as the result of someaccident, it is highly desirable that the entire
fuel source be in one small area rather than scattered over manysquare
miles, as might occur in the case of many individual fuel capsules ran-
domly reentering. There would be a muchbetter chance of recovering all
the fuel in the event of land impact of a single reentry body, and a mini-
mumof land areawould be affected.
The radiation shield is the major weight component in all the con-
ceptual system designs. Therefore, for each of the system concepts, the
lightest weight is obtained whenusing 238pu02 as the fuel because it
ll
requires the least shielding; on the other hand, 244Cm203fuel gives the
largest weight because it requires the most shielding.
From the standpoint of long-term (ten half-life) containment reli-
ability, 238Pu02is the least desirable fuel because of its long half-
life and the helium pressure problem, whereas i_7Pm203is the best fuel
for the opposite reasons. The total weights estimated for the various
fuel block, reentry body_ and shield system concepts vary considerably,
with the lowest being approximately 3000 lb in the case of single-layer
plane arrangement of fuel capsules containing 238Pu02fuel depleted by
a factor of 20 in 180 to a high of approximately 25,000 lb in the case
of the passive emergencyheat-rejection concept with 244Cm203as the fuel.
In most designs the weight_of the system with 244Cm203as the fuel is
about twice that for 238Pu02as the fuel. The system weight for promethium
(147pm203)fuel falls between that for 238pu fuel and that for 2_4Cmfuel.
If the allowable dose rate were increased by a factor of 4, 238Pu02de-
pleted in leo would still give the lightest system weights; however, the
difference between the weight with it and that with 244Cm203would become
much less pronounced.
From a heat transfer standpoint, all three fuels are capable of being
assembled into a 25-kw heat source that would deliver the required amount
of heat to the Brayton-cycle working fluid (argon) within the 2000°F cap-
sule surface temperature limitation and without exceeding the allowable
(3 to 7%) pressure drop in the heat exchanger. Relatively simple heat
exchanger designs and presently available thermal insulations could be
used. From a practical engineering standpoint, considerable development
work is necessary, particularly in the area of fuel-compound stability
and compatibility and in metals strength properties determination, before
long-term containment integrity of the heat source can be assurred.
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3. FUELPROPERTIESANDAVAILABILITY
3.1 Fuel Properties
Three radioisotopes 3 244Cm, 238pu, and 14?Pm were considered as po-
tential fuel materials for Brayton-cycle heat sources for space applica-
tion. The compound forms of these radioisotopes of interest are
2381_i02, with both natural oxygen and oxygen
depleted in i?0 and 180,
2381::>t,d_j
24&Cm203 and 244C1TJ.023
147Pm203 and 147pm elemental metal.
During the course of the study 238puN, 244Cm02, and 147pmmetal were
.dropped from consideration for one or more of the following reasons:
1. There was little or no advantage over the retained compound.
2. There would be compatibility or stability problems.
3. There would probably be production difficulties.
The remaining compounds were carried through the entire conceptual
design phase of the study.
The Division of Isotopes Development, AEC, is presently carrying
out several properties determination programs on fuel forms at Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, Battelle Northwest Laboratories, Mound Laboratory,
and Savannah River. However, these programs are in their initial stages,
and it was often necessary to estimate property values from preliminary
experimental data, by analogy to chemically similar compounds, or with
data obtained from different isotopes of the same element.
3.1.1 Plutonium-238
Plutonium-238 is produced in a reactor by neutron capture in a 237Np
target:
#- (n, 2n) (n, 7) 15- (n, 3')
236pL1. _ 236Np ,m 237Np L 238Np _ 238pu _ 239pt,t
1.6 mb (f) 170 b 2.1 days 400 b
(n,f)
1600 b
F.P.
13
It is also formed by the alpha decay of 242Cm,which gives a product free
of 236pu and 239Pu; however, this is not the usual method of obtaining
the isotope. It has a half-life of 86.4 y, and its specific activity is
17.4 curies/g. A typical isotopic distribution of the reactor-product
plutonium produced by irradiating 237Np, as reported by Mound Laboratory, l
is listed below:
Plutonium Average
Abundance
Isotope (%)
238 8O.O
239 16.5
240 2.5
241 0.8
242 0.08
In addition to these isotopes, reactor-produced 238pu contains a
small amount of 236pu, which could have a significant effect on the shield-
ing requirements, as discussed in Section 6. It is expected that 236pu
contamination can be kept at less than i to 2 ppm.
Plutonium-238 nitride has a higher melting point, higher power den-
sity, and lower neutron output (Table 3.1, based on Refs. i and 2) than
238pu02; however, it reacts spontaneously with air, and therefore the fuel
preparation and encapsulation operations are greatly complicated. In the
case of an intact reentry application, 238pun is probably a greater safety
hazard than 238pu02 because a capsule failure on the ground would result
in a reaction of the fuel with air that would probably result in a very
fine particulate smoke. In the Brayton-cycle application where the capsule
temperatures are well below the melting point of both 238Pu02 and 238puN
and where the power density of a capsule is primarily controlled by the
free volume required for long-term helium containment, there is no signifi-
cant advantage to the use of 238puN. There is very little definitive com-
patibility information for either compound with potential encapsulating
materials, and future tests may show 238PUN to be superior to 238pu02 in
this regard.
At the present time, the dioxide is the most commonly considered com-
pound of 238pu for isotopic power applications. The compound is prepared
14
at MoundLaboratory both as pressed high-density pellets and plasma-
spheroidized (microspheres) particles. The microsphere fuel form ranges
in size from 37 to 250 Wwith an average size of approximately 150 _,
and the best packing that can be expected is 80%. Even though this would
Table 3.1. Properties of Plutonium-238 Fuel Forms Based on
Mixture of 80%238pu-20%239puand Other Impurities
238Fu02 2_ 8pu_N
Half-life, y
Specific activity of compound, curies/g
Specific power of compound, w/g
Power of compound, w/cm 3
Chemical purity, %
Neutron activity, neutrons/sec.g
Density_ g/cm 3
Melting point, °C
Boiling point, °C
Specific heat at 25°C, cal/mole.°K
Thermal expansion coefficient at
IO00°C, °C-Z
Thermal conductivity, w/cm.°C
Crushing strength, kg
Electrical resistivity; ohm-cm
Heat of formation, kcal/mole
Free energy of formation, kcal/mole
Absolute entropy, cal/°Komole
86.4 86.4
ll. 7 12.9
O. 406 O. 435
3.7 a 6.2
,-399 _99
lO4 (b) lO3
i!. 46 14.25
2280 c 2627
3550
16.4
14.4 x 10 -6
See Figs. 3.1
through 3.4
>i
800 at 1250°K
--252.9 at 25°C
--253.3 at !200°C
--240.4 at 25°C
-192.3 at 1200°C
19.7 at 298°K
Fig. 3.1
aAssumes 80% packing for microspheres.
bNaturally occurring ratio of oxygen isotopes assumed.
CReported melting temperature is actually for Pu01. 62 due to dis-
sociation of Pu02 as it approaches this temperature. The melting
point of Pu02 is 2400°Co
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result in a lower thermal conductivity value and would require more vol-
ume to hold the fuel, the low solubility of the microsphere form in sea-
water and its inertness to the atmosphere more than compensate for the
higher density of the pressed-and-sintered pellet form. Thus the micro-
sphere form of 238pu02 was selected. The composition of the plutonium
dioxide microspheres formed by the plasma-torch technique was determined
by crystallographic techniques to be Pu01.98. There is some speculation
that at the operating temperature of interest (_2000°F) the plutonium
oxide fuel form might exist as a mixture of Pu203 and Pu02 (Ref. 3).
Properties related to its use as an isotopic power fuel are given in Table
3.1. Most physicochemical values for this table were determined by the
measurements on compounds of the more stable 239pu isotope.
Since very little information on the thermal conductivities of the
plutonium fuel forms is available, approximate thermal conductivity values
were determined by utilizing the values reported for several chemically
similar fuel forms. The estimated thermal conductivity values for pressed-
and-sintered pellets of 238pu02 and 238puN are shown in Fig. 3.1. The
estimated thermal conductivity of the plutonium dioxide pressed-and-
sintered pellet was determined from data 4 obtained for U02. The estimated
thermal conductivity of PuN was obtained by using data 5 for UN at lower
temperatures and data 6 for TiN and ZrN at higher temperatures. The cri-
teria used in estimating 7 the effective thermal conductivity (conductance)
of Pu02 packed microspheres were
Average particle size, W 150
Packing density, % 80 and 60
Pressure between particles Vacuum and l and i0 atm helium
The results are shown in Figs. 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4, where the effective
thermal conductivity, Keff, is plotted against temperature, and Kef f is
defined as
= +K + Knc ,Keff Ksc gsc Krad +
where
Kef f = effective thermal conductivity of the fuel,
18
K
sc
K
gsc
K
tad
K
nc
= thermal conductivity due to solid contact,
= thermal conductivity due to gas-solid contact,
= thermal conductivity due to radiation,
= thermal conductivity due to natural convection.
3.1.2 Curium-244
Curium-244 is produced by multiple neutron captures in 239pu according
to the following sequence:
(n, 7) (n, 7 )
239pu _ 2_01_i
303 b 250 b
241pu
(n, 7 ) (n, 7)
242pu
390 b 52 b
244Cm _ 244Am_
26 m 138 h
243pu
4.98 hI
(n, 7)
243_Ii
The oxide form of 244Cm is the only compound that has been investi-
gated as an isotopic power fuel. Two stable oxides_ Cm203 and C_02, are
possible; however, the results of several thermogravimetric analyses 8'9
of milligram quantities of curium oxide show that Cm02 will not exist
above 1000 to ll00°C. The present production method for this material
involves precipitation as an oxalate followed by calcination to the oxide
at temperatures in excess of 1000°C; therefore, it is probable that the
oxide will be largely in the Cm203 valence state, so this form was se-
lected for this study.
Very little information is available on the various nuclear, thermo-
physical, and mechanical properties of this fuel, but work is in progress
at both 0RNL and Savannah River to determine these characteristics. The
expected composition based on large-scale production of 244Cm is given
below: 10
19
MassAbundance*
Nuclide (wt %)
242Cm 0.02
243Cm 0.002
244Cm 95.3
245Cm 0.9
246Cm 2.7
247Cm O. 07
248Cm 0.05
24_Am 0.5
252Cf <4 × i0 -S
The property data available 10-12 for this product curium (_95% 244Cm)
are listed below; most values are estimates based on chemically similar
stable materials whose properties are known:
Half-life, y
Specific activity of compound, curies/g
Specific power of compound, w/g
Power of compound, w/cm 3
Chemical purity, %
Neutron activity, neutrons/sec.g
Density, g/cm 3
Melting point, °C
Thermal expansion coefficient, °C -l
Thermal conductivity, w/cm.°C
Modulus of rupture, kg/cm 2
Compressive strength, kg/cm 2
18. i
N70.5
2.43
26.0
_95
4.2 × 105
10.7
1950
C_l XI0 -5
See Fig. 3.1
170
1900
Two physical forms of Cm203 were investigated -- pressed-and-sintered
pellets and packed powder. There has been some experimental work at ORNL
directed at perfecting a method of preparing 244Cm203 microspheres, but
this fuel form was not considered because it is still in the laboratory
development stage. The thermal conductivity for pressed-and-sintered pel-
lets (Fig. 3.1) was estimated 11 from known values for the chemically simi-
lar materials Y203, U02, and Th02. In this application, the conceptual
capsules each have only a very small volume of 244Cm203 in relation to the
total capsule volume, and a lightly packed powder form of the compound is
satisfactory from the standpoint of temperature in the fuel. The lightly
packed powder fuel was assumed to have only 50% packing, and the thermal
*One year after reactor irradiation, 97% of the 24_Cm product will
be of this composition; 3% of the product will contain higher concentra-
tions of 242Cm and 243Cm.
2O
conductivity was estimated to be similar to that of Pu02 microspheres
with the samepacking. With this approach, the estimated thermal conduc-
tivity of Cm203packed powder (50%packing) at 1200°C is 0.0035 w/cm.°C. 7
This value was used in the capsule design program.
3.1.3 Promethium-147
Promethium-147 is a fission product that is separated from reactor
fuel-reprocessing wastes. It can also be obtained by the irradiation of
neodymium; however_ the high target-fabrication and handling costs do not
make this method an attractive alternative. The significant contaminants
are 146pm and 14Spm. The other rare earths can be separated and reduced
to an insignificant level by ion exchange. Promethium-148, which has a
half-life of 42 d, can be brought to an acceptably low level by aging
the waste before processing. Promethium-146 has a half-life of 4.4 y and
therefore cannot be removed adequately by aging. Promethium-146 is formed
by the (n,2n) reaction on 147pm_ and fortunately the cross section for
this reaction at thermal fluxes is low. Promethium-147 obtained from
highly thermalized production reactors 13 has approximately 5 x 10-5% 146pm,
while that obtained from typical power reactors is expected to have an
order-of-magnitude larger quantity of l_6pm (Table 3.2).
The two forms of 147pm considered for this study were 147pm metal
and 147pm203 pressed-and-sintered pellets. At the expected operating tem-
peratures (_2000°F) the l&Tpm metal would be in a molten form, and it
would require a special inner container to retain the fuel in the configu-
ration required. The container would have to be compatible with the molten
promethium metal. In the conceptual designs of the capsule for 147pm, the
capsule is essentially completely filled with the fuel because there is
no gas evolution during radioactive decay. Therefore, the slightly higher
power density of the metal would offer a corresponding advantage of about
15% in weight of fuel. Because of the lack of information and lack of
planned experimental programs to determine the compatibility of liquid
and vapor-phase 147p_I metal with potential encapsulating materials, as
well as the potentially severe dispersal problem if the molten metal should
come in contact with air, it was not carried through to a conceptual de-
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The available properties of each of these fuel forms, as determined
at Battelle-Northwest 13 and 0RNL,_I, 14 are listed in Table 3.3. Most
values are estimated from neighboring rare-earth values.
Table 3.3. Properties of Promethium-147 Fuel Compounds
Properties 147pm Metal 147pm203
Half-life, y 2.62
Specific activity of compound, curies/g 928
Specific power of compound, w/g 0.333
Power of compound, w/em 3 2.43
Chemical purity, % >99
Density, g/cm 3 7.3
Melting point, °C 1080
Boiling point, °C 3300
Thermal expansion coefficient at 6.7 × 10 -6
at 400°C, °C -I
Thermal conductivity, w/cm.°C Fig. 3.5
Temperature of transition to body- 890
centered cubic form, °C
Heat of transition, kcal/mole 0.73
Heat of sublimation at 960°C, kcal/mole 75
2.62
798
O. 286
2.09
>99
7.3
2270
9 xlO -6
Fig. 3.1
The estimated thermal conductivity of 147pm203 was assumed to be the
same as that for 244Cm203 pressed-and-sintered pellets and is shown in
Fig. 3.1. The calculated thermal conductivity for promethium metal, 14
both in solid and liquid form, is shown in Fig. 3.5.
3.1.4 Maximum Allowable Fuel Diameter
The maximum fuel center-line temperature for solid fuel forms as a
function of fuel diameter was determined as shown in Fig. 3.6. In all
cases the outer surface temperature of the fuel was assumed to be 2000°F
and to simplify the calculation in a conservative manner, the end caps
were considered as perfect insulators. The dashed lines represent points
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Fig. 3.6. Fuel Center-Line Temperature Versus Fuel Diameter for
Fuel Forms Studied. Fuel outer surface temperature of 2000°F assumed.
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where the maximum fuel temperature comes within 200°F of the fuel melting
point. This criterion (200°F or more below the melting point) was used
in the capsule design, and therefore the Pu02 microsphere form was limited
to a maximum diameter of approximately 3 in. and the Pu02 pressed pellet
to slightly over 4 in. The Cm203 pressed pellet was limited to diameters
less then 1.5 in., while the Cm203 packed powder was the worst case and
was limited to approximately 0.75 in. in diameter. Annular arrangement
of the fuel in the capsule would permit much larger diameter capsules to
be utilized if desired and still be within the design guidelines. As is
shown in the capsule design study (Sect. 5), large void volume-to-fuel
volume ratios are required to meet the stress limitations for ten half-
life containment of the alpha-emitting fuels, and using an annular fuel
arrangement would provide large volumes of free space at the center of
each fuel capsule for the helium generated, as well as allow larger diame-
ter capsules.
3.1.5 Fuel Property Summary
A summary of the property values used in this study for each of the
three fuel compounds selected is given in Table 3.4. The values for the
alpha emitters are based on 80% packing for the microsphere form of Pu02
and 50% packing for the packed powder form of Cm203. The thermal con-
ductivity values for each of the alpha emitters are based on assuming
that helium occupies the void volumes in each of these fuels.
The total fuel requirements for a 25-kw Brayton-cycle heat source
are listed in Table 3.5. The values for this table were based on assuming
that the total wattage initially required would include allowing for fuel
decay during the 1-year mission, 10% excess wattage for heat losses through
the system insulation, and a two-month period for encapsulating fuel and
loading it into the spacecraft prior to launch.
3.2. Fuel Availability
The Division of Isotopes Development, AEC, has estimated the quan-
tities of 244Cm, 238pu, and 147pm that may be available annually up to
1980, and their data 15 are listed in Table 3.6.
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Table 3.4. Fuel Property Data Sheet for Brayton-Cycle Heat Source
General Properties 238puo2a 147pm203 244Cm203
Half-life, y 86.4 2.62 18.1
Density, g/cm 3 11.4 7.3 10.7
Specific power of compound, w/g 0.406 0.286 2.43
Power of compound, w/cm 3
Maximum 4.63 26.0
Design 3.7 b 2.09 13.0 c
Melting point, °C 2280 2270
Thermal conductivity at 1200°C, w/cm.°C
Maximum
Design
1950 in He
0.0315 0.0280
0.0135 b 0.0280 0.0035 c
aBased on 80% 23_Pu--20% 239pu and other impurities.
bBased on 80% packing.
CBased on 50% packing.
Table 3.5. Fuel Requirements for Brayton-Cycle Heat Source a
Requirements 238pu02 147pm203 244Cm203
Total power required to provide 25 kw(th) 27.9
at end of 1-year mission_ kw
Initial activity required 3 curies 842,000
Total weight required, ib 151
Total volume required, in. 3 460 b
39.75 29.25
iii, 000,000 850,000
307 26.5
1160 138 c
alncludes two-month lag between load and launch and 10% excess watt-
age for heat losses through insulation.
bBased on packing of 80%.
CBased on packing of 50%.
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Table 3.6. Fuel Availability
Radioisotope ProductCompound
Availability
[kw(th)lYear]
1967 1970 1980
147pm Pm203 i a 7.2a 33b
238pu lOu02 ii.4 a 15a,c 60b
244Cm Cm203 5d i00 e 400
ascheduled availability from AECoperations.
bBased on civilian nuclear power operations.
CCouldbe increased to 25 kw in 1970 and 180 kw
in 1980 at a 50%increase in cost.
dDevelopmental
eln 1972.
It has been estimated 16 that if 25%of the commercial power reactors
operating by the year 1980 recycle uranium and plutonium and separate the
243Amand 237Npfor irradiation in high-flux (_i014 neutrons/cm2, sec)
government reactors, the availability of 244Cmcould be increased to ap-
proximately 500 kw(th) per year and that of 238pu to approximately 200
kw(th) per year. The 147pmfrom a civilian power fuel economyof approxi-
mately 90,000 Mw(e) in 1980 would amount to approximately 40 kw(th) per
year if the reprocessing waste were aged about two years to reduce the
148pmcontent to insignificant levels. 16
Presently announcedAECplans for all three isotopes are not adequate
to fuel even one 25-kw Brayton-cycle heat source in 1970, and only 238pu
and 244Cmwould be available in sufficient quantity in the 1972 through
1980 time period.
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4. MATERIALS
The general overall criterion that had the most influence on the
studies leading to the selection of an encapsulating material for the
isotopic heat source was the requirement for the containment of the fuel
for ten half-lives. For 147Pmthis is 26 years; for 244Cm,181 years;
and for 238Pu, 864 years. There is no engineering precedent for design-
ing even simple vessels for useful lives beyond about 30 years, and even
in the 30-year cases it is assumedin the design that the vessel will be
periodically inspected and maintained. In the case of the fuel capsules
for this Brayton-cycle application, not only are the design life times
very long, but aAso the capsules cannot be inspected and maintained. In
addition, the fuel capsules maybe at a high temperature (_2000°F) and,
in the case of the 238puand 244Cmfuels, they will have a high internal
pressure_
The conditions and properties that had to be determined in the selec-
tion of materials for the capsule were
i. expected worst temperature history throughout the design life,
2. structural properties of potential encapsulating materials in the
temperature range and time of item i,
3. expected worst stress history over the design l_fe, and
4. chemical compatibility of the encapsulating materials with the fuel,
potential external environments, and each other in the temperature
range and time of item i.
Since there are no experimental structural property data or compatibility
data extending over periods of time that approach the times of interest
in this application, it was necessary to take a cautious approach to the
capsule conceptual design.
The initial capsule operating temperature will be approximately 2000°F
and, although the temperature would decrease with time due to radioactive
decay of the fuel, the capsule might be very hot for manyyears beyond
the Brayton-cycle power system operating life. For example, in the event
of a mission abort onto land and the subsequent burial by drifting sand
o_"other mediumof a capsule containing 238pu, more than 50 years would
elapse before the capsule temperature would decrease to 1324°F (i.e.,
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to three tenths its absolute melting temperature) if its initial burial
temperature was 2000°F. Both curium and plutonium are alpha emitters,
and therefore helium would be continuously generated and would create con-
stantly changing internal pressures within the capsule. The creep resis-
tance of the primary encapsulating material therefore becomesa most im-
portant factor in capsule design considerations. The operating temperature
(2000°F) is beyond the range in which superalloys can be used, and thus a
refractory metal is required. This, in turn, requires selection of cor-
rosion-resistant metal to protect the container from oxidation, since
during at least part of its life the capsule will be in air.
The worst long-term temperature condition to which a fuel capsule
might be exposed in this application is considered to be the case of burial
in a mediumsuch as sand. As is discussed in Section 5, it is possible
to design a capsule with a low enoughsurface heat flux to limit its
maximumtemperature under this condition to the samevalue (2000°F) as
the normal operating temperature. The radioactive decay schemesof the
radioisotope fuels are well knownand it was therefore possible to deter-
mine quite accurately both the long-term temperature and internal pressure
history for the burial case. The long-term structural and compatibility
properties of encapsulating materials are now known, and it was necessary
in determining the materials requirements to extrapolate in both time and
temperature the relatively scanty and short-term data available. It is
possible that the fuel capsules might be exposed to a short-term tempera-
ture environment higher than has been used in predicting the ten half-
life containment requirement, such as in a launch-pad fire. The heat
source must be designed to maintain containment of the radioisotope fuel
under these conditions also; however, in this case the location of the
fuel capsules is known and they can be recovered, and therefore contain-
ment for ten fuel half-lives is not required.
A schematic representation of a typical capsule for this application
is presented as Fig. 4.1, which showsthe multilayer design that is neces-
sary to provide long-term containment of the fuel. Three of the materials,
tungsten, platinum, and thoria_ are used for compatibility and corrosion
protection. The tantalum alloy T-222 is used to provide the necessary
high-temperature strength, and the iron titanate coating 17 on the platinum
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is needed to improve the emissivity of the capsule surface. In NASA ex-
periments, iron titanate has maintained an emittance of 0.84 for i0,000 hr
at 1700°F on Cb-l% Zr in a high-vacuum environment.
The determinations of the capsule dimensions and geometry for each
of the fuels, 238pu02, 2_4Cm203, and 147pm203, are described in Section 5.
The remaining parts of this section discuss the reasons for the selection
of the encapsulating materials shown in Fig. 4.1.
4.1 Selection of Protective Cladding
As noted previously, the expected fuel capsule temperatures (up to
2000°F) required that a refractor metal be used as the primary capsule
and, because of the reactivity of refractory metals, that it be protected
by a more inert cladding material. A literature search was made for in-
formation that would lead to the selection of a metal cladding that would
offer the best potential for good resistance to both soil corrosion and
air oxidation at temperatures up to 2000°F and sea-water corrosion at
temperatures up to 200°F. These are the expected temperatures if a single
capsule became buried in sand or immersed in the ocean (see Appendix A).
Platinum, rhodium, or alloys of platinum with i0 to 30 wt % rhodium ap-
pear to offer this potential if it is assumed that oxidation will be the
main corrosion mechanism when the capsules lie in soil. Figure 4.2 gives
experimental data on the stability of platinum and rhodium in air. The
chart combines the data of Hill and Albert 18 with the results of Krier
and Jaffee 19 to cover the temperature range between 2000 to 3100°F.
Platinum and rhodium lose weight at elevated temperatures by volatili-
zation of their oxides to give the linear relationship shown; however,
both rhodium and platinum show extremely low oxidation rates. A single
point is included on Fig. 4.2 for Hastelloy X, an alloy considered to
have good oxidation resistance, that clearly shows the superiority of
platinum and rhodium. Rhodium exhibits a lower oxidation rate than
platinum but the rates for both metals are in the same order of magnitude.
A feature of rhodium that may significantly reduce its oxidation rate at
temperatures below 1832°F is the formation of a "protective" oxide. Since
there does not seem to be a large difference between platinum and rhodium
32
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and because platinum is considerably more abundant and less costly, pure
rhodium was not considered any further in this study. Platinum-rhodium
alloys may also exhibit the protective oxide formation amd should be
further evaluated.
Based on the corrosion rates shown in Fig. 4.2 and the temperature
decay versus time relationship for 2_Cm and 238pu, the thickness of
platinum required to protect the T-222 alloy from oxidation for ten fuel
half-lives was calculated (Table 4.1). Because of the more rapid tempera-
ture decay of the 244Cm fuel, the platinum thickness required is only
0.554 mil compared with a thickness of 2.026 mils for the 238pu fuel.
After the temperature has declined to 1250°F, the effect of oxidation on
platinum becomes insignificant.
The oxidation of platinum in air and the corrosion of platinum in
soils at elevated temperature may not be equivalent. Zysk 2° reports that
caustic, alkalis, nitrates, cyanides, alkaline earths, and the hydroxides
of barium and lithium attack platinum at red heat. He also reports that
phosphorus, arsenic, and sulfur cause embrittlement of platinum. Analyses
of soils show that some of these elements exist in soluble form in soils
in small percentages. 21 It is necessary, therefore, that the corrosion
of platinum, and possibly platinum-rhodium alloys, in a variety of soils
at elevated temperatures be studied to insure the reliability of these
metals in this environment. In the absence of data on soil corrosion, we
have allowed an order-of-magnitude safety factor that increases the plati-
num thickness to 20 mils.
As is discussed in Section 5, in the event of a mission abort and
subsequent burial in soil of a capsule containing 147Pm, the initial
equilibrium temperature will be approximately 2500°F. Calculations indi-
cate that the 20-mils-thick platinum cladding will be sufficient protec-
tion in this case too. Because of the shorter half-life of 147Pm, the
temperature decays more rapidly than for 2_4Cm and 238Pu sources_ and its
residence at the high temperatures is appreciably shorter.
Experimental data, 22 listed in Table 4.2, indicate that the resis-
tamce of platinum to seawater is excellent. The corrosion rate, which
ranges between 0.001 and 0.005 mils penetration per year, indicates ex-
ceptional resistamce. These experiments show that platinum is about two
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Table 4.2. Corrosion of Commercially Pure Platinum
in Seawater Flowing at 2 fps
Specimen dimensions: 2 x 0.75 x 0.010 in.
Exposed area: 3 in. 2
Test Period
(days)
Weight Loss
(mg)
Corrosion Rate
mils/dm2"day mil/year
14 0.i 0.038 0.0025
31 0.4 0.068 0.0046
60 0.3 0.026 0.0017
179 2.2 0.065 0.0044
180 0.5 0.015 0.001
23
orders of magnitude more corrosion resistant than Hastelloy C, an alloy
frequently cited for its excellent corrosion resistance to seawater. No
evidence of localized effects such as pitting were observed in these
tests. The results are of limited value because of the relatively short
duration of the tests and the fact that the tests were conducted at nor-
mal laboratory and seawater temperatures. In the event of an abort into
the sea, capsules designed as shown in Section 5 (Figs. 5.1 and 5.2)
would reach an equilibrium temperature of approximately 200°F. Although
the existing data are encouraging, it is apparent that long-term elevated-
temperature tests in seawater should be conducted to substantiate esti-
mates based on existing data.
The possibility of galvanic corrosion in seawater also needs to be
considered. Six-month tests to determine the anodic corrosion of platinum
and its alloys in seawater did not show any disastrous effects. 24 The
results of these tests are listed in Table 4.3. At a current density of
50 amp/ft 2 the corrosion rate was relatively unaffected. At 500 amp/ft 2
a significant increase in corrosion occurred, but the corrosion resistance
could still be classified as excellent. The excellent corrosion resis-
tance of Pt--20% Rh alloy in these tests indicates that this alloy is
worth further study as a protective cladding.
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Table 4.3. Anodic Corrosion of Platinum and Platinum
Metal Alloys in Flowing Seawater
Exposedarea of specimens: 3 in. 2
Duration of test: 6 months (179 days)
Current Weight Consumption CorrosionAnode Density Density Loss Rate Rate
Material (g/cm3) (amp/ft 2 ) (mg) (mg/amp.year) (mil/year)
Platinum 21.4 50 4.5 9 0.009
500 24.8 5 0.048
80%Pt-20% Pd 18.6 50 10.5 20 0.023
500 70.7 14 0.157
80%Pt-20%Rh 18.7 50 6.5 13 0.015
500 87.9 17 0.196
75%Pt-25% Ir 21.7 50 6.5 13 0.013
50O 55.0 ll 0.105
4.1.1 Compatibility of the Platinum Cladding with the Primary
Capsule Material
Recent studies by Seebold and Birks 25 on the niobium-platinum system
revealed that after 188 hr at 2000°F, there was a 0.040-mil diffusion
zone; the compounds Nb3Pt , NbPt, NbPt2, and NbPt 3 were identified in such
zones. Since the niobium-platinum and tantalum-platinum phase systems
are similar, 26 similar diffusion effects between platinum and tantalum
would be expected. Passmore and his co-workers 27 examined the reaction
of platinum with tantalum at 3100°F and found that after i hr there was
a 0.040- to 0.100-mil-thick diffusion zone that had a maximum hardness
of 1250 VHN. Although Passmore did not identify intermetallic compound
formation, the high hardness value indicates the presence of a brittle
intermetallic phase, probably Ta3Pt. The penetration of this brittle
compound is a serious matter because it would no doubt have a marked
deleterious effect on the creep and yield properties of the T-222 alloy
container. Although Passmore's data are limited, it is possible to esti-
mate the time elapsed to form a 0.100-mil diffusion zone at 2000°F by
using the relationship
37
_n , (i)
where
Q = activation energy = 60 kcal/mole,
R = gas constant,
DTi = diffusion coefficient at temperature TI,
DT2 = diffusion coefficient at temperature T2.
On the basis that TI is 2000°F and T2 is 3100°F, the ratio DTi/DT2 equals
1.5 × l0 -3. From the relationship,
DTI/DT2 = t2/ti , (2)
where tl is the time to form a 0.100-mil diffusion zone and t2 is the time
to form a 0.100-mil diffusion zone at 3100°F (t2 = 3.6 X 103 sec), it is
found that tl = 2.4 x 106 sec (NI month) and therefore one month at 2000°F
is required to form a 0.100-mil-thick diffusion zone.
By utilizing the equation for volume diffusion, the diffusion coeffi-
cient at 2000°F can be estimated from the following relagionship:
x , (3)
where
X = thickness of diffusion zone,
t = time,
D = diffusion coefficient.
If we assume X = 0.i00 mil and t = 2.a x 106 sec,
D = 4.2 X 10-11 cm2/sec .
With this value we estimate that after ten years the penetration of
the brittle intermetallic phase into the stress-bearing T-222 alloy will
be 70 mils. This analysis only takes into account volume diffusion ef-
fects. Other considerations such as grain-boundary diffusion could in-
crease penetration of the undesirable element by orders of magnitude. In
order to circumvent this problem, a 10-mil plasma-sprayed coating of thoria
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could be applied to the surface of the T-222 alloy primary capsule to act
as a mechanical barrier to prevent the platinum from contacting the T-222.
It would be necessary to do the plasma coating in a very high-purity
inert-gas chamber to prevent damage to the refractory alloy and insure
a high-purity coating. This approach is acceptable because, as is dis-
cussed in Section 5, the effect on the temperature drop across the capsule
would not be significant.
4.2 Selection of Primary Capsule Material
Since 244Cm and 238pu generate helium as they decay, a container for
either of these isotopes is basically a pressure vessel. After reviewing
the design requirements for this Brayton-cycle application, T-222, a
tantalum-base alloy nominally containing 9.5 wt % tungsten, 2.5 wt %
hafnium, and i00 ppm carbon, was selected as the stress-bearing material.
T-222 alloy was considered the best commercially available refractory
metal alloy to contain the helium gas pressure because in the operating
temperature range of interest (2000°F maximum) the alloy combines good
strength and ductility with weldability.28, 29 The mechanical strength
limitations of this material when subjected to a constantly changing
pressure, as is the case with 238pu and 244Cm isotopic fuels, were ob-
tained from a stress-rate theory developed by Kennedy. 3° Although there
is not enough data on this refractory alloy to classify it as an engineer-
ing material in the sense that stainless steels are rated, it does have
this potential. As a conservative measure_ results 31 were used that were
obtained from strength data on the T-ill alloy, which is very similar to
the T-222 alloy but presumed to be somewhat weaker. For the purpose of
this conceptual design, it was assumed that the creep strength properties
of the T-ill alloy probably represent the lower side of the spread of creep
strength properties of T-222 alloy. 32 It is expected that before a cap-
sule is designed for fabrication, sufficient T-222 alloy strength data
will have been obtained to refine the design. Stronger advanced tantalum-
base alloys are being developed 33 that may, in the future, be substituted
for T-ill or T-222 with a minimum of change in the basic capsule design.
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4.2.1 Stress-Rate Analysis of Primary Capsule Life
Because of the radioactive decay characteristics of the alpha-emitting
isotopes_ the fuel capsule temperature would be a maximum and the pressure
a minimum immediately after encapsulation. As time passed, the total
number of moles of helium in the capsule would continuously increase; how-
ever_ both the rate of increase and the temperature would decrease with
time. After approximately 1.5 radioisotope fuel half-lives_ the capsule
internal pressure would pass through a maximum and then start decreasing
for the rest of the life of the fuel because the rate at which helium was
being generated would not be large enough to compensate for the rate at
which the pressure was decreasing because of decreasing temperature. These
relationships are shown schematically in Fig. 4.3 for a fuel capsule with
a start-of-life temperature of 2000°F (I093°C), as do the fuel capsules
for this study. The figure also shows that after a decay time of approxi-
mately 0.5 half-life, the temperature would decrease to about three-tenths
the absolute melting temperature of the T-222 alloy being used for the
primary fuel capsule.
The approach to predicting the required life expectancy for the T-222
alloy was based on the premise that when the wall temperature of the cap-
sule declined to less than about three-tenths of the melting temperature
(in degrees absolute), the creep strength of the material would no longer
be an important factor. Below this temperature atom movements are sluggish
and diffusion is not likely to produce creep and phase changes. Beyond
this time_ when the temperatures are lower, the prediction of failure
should be considered an elastic problem. The tensile and yield (elastic)
properties would assume more importance, but elastic failures would be
very unlikely if the design stress were limited to 25% of the tensile
strength and 33% of the yield strength when temperatures were below about
three-tenths the absolute melting temperature of the T-222 alloy_ which
is 1324°F (718°C). A capsule containing 2_4Cm would reach this tempera-
ture after approximately ii years, and the internal helium pressure would
reach a maximum after 28 years when the temperature had declined to ap-
proximately 750°F (400°C). In the case of a capsule containing 238pu,
approximately 55 years would elapse before the temperature had declined
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to 1324°F (718°C), and the pressure would not reach its maximumuntil 130
years had elapsed when the temperature of the capsule had decreased to
approximately 750°F (400°C). An inspection of the elevated-temperature
tensile and yield properties of the T-ill alloy indicates that these
properties are not limiting and that this alloy has sufficient strength
capability to resist the additional pressure generated after the tempera-
t_re has declined to 1324°F (718°C).
It is concluded that ten half-life containment is feasible from a
stress analysis standpoint if satisfactory creep behavior of a 244Cm-
bearing T-222 alloy capsule during a period of ii years and a T-222 alloy
capsule containing 238Puthrough a period of 54 years can be established
with confidence. Conventional engineering practice would require that
experimental creep test data be obtained for time periods up to at least
one-fifth the time over which the life is to be predicted to obtain re-
liable results. Thus, in the case of the Brayton-cycle capsules, it would
be desirable to have 2-year creep data in the 2000 to 1324°F (1093 to
718°C) temperature range when considering 244Cmas the fuel and 10-year
creep data in the case of the 238Pufuel. At the present time creep data
for T-ill for times approaching those of interest in this study are not
available, and it has been necessary to extrapolate in time.
Also, the creep experiments have been carried out in the conventional
manner at constant temperature and constant nominal stress. In order to
establish allowable design stress rates during the period in which the
capsule is above three-tenths its melting point, a meansof predicting
the behavior of the encapsulating material under conditions of varying
stress and temperature from conventional creep data is desirable. An ap-
proximate method for doing this wasdeveloped.
Important relationships in the development of this method are il-
lustrated schematically in Fig. 4.4. A conventional stress-strain curve
(determined at constant nominal stress and constant temperature) is il-
lustrated in Fig. 4.4a.
by the equation
For most materials, this curve can be represented
t = n , (4)
where t is time to strain, _ is stress, and A and n are constants.
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Figure 4.4b shows a plot of the logarithm of time to strain versus
the logarithm of stress rate (_) at constant temperature. This curve can
be derived, as shownby Kennedy,3° from conventional stress-strain data
for a numberof materials with the equation
An = #n t(n+l) , (5)
n+l
where A and n are the constants in Eq. (4).
Figure 4.4c shows schematically a plot of log stress versus the
Larson-Miller parameter,
Log _ = f(P) ,
P = (T + 273)(C + log t) ,
where
P = Larson-Miller parameter,
C = Larson-Miller constant,
T = temperature,
t = time to rupture,
which provides the meansof interpolating existing creep data in tempera-
ture and extrapolating in time.
For any radioactive isotope an equation can be written for the con-
tainer temperature as a function of time:
T = (T O -- Ta) exp (--0.693t/_1/2) + T a , (6)
where
T = temperature at time t,
To : initial temperature,
T a = ambient temperature,
t : time,
Xl/2 _ half-life of the isotope.
By substituting an arbitrary value of time into Eq. (6), the temperature
of the capsule (T) can be determined at that time. Substituting T and
two arbitrarily chosen values of time (e.g., i0 and i000 hr) into the
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Larson-Miller equation gave the corresponding values of stress for con-
structing a stress-rupture curve for T. With this artificially constructed
stress-rupture curve, the constants A and n of Eq. (4) were determined,
and then by using Eq. (5) it was possible to calculate a point on a tem-
perature-compensated plot of stress rate versus time for the particular
combination of isotope and container material. By repeating this proce-
dure at small time intervals, a complete curve can be calculated over
any time range of interest. Such a curve is illustrated schematically in
Fig. 4.4d. The curve can be generated on the basis of stress-to-rupture
data or data for stress to any specified percent creep. In the calcula-
tion of each point on such a curve it is assumedthat the stress is applied
to the capsule at a single temperature, the low temperature corresponding
to the stress-rate value. In the use of such curves it is assumedthat
the stress rate has a constant value, which is the initial high value
that exists when the capsule becomessealed. It is believed that the
combined effects of the two assumptions tend to give low values for the
time to rupture or time to reach the design strain. An example of the
calculational procedure is given in Appendix B. In the temperature range
of interest in this study this temperature-compensated curve will show a
knee that identifies the stress rate and represents the design limit based
on the creep data used. For achieving desired safety factors, a stress
rate less than this can be selected.
A computer program was written for performing these calculations for
this study. A Larson-Mil!er master rupture or creep function is first
fitted to the data by a separately operable subroutine. The program then
uses this plot to carry out the previously described calculations. The
stress-rate curve for 24_Cmin a capsule initially at 2000°F based on
stress-rupture data for T-ill alloy is shownin Fig. 4.5. The stress-
rupture data used in constructing the curve are listed in Table 4.4.
It maybe seen in Fig. 4.5 that the minimumstress rate that causes
creep rupture or maximumstress rate that avoids creep rupture according to
this temperature-compensated stress-rate versus rupture-time curve occurs
at a stress rate of 0.8 psi/hr. As shownin Fig. 4.6 for 238Pu, the maxi-
mumoccurs at 0.15 psi/hr in a similar type of plot. The difference in
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Table 4.4. Stress-Rupture Data 31
for T-ill Alloy
Temperature
°C °F
Time to
Stress
Rupture
(psi) (hr)
1205 2200 35,000 8.60
30,000 23.7
25,000 65.6
22,500 i01.5
20,000 485.0
17,500 975. i
15,000 1737.3
1425 2600 15,000 19.2
12,500 25. i
12,500 27.2
i0,000 168.5
7, 500 575.4
1650 3000 13,900 O. 62
i0,000 2.90
7,000 22.6
4,500 177.0
3,500 493.2
these stress-rate values is attributed directly to the longer half-life
of the 238pu isotope, which accounts for its longer residence at tempera-
tures higher than 1324°F (718°C) compared with the 244Cm isotope. It is
also worthy of note that the maximum stress rates that avoid creep rupture
occur at time values on these curves at which the absolute temperature of
the primary capsule material reaches approximately three-tenths its melt-
ing temperature. This will generally be the case if the creep rate of the
material becomes very low at three-tenths its melting temperature and the
design point temperature of the material is not appreciably higher than
three-tenths the melting temperature so that the creep-temperature rela-
tionships are approximately linear. This maximum stress rate that avoids
creep rupture represents compliance, insofar as creep is concerned, with
the guideline of ten half-life containment. Appropriate safety factors
were applied to such a stress rate to obtain the stress rates used for the
design of the capsules described in Section 5.
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Calculations were also madewith a computer program to define the
maximumstress rate that results in no more than 2%creep on a curve in
which a temperature-compensated stress rate is plotted versus time to 2%
elongation. The Larson-Miller plot for this is illustrated in Fig. 4.7,
and the data from which the plot was derived are listed in Table 4.5. The
results are illustrated in Figs. 4.8 and 4.9. In this case the maximum
value according to the curve for the 244Cmcapsule occurs at a stress
rate of 0.4 psi/hr. In the case of the capsule containing 238pu, it oc-
curs at a stress rate of 0.065 psi/hr.
Table 4.5. Creep Data31 for 2%
Elongation of T-ill Alloy
Temperature
°C °F
Time to 2%Stress Creep(psi) (hr)
1205 2200 35,000 1.20
30,000 1.46
25,000 5.50
22,500 7.90
20,000 21.0
17,500 25.5
15,000 43.8
1425 2600 15,000 0.90
12,500 3.75
12,500 4.70
i0,000 29.8
7,500 64.7
1650 3000 13,900 0.05
i0,000 0.45
7,000 2.67
4,500 12.4
3,500 22.7
Existing data on T-ill or T-222 alloys are not sufficient to design
a capsule actually intended for operation. They have only been used in
this study to estimate the potential offered by these alloys. The re-
liability of the tensile and creep properties of the T-222 alloy for these
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long-time applications must be determined by testing and evaluation on
a statistical basis. The areas of work include:
i. verification of the temperature-compensated stress-rate method of
analysis by comparing experimental variable stress rate-variable
temperature data with results calculated from experimental creep
data,
2. determination of the effect of long-term high-temperature environment
(equivalent to one-fifth the time involved in temperature decline to
1324°F) on the creep properties,
3. studies of the effect of the long times at elevated temperatures and
stress on the tensile properties,
4. evaluation of the effect of long times at elevated temperatures on
physical and metallurgical characteristics_ such as grain size, etc.,
and
5. analyses of the effects of long times at elevated temperatures on weld-
ments.
Collecting these data for a statistically meaningful number of heats
of the T-222 alloy will be an arduous and expensive program. A possible
alternate approach is to purchase, well in advance of the time it is to
be used, a large heat of T-222 alloy so that the creep, tensil_ and
stress-rate data necessary to design fuel capsules for the intended ap-
plication can be obtained from samples prepared from this heat and the
remainder of the heat can be used for the fabrication of the actual cap-
sules.
4.2.2 Compatibility of Fuel with Primary Capsule Material
It is important in isotopic power systems to ascertain that the
isotope fuel, whether in the elemental or compound form_ is compatible
with the encapsulating material because of the effect an incompatibility
might ha_e on the long-term strength and integrity of the capsule. As
mentioned before, the primary capsule material in this study is T-222
alloy_ and the three fuel compounds being considered are 238Pu02, 244Cm203,
and 147Pm203. The common practice was followed for predicting whether
two materials are compatible when experimental evidence is not available
5O
of using an equation involving the reaction of the stoichiometric compounds
and calculating the total free-energy change. No thermodynamic data were
available for the curium and promethium oxides, so data for praseodymium
oxide was used in the calculations. Data were available on Pu02 and Pu203,
and free-energy change calculations were madefor both these oxides. The
results of the thermodynamic calculations with each of the alloying ele-
ments in T-222, tantalum, tungsten, and hafnium, are listed in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6. Calculated Total Free-Energy Changesin
Isotope 0xide-Metal Reactions
Reaction Temperature f_Freac f_F(°K) (kcal) a (kcal)b
W+ 4Pu02_- 2Pu203+ WO2
2Ta + 10Pu02_ 5Pu203+ Ta205
Hf + 4Pu02_- 2Pu203+ Hf02
2Pu203+ 3W_- 4Pu + 3WO2
5Pu203+ 6Ta _---10Pu + 3Ta205
2Pu203+ 3Hf _---4Pu + 3Hf02
3W+ 2Pr203 _- 4Pr + 3WO2
6Ta + 5Pr203 _ 10Pr + 3Ta20_
3Hf + 2Pr203 _- 4Pr + 3Hf02
i000 +68.6 +17.8
2000 +48.0
i000 +27.0 --99.5
2000 --27.5
i000 --55.2 --106.0
2000 --73
lO00 +366.6 3444.6
1000 +484.5 +679.5
i000 --4.8 +73.2
2000 +276
2000 +990
2000 +89_0
aData from Refs. 34 and 35.
bData from Ref. 36.
TWQvalues of the free-energy change (LkF)are given in the case of
oxides of plutonium- the first, LkFreac , being based on thermodynamic
values recommended by the Bureau of Mines 34 and data from Argonne National
Laboratory 35 and the second, LkF, based on Chikalla?s values. 36 In both
cases, there is an estimated uncertainty of ±50 kcal in the totals. It
is shown in Table 4.6 that Pu203 should be more stable with tantalum and
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tungsten than Pu02 and that hafnium will very likely reduce Pu02 as well
as Pu203. If it is assumedthat the free energy of Pr203 is equivalent
to the free energies of Cm203and Pm203,Cm203and Pm203should be stable
with tantalum and tungsten. Although the _F of the reaction between
hafnium and Pr203 is positive, somedoubt exists regarding the stability
of Cm203and Pm203with hafnium because the value (+89 kcal) is quite
low. These thermodynamic calculations neglect the possibility of solu-
bility between constituents. For example, there is a possibility of form-
ing a compoundof the type PuxMy03,where M is the other metal and x + y
is 2. Russell and his co-workers37 have already identified compoundsof
this type in which M has been barium, manganese,vanadium, chromium, and
aluminum. In short, the phase diagrams of the constituents should be
known before a large amount of dependenceis placed in thermodynamic cal-
culations based on stoichiometric compounds.
In addition to considering the compatibility of the initial fuel with
the capsule, it is also necessary to consider the compatibility of the
radioactive decay products with the capsule. This is particularly true
in the case where long containment times, comparedwith the fuel half-
life, are necessary during which a substantial part of the radioisotope
fuel will decay to another chemical compound. In the case of 244Cmthe
decay product is 2_°pu, which can be expected to have the samecompati-
bility properties as 238pu. The half-life of 24°pu is 6580 y, and it can
therefore be considered stable insofar as ten half-life containment for
244Cm(180 y) is concerned. The 238pu fuel form will decay to 234U,
which is, for this purpose, stable (half-life = 2.5 × 105 y). The com-
patibility of various uranium oxides with refractory metals has been in-
vestigated in connection with advancedreactor fuel concepts, 38 and it
is expected to be quite similar to that of plutonium. The 147Pmfuel
form will decay to essentially stable 147Smwhich, being an adjoining
rare earth, is expected to have about the samecompatibility properties
as the parent 147pm.
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In considering the selection of the most favorable plutonium oxide, thermo-
dynamics favor Pu203; however, at this time Pu02 has been chosen primarily
because the compoundis readily madeand retains its stability during
handling, as mentioned in Section 3. Curium oxide (Cm203)and Pm203are
the choice forms for the 2440m and 147pm isotopes because the thermo-
dynamics favor their stability with both tantalum and tungsten and
possibly hafnium.
The thermodynamics indicate that there may be a compatibility problem
with all these fuel oxides and hafnium and that the 23SPu02 fuel form is
worst in this respect. To circumvent this problem for the purpose of a
conceptual capsule design, a tungsten-foil annular fuel holder is used to
provide a wall between the T-222 alloy and the isotopic fuel. Its use-
fulness is based on the premise that diffusion of the hafnium from the
T-222 alloy to the oxide fue_ will be held in check by the tungsten.
Quantitative diffusion tests are necessary to ascertain that tungsten will
truly be an acceptable barrier between the hafnium and the fuel oxide.
4.2.3. Sealing the T-222 Alloy Container
Figure 4.1 (cited previously) illustrates the reference joint design
suggested to effect a seal of the T-222 alloy container. The design is
the result of a scheme for thicknening the wall of the capsule in the
vicinity of the welded joint. In this manner the stress on the heat-
affected zone in the welded region caused by the internal gas pressure
can be greatly relieved. The operation involves electron-beam welding
and backbrazing, and in order to be effective, the backbrazing must com-
pletely seal off the threads from the helium being generated by the fuel.
Although several brazing alloys appear attractive,4°, 41 and even though
T-222 alloy appears to have good weldability, thorough testing and evalua-
tion need to be conducted to establish reliability of this design. Further
weld development work with the T-222 alloy may show that the creep and
tensile properties are not seriously affected by welding and that there
is no need to reduce the stresses in the vicinity of the weld; this would
eliminate the need for the braze. If brazing were required, a test pro-
gram would be needed to determine that over long periods of time the braze
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does not gradually diffuse into the base metal and leave a void that
would weakenthe capsule. For conceptual design purposes, a niobium base
braze has been specified.
An alternate design that essentially accomplishes the samepurpose
is shownschematically in Fig. 4.10. In this case, the increase in wall
thickness in the vicinity of the weld is obtained by machining the cap-
s_le to the illustrated container design. Since in this design the open-
ing in the top of the capsule is smaller than the inside diameter of the
body of the capsule, the annular tumgsten fuel holder will have to be
madein the form of a ring that can be slightly compressedfor insertion
into the capsule.
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5. FUELCAPSULEDESIGN
The design objective for the radioisotope fuel capsules is complete
containment of the radioisotope fuel for ten fuel half-lives under all
reasonable conditions. During this phase I analysis the main conditions
that determined the fuel capsule conceptual designs were the abnormal
situations in which the radioisotope fuel source might undergo randomre-
entry into the earth's atmosphere and subsequent impact on the ground or
into the water, where it might never be located for retrieval. The normal
operating requirement of the fuel capsules (1 year at 2000°F) is rela-
tively minor from a containment standpoint when comparedwith the abnormal
mission abort conditions. The conceptual design approach has also been
influenced by the desire to stay close to current or near-future technology
in the areas of radioisotope fuel form and encapsulating materials manu-
facture and remote handling.
The reentry analysis (Sect. 8) showedthat unprotected individual
fuel capsules could not be expected to remain intact through a randomre-
entry and impact from orbit. Shielding and armoring of the individual
capsules could be used to avoid burnup during reentry and failure on im-
pact; however, the possibility of earth burial or partial burial and sub-
sequent meltdown would still exist. Also a wide dispersal of the capsules
could occur that would complicate any attemps to find and recover the
radioisotope fuel. Therefore, it was assumedin the capsule design that
the capsules would be contained within a separate reentry body of low
ballistic coefficient, which would provide the necessary protection from
each of these eventualities.
Since two of the fuels considered, 238pu02 and 244Cm203,are alpha
emitters, the main problem in the conceptual capsule design was to devise
a method of coping with the internal pressure buildup resulting from the
large quantity of helium that would be generated during the course of ten
half-lives. Twoapproaches to this problem were considered:
i. a capsule that would allow the helium to vent, and
2. a capsule with sufficient void volume and wall thickness to contain
the helium for a time equivalent to ten half-lives of the fuel.
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The concept for venting helium was a capsule that contained a rup-
ture disk and a porous plug in one end. The rupture disk would have suf-
ficient strength to contain the helium for a period of approximately 5
years and then, if the source had not been recovered_ the rupture disk
would break and the accumulated helium would vent through the porous plug.
The porous metal vent plug should have a filtration efficiency of 99.97_
for 0.3-_ particles to be equivalent to the "absolute" air filters pres-
ently used in radioactive materials processing facilities in the United
States. The choice of five years for the life of the rupture disk was
made to allow ample time for search and recovery operations in the event
the heat source was lost due to an aborted mission. The use of a vented
capsule would permit muchhigher fuel loadings in each capsule than would
be possible with a capsule designed for complete containment of the helium.
However_as discussed in Section 5.2.2 and Appendix A, fuel loadings
giving surface heat fluxes above 4000 Btu/hr.ft 2 would result in exces-
sive temperatures if a capsule should becomeburied after reentry impact.
Also, there would be the problem of oxidation of the primary capsule from
the inside when the rupture disk broke and allowed air to diffuse into
the capsule through the porous plug. In addition to these problems, the
technology for fabricating and installing a suitable porous plug in a
fuel capsule and insuring that it would maintain its integrity with-
out cracking or plugging for very long periods of time is not yet avail-
able. For these reasons it was decided that a vented capsule design
would not be used in the phase I conceptual studies and all the final
conceptual designs would use fuel capsules designed for complete con-
tainment.
5.1 Capsule Geometry
Before the final encapsulating materials were chosen (Sect. 4),
initial studies were made for each of the fuel forms to indicate prac-
tical individual capsule sizes to guide the initial thinking on the fuel
block-heat exchanger concepts. It was assumed that the final conceptual
design would be a multilayered capsule with a primary structure to with-
stand internal pressure buildup from the helium generation from the
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alpha-emitting fuels and to withstand reentry impact, and an outer layer
to withstand the corrosive effects of either seawater or land burial.
As a result of these initial considerations, the following capsule
design boundary conditions were established:
Capsule surface temperature
Normal operating life (i0,000 hr) 2000°F or less
Earth burial
244Cm203 and 23SPu02 fuel 2000°F or less
147Pm203 fuel 2500°F or less
Maximum fuel compound temperatures 200°F or more below
melting point
Primary structure wall thickness, t 0.060 in. _ t _ 0.250 in.
Primary structure inside diameter, d 0.5 in. _ d _ 4.0 in.
Primary structure length-to-diameter 4 or less
ratio
Maximum allowable dimension change 3_
(creep) during operating life
The normal operating temperature of the capsule surface (2000°F) was part
of the original study criteria (Sect. I). This same temperature restric-
tion was held for the earth burial case for the 23Spu and 244Cm fuels.
In the case of 147pm, there would be no internal pressure buildup during
the decay of the radioisotope, and this coupled with the shorter half-
life makes the containment problem much less severe. Therefore the tem-
perature was allowed to go to 2500°F in the event of an accidental burial
in sand. The limit on the maximum temperature in the fuel (200°F or more
below melting point) was included to eliminate any liquid phase--solid
phase solubility problems between fuel and capsule.
The limits on the diameter and wall thickness of the capsules were
primarily determined by current hot-cell and remote-fabrication capa-
bilities. A minimum acceptable wall thickness of 0.060 in. was selected
to provide strength to the capsule for routine handling during fabrication,
and the maximum thickness of 0.250 in. was selected because it was con-
sidered the maximum thickness for which a reliable weld could be made
with current remote-welding techniques. To keep capsule sizes in a range
that can be efficiently handled with remote manipulators, the maximum
capsule inside diameter considered was 4 in. The minimum diameter (0.5
in.) was chosen because the analysis showed that an excessively large
number of capsules would be required if smaller sizes were used.
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The initial analysis showedthat the capsule power density (w/lb)
would increase as the length-to-diameter ratio increased. However, impact
studies by the Sandia Corporation 42 indicated that to minimize columnar
buckling effects in the case of an end-on impact at high velocity, the
L/D ratio of a cylindrical capsule should not exceed approximately 4 or
5. A maximumL/D of 4 for the primary capsule was chosen for this study
to avoid this problem.
The 3%dimensional change allowance during the one-year operating
life was established to set tolerances on the capsule holder (fuel block)
design. This did not turn out to be a limiting criterion because the
capsule wall was madethick enoughbased on other considerations to reduce
the first year creep to less than 1%.
Right cylinders, annular cylinders, and spheres were considered as
possible fuel capsule shapes. Since relatively large void volumes are
required for the helium generation from the alpha emitters, the annular-
shaped capsules would not be utilizing the center of the capsule for this
volume; therefore, there would be a muchsmaller amount of fuel for any
selected diameter than for a corresponding right cylindrical capsule with
an annular-shaped fuel matrix. The spherically shaped capsules give the
lowest surface-area-to-volume ratio and lowest weight-to-volume ratio.
However, since they could not be stacked as efficiently as cylinders, the
total volume occupied by spherical capsules would be greater than for a
source composedof cylindrical capsules. Also, the fabrication, fueling,
and sealing of spherical capsules could be expected to be more difficult
and time consuming than for the more conventional cylindrical capsules.
Accordingly the right circular cylinder was used as the basic capsule
shape for all three radioisotope fuels. In the case of the alpha emitters,
hemispherical end caps were used and the fuel was arranged in an annular
ring against the inside wall to aid heat transfer and leave the center
of the capsule free to accommodatethe helium given off during radioactive
decay. The 147pm203fuel form does not have an internal gas pressure
problem, so the cylindrical capsule has flat end caps; solid cylindrical
fuel pellets fill essentially the entire internal volume.
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Figures 5.1 and 5.2 showthe final conceptual capsule designs. The
results of the materials analysis, discussed in Section 4, led to the
choice of the tantalum-based alloy T-222 for the primary pressure-bearing
layer and platinum for the outer corrosion-resistant layer. The other
layers shownin the figures are, as discussed in Section 4, a thoria dif-
fusion barrier between the platinum and the T-222 alloy, an iron titanate
coating on the platinum to improve its emissivity, and an inner tungsten
liner for the fuel for compatibility assurance. The dimensions shown in
Figs. 5.1 and 5.2 were determined by the capsule optimization procedures
described in Sections 5.2 and 5.3.
5.2 Optimization of the 238puog and 244Cr_0_ Capsules
In this study the optimum capsule dimensions are those that will re-
sult in the minimumheat source system weight. In cases where little or
no radiation shielding is required for the heat source system, the minimum
system weight is obtained by using minimum weight capsules. However, where
shielding becomes a significant part of the system weight, capsules having
minimum volume or close to minimum volume may give the minimum total system
weight.
5.2.1 238pu02 and 2440m203 Fuel Capsule Optimization for Minimum
Weight of Unshielded Capsules and Fuel
The stepwise procedure used to arrive at optimum capsule designs for
238Pu02 and 244C_203 is described in Fig. 5.3. As indicated, it is neces-
sary to determine both the capsule design that will give the minimum total
weight of capsules without exceeding the 4-in.-OD and 0.250-in.-wall-
thickness design limits and the design that will give the minimum total
volume of capsules. A trade-off is then made between the two designs to
arrive at the minimum system weight that is consistent with the capsule
design boundary conditions given in Section 5.1. Figure 5.3 also shows
that after determining the minimum weight and volume designs on the basis
of normal operation, it is necessary to determine the equilibrium tempera-
ture the capsule would reach if it became buried and, if necessary, reduce
the fuel loading in the capsule to a level that does not let the tempera-
ture exceed 2000°F.
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The determination of the maximumallowable stress rate for the primary
capsule material, T-222 alloy, was described in Section 4 and a comparison
of the results for capsules containing 23SPu02and 24_Cm203is shownin
Fig. 5.4. This figure illustrates the effect of the longer half-life for
the 238Puon the maximumallowable stress rate. The maximumstress rate
for the 238Puthat will never result in a rupture due to creep is approxi-
mately 0.145 psi/hr, while for 244Cmit is approximately 0.75 psi/hr.
Since the 238puhas approximately 5 times as long a half-life as the 244Cm,
the difference in the maximumallowable stress rate is a factor of approxi-
mately 5. Also, the figure shows that the period required to reach the
point on the curve that determines the maximumallowable stress rate for
238Pu(54 years) is approximately 5 times as long as the corresponding
time for 244Cm (ii years).
As described in Section 4, the creep mode of failure for these cap-
sules ceases to be a dominant factor at three-tenths the absolute melting
temperature of the primary capsule material. However, the time required
for the creep mode of failure to cease to be a dominant factor occurs at
a point in time when the total capsule pressure is still increasing. The
maximum capsule pressure for each fuel occurs at about 1.5 times the fuel
half-life, while creep failure ceases to be dominant at slightly over 0.6
times the fuel half-life. As mentioned in Section 4, when the capsule
age reaches 0.6 times the half-life of the fuel, the capsule would be
expected to have adequate elastic strength, as well as creep strength, to
withstand the continuing increase in helium pressure. For a conservative
approach, the elastic strength was checked for each selected allowable
stress rate by utilizing simultaneously the maximum pressure, which occurs
at 1.5 times the half-life for each fuel, and the maximum temperature in
the elastic range, which occurs at approximately 0.7 times the half-life.
An example of this calculation is given in Appendix C. In all cases
studied, the capsule strength in the elastic region meets or exceeds
safety factors of 4 for tensile strength and 3 for yield strength. Thus
when the capsule design is based on the maximum allowable stress rate for
creep with appropriate safety factors, containment from a stress analysis
standpoint can be shown for the complete ten half-life period for each
fuel in this Brayton-cycle application.
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The rate at which stress in the wall of the capsule increases with
time can be changedby varying any one or all of the following factors:
(i) amount of fuel in each capsule, (2) capsule wall thickness, and (3)
capsule void volume. With the stress rates shownin Fig. 5.4 as the limi-
tation for ten half-life containment, the capsule designs for both 238pu
and 24_Cmwere obtained by varying each of the variables listed above to
find the combination that gave the minimumweight of fueled capsules for
the 25-kw heat source. This process was repeated for each fuel and for
stress-rate safety factors of 2.5, 4, and 7 so that the effect of the
safety factor applied to the maximumallowable stress to obtain the design
stress rate could also be determined. The computations were carried out
on a CDC1604-A computer in the following sequence.
For each design stress-rate value, the allowable pressure rate inside
the capsule that would result in the design stress rate in the primary
capsule wall was varied to determine the effect of varying fuel amounts,
void volumes, and primary capsule wall thicknesses. This calculation was
based on the hoop stress being the limiting stress and the ideal gas law,
PV = NRT. This was done for different capsule inside diameters ranging
from 0.5 to 4.0 in. For a particular allowable stress rate, allowable
pressure rate, and capsule inside diameter and length, the maximumamount
of fuel for that particular capsule was determined. After this was deter-
mined the total numberof capsules for that particular capsule design _s
determined by dividing the amountof fuel in each capsule into the total
amount of fuel required for the heat source. Then the total unshielded
weight, including fuel and capsule material required for a particular cap-
sule size, was determined and divided into the total power required to
obtain the specific power of the fuel capsules in watts per pound. Finally,
the capsule design that results in the highest specific power within limits
of the design guidelines was determined for each fuel for each stress-rate
safety factor studied. Details on the method of calculation for this pro-
gram are in Appendix C.
Figures 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7 showthe results of this weight minimizing
program for 238Pu02for stress-rate safety factors of 2.5, 4, and 7. The
effect of burial is not taken into account in these figures. The primary
capsule inside diameters are plotted as the abscissa with the specific
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power as the ordinate. For a given stress-rate safety factor the allowable
pressure rate is varied as illustrated by the curves. The allowable pres-
sure rate that results in the optimum combination of fuel, void volume,
and primary capsule thickness is then determined. For example, in the
case where the stress-rate safety factor is 2.5 (Fig. 5.5), the minimum-
weight capsule design for a stress-limited condition only is a 4.0-in.-ID
capsule with an allowable pressure rate of 0.004 psi/hr. The results for
allowable pressure rates other than those shownin the figures were deter-
mined but were omitted for clarity. At pressure rates both above and below
0.004 psi/hr, the high points on the curves are at lower specific powers
than the specific power for the 0.004-psi/hr case. The dashed-line por-
tions of the curves indicate that capsules having inside diameters lying
on that portion of the curve for that pressure rate have wall thicknesses
that lie outside the capsule design boundary conditions of 0.060 to 0.250
in. The smaller diameter capsules with the lower allowable pressure rates
generally result in required wall thicknesses less than 0.060 in., while
the larger diameter capsules with the higher pressure rates generally ex-
ceed the 0.250-in. limitation. In all the 238Pu02cases studied, except
for the higher allowable pressure rates, the maximumspecific power is
not obtained before the 4.0-in.-ID maximumallowable capsule diameter is
exceeded. However, only a slight weight penalty is incurred since, as
seen in the figures, the slopes of the curves are nearly zero at this
point in all cases.
The results for the 244Cm203fuel for the samestress-rate safety
factors are shownin Figs. 5.8, 5.9, and 5.10. The maximumallowable
stress rate was determined for each stress-rate safety factor, and the
pressure rate that resulted in minimumunshielded capsule weight was deter-
mined for each case considered.
5.2.2 Effect of 2000°F Burial-Temperature Limitation on Capsule
Optimization
As noted previously, the fuel capsules containing alpha emitters, in
addition to having sufficient strength, must also be designed so that the
temperature does not exceed 2000°F if an individual capsule becomes buried
in an insulating medium such as dry sand. This is necessary because the
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capsule wall thickness for the long-term containment of the helium in the
event of loss of the heat source after reentry was based on a maximum
temperature of 2000°F. The reentry body, which would protect the fuel
capsules in the event of a mission abort and random reentry from space,
was designed to prevent the burial of the fuel capsules, as described in
Section 8. However, if the individual capsules could also be designed not
to exceed 2000°F if buried without imposing too big a weight penalty on
the total system weight, it would be a desirable safety backup for the
reentry body design.
The effect of the allowable temperature limitation and the capsule
diameter on the maximum allowable power per capsule in case of earth burial
of a single capsule is illustrated in Fig. 5.11. The method of calculation
for this figure is given in Appendix A. As illustrated, the maximum allow-
able power per capsule would increase as the capsule diameter increased
because of the increased area for heat transfer. Figure 5.12 is a typical
example of the effect of the 2000°F burial-temperature limitation on the
minimum weight capsule size for the alpha emitters. This figure shows a
typical allowable pressure rate limitation curve obtained from the pre-
viously described unshielded weight minimizing procedure with a curve
showing the effect on specific power of imposing a 2000°F burial-tempera-
ture limitation on the same range of capsule diameters. As illustrated,
the smaller diameter capsules are not affected by the allowable burial
temperature, while the specific powers of the larger diameter capsules
are reduced by the burial-temperature limitation. This indicates that
in large capsules there can be less fuel in each capsule if both the stress-
rate and burial-temperature criteria are to be satisfied. This results
in a corresponding increase in the number of capsules required for the
total heat source for a given capsule diameter. The capsule design that
has the greatest specific power and satisfies both criteria occurs at
the point of intersection of the two curves.
The highest specific power for each design stress rate for each fuel
was obtained by determining the intersection point between the two curves
for each allowable pressure rate studied. The results of this analysis
for each safety factor for 23Spu, Figs. 5.13, 5.14, and 5.15, show that
only the lower stress-rate safety factor values are affected by the 2000°F
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burial-temperature limitation. Figure 5.13 shows three typical stress-
limited curves with the corresponding 2000°F burial-temperature limitation
curves. The peak specific power is obtained with a pressure rate of 0.004
psi/hr, while the other two intersection points occur below this point.
Other pressure rate curves between and above and below these values were
determined but were omitted from the figure for clarity. Figure 5.14 for
238Pu02 with a stress-rate safety factor of 4 shows that the highest spe-
cific power is obtained with the the maximum-diameter capsule, 4 in., for
a 0.0025-psi/hr pressure rate, and this capsule meets both the stress-rate
and burial-temperature requirements for ten half-life containment. Other
intersection points for different pressure rates occur below this point.
The highest specific power for 238Pu with a stress-rate safety factor of
7 (Fig. 5.15) is the optimum condition for the stress-rate limitation
only. This is the peak specific power that can be obtained, and it is
not affected by the burial-temperature limitation of 2000°F.
In the case of 244Cm, the burial-temperature limitation affected the
capsule optimization for all stress-rate safety factors considered. The
results of this analysis are shown in Figs. 5.16, 5.17, and 5.18. Figure
5.16 for 244Cm with a stress-rate safety factor of 2.5 shows that the
optimum specific power which satisfies both criteria occurs with a 0.025-
psi/hr pressure rate, but this capsule design does not meet the capsule
design guidelines, since the primary capsule wall thickness is less than
0.060 in. The optimum capsule design that meets all requirements is the
maximum allowable specific power point for the 0.030-psi/hr pressure rate.
Figures 5.17 and 5.18 show the highest specific power for stress-rate
safety factors of 4 and 7, respectively. In all cases for 244Cm the 2000°F
burial-temperature limitation limits the capsule design to smaller diame-
ters that result in a large increase in the number of capsules required
for the heat source and a larger percentage weight penalty than is the
case for the 238pu.
Table 5.1 gives a summary for both fuels of the capsule optimizations
for minimum unshielded weight with and without the 2000°F burial-tempera-
ture criterion imposed on the design. As shown by the table, a very small
weight penalty compared with the total system weight is required to insure
against accidental loss and burial of a single capsule for any case.
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5.2.3 Optimization for Minimum Volume of Capsules and Comparison
With Minimum Unshielded Weisht Designs
The procedure just described for minimizing the weight of unshielded
fuel capsules (Sect. 5.2.1) was repeated with modifications that gave the
minimum volume of capsules for each stress-rate safety factor. Also,
since neither the minimum unshielded weight capsule design nor the minimum
volume design may, in the final analysis, be the best overall capsule de-
sign from the standpoint of total system weight, the designs for various
allowable pressure rates between the ones that resulted in the minimum
unshielded weight and volume designs were also determined.
Figures 5.19, 5.20, and 5.21 show the minimum unshielded weight and
the minimum volume required for 238Pu02 capsules in a 27.9-kw heat source,
with stress-rate safety factors of 2.5, 4, and 7 for various allowable
pressure rates. The designs satisfy both the stress limitations and the
2000°F burial-temperature limitation. The lines designate the minimum
possible capsule volumes and weights, and the circles designate the design
values that lead to the highest system weights as determined by iterative
processes in Sections 9 and 10.
Figure 5.19 for 23_Pu with a stress-rate safety factor of 2.5 shows
that the minimum unshielded weight capsule design results in an allowable
pressure rate of 0.0025 psi/hr, as previously described in the minimum
unshielded weight optimization section, but that the corresponding total
volume required for this design is very high. The minimum volume design
is obtained with an allowable pressure rate of 0.015 psi/hr with a cor-
respondingly higher total capsule weight required. However, the dashed-
line portion of the curve indicates the range where the design guideline
maximum wall thickness of 0.250 in. was exceeded. The minimum volume de-
sign that does not exceed this design guideline occurs with an allowable
pressure rate of approximately 0.01 psi/hr. As discussed in Section 9,
the capsule designs that lead to minimum system weight for 238Pu for all
the stress-rate safety factors were those that resulted in a minimum
volume of capsules within the maximum allowable wall thickness require-
ment. The approxin_tely 17% increase in the total weight of the capsules
in the case of a stress-rate safety factor of 2.5 was more than compensated
by the shield weight saving obtained with the minimum system weight capsule
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because of the smaller volume reentry body required to house the Brayton-
cycle heat source.
This comparison of weight and volume requirements was repeated for
238Pu for stress-rate safety factors of 4 and 7 with similar results, as
shown in Figs. 5.20 and 5.21. However, it is evident that as the safety
factor increases, the lowest volume acceptable to all design guidelines
moves farther away from the true minimum volume design.
This program was repeated for 244Cm for stress-rate safety factors
of 2.5, 4, and 7, as shown in Figs. 5.22, 5.23, and 5.24. Figure 5.22
for 244Cmwith a stress-rate safety factor of 2.5 shows that the actual
minimum unshielded weight design does not meet the minimum required wall
thickness of 0.060 in., as discussed previously, while the minimum volume
design is obtained with an allowable pressure rate of 0.08 psi/hr. As
shown in Section 9 the best capsule design for a minimum system weight
is a compromise between the minimum unshielded weight capsule and the
minimum volume capsule and occurs with an allowable pressure rate of 0.065
psi/hr. For the other stress-rate safety factors considered (Figs. 5.23
and 5.24), the minimum system weight capsule design was also determined
to be between the minimum unshielded weight and the minimum volume designs.
In each case the capsule design for a minimum weight curium system was
obtained by utilizing a design that resulted in only a slight penalty from
the minimum capsule volume point while limiting the weight of the un-
shielded capsules to a lO to 20% weight increase over the minimum capsule
weight.
5.2.4 Conceptual Design of the 238Pu and 244Cm Capsule
Figure 5.1 (cited above) shows the phase I conceptual design selected
for both the 238pu and 244Cm fuel capsules for stress-rate safety factors
of 2.5, 4, and 7. The choice of materials is discussed in Section 4.
Typical examples of the expected thermal profiles of these designs are
shown in Figs. 5.25 and 5.26. Figure 5.25 is the expected thermal profile
for 23SPu02 with a stress-rate safety factor of 2.5. The total temperature
drop across the capsule is only 57°F, which is very low and is due pri-
marily to the low individual capsule power when compared with a relatively
large surface area of the capsule. The average helium temperature was
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MATERIAL
_. IRON TITANATE
.Pt
. GAS GAP
• ThO 2
• T-222
. HELIUM GAP 0.0t0 t4
• TUNGSTEN 0.020 NEG
• PuO 2 0.090 51.5
. TUNGSTEN 0.020
_1_I¢_ "_ _--/_// CAPSULE SURFACE TEMPERATURE: 2000°F
f/_ "_ _/_l_:i_L_'x_ MAXIMUM FUEL TEMPERATURE= 2057 °F
r/j_ _/_ _ _._ii H TOTAL POWER PER CAPSULE = 259 WATTS
__ CAPSULE DIMENSIONS 2 58 in OD, I0 15 in LONG
ORNL- DWG 66-4956AR1
THICKNESS Z_T, (°F)
(in.)
0.002 <I
0.020 NEG
0.002 7.5
O.0tO 4
O.227 2
Fig. 5.25. Thermal Profile of PuO2-Fueled Capsule.
ORNL- OWG 66- _948AR1
&T, °FMATERIAL THICKNESS
(in)
IRON TITANATE 0.002
Pt 0.020
GAS GAP 0.002
ThO 2 0.0t0
T-222 0. t42
HELIUM GAP 0.0t0
TUNGSTEN 0.020
Cm205 FUEL 0.050
TUNGSTEN 0.020
HELIUM
_2. NEG
/42_ F_!_4' MAX,M_MEUELTEmPErATURE=2,_2°_
f'_ _',_i::;H 'OTAL_OWE"_ERCAP_0LE=,,O_ATTS
¢ CAPSULE DIMENSIONS 1598 in 00, 62 in LONG
Fig. 5.26. Thermal Profile of Cm203-Fueled Capsule.
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assumedto be the temperature at the outer surface of the fuel plus one-
half the temperature drop across the fuel. It was also assumedthat no
heat was lost through either end cap and that the surface temperature
was 2000°F.
Figure 5.26 shows the expected thermal profile for the 244Cm203con-
ceptual design with a stress-rate safety factor of 7. Even though the
maximumfuel temperature is approximately IIS°F higher than for the 238pu
capsule, these temperatures are still well within the design guideline
limitations. The comparatively large temperature drop across the fuel
is due primarily to the 50%packing density expected for the loose powder
with helium occupying the void volumes.
5.3 Optimization of the 147pm203 Capsule
Since 147pm is a beta emitter with no resulting helium generation,
the size of the 1a7pm capsules is limited only by (i) the allowable power
to surface-area ratio required in order not to exceed the burial-tempera-
ture limitation, (2) the fuel center-line temperature, and (3) the primary
capsule wall thickness sufficient to withstand a secondary impact when
the reentry vehicle impacts with the earth. As discussed previously, the
burial-temperature limitation for promethium was raised to 25006F, since
promethium has a relatively short half-life and therefore a shorter time
at elevated temperatures. To obtain the best capsule design for this fuel
form, the largest capsule with a primary capsule length-to-diameter ratio
of 4 that could be effectively and completely filled with fuel and not
exceed the 2500°F burial-temperature limit was selected.
Figure 5.2 (cited above) shows the conceptual design of the 147pm203
capsule selected for the phase I studies. Basically the multilayered
capsule principle for the alpha emitters is the same as that for 147pm.
For this capsule, a minimum wall thickness of 0.i00 in. was considered
adequate to meet the expected secondary impact requirements. A flat-head
design with rounded corners was provided, since no internal pressure prob-
lems are expected. A 0.010-in. tungsten liner was included to provide
a barrier between the Pm203 and the T-222 alloy and to insure good full-
strength welds.
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The expected temperature profile for this conceptual design with a
2000°F normal-condition capsule surface temperature is shown in Fig. 5.27.
Under burial conditions with a surface temperature of 2500°F, the expected
temperature drop should be approximately 160°F, and thus the fuel would
be well below its melting temperature.
5.4 Summary of Heat Source Capsule Design
To summarize the capsule design study, Table 5.2 compares the se-
lected minimum system weight capsule designs for each fuel and for each
selected stress-rate safety factor for the alpha emitters. The total
unshielded weights and volumes required for each fuel show that on an
unshielded basis the 238pu heat source is the heaviest, but, as shown
in the systems section (Sect. 10), it is actually the lightest weight
system because less shielding is required.
Table 5.2. Summary of Results of Capsule Optimization for
Minimum System Weight
Overall Total
Stress-Rate Capsule Size (in.)
Fuel Safety Capsules
Factor Outside Required
Diameter Length
Total
Weight
(lb)
Total
Volume
(in. 3 )
2381:h/02
1.451 5.65 204
2.5 1.022 3.90 274
4 1.212 4.66 229
7 1.598 6.20 172
2.5 2.580 10.13 108
4 3.318 13.08 80
7 4.510 17.85 71
720
265
379
534
1,450
i, 931
2,860
i, 900
875
i, 215
2,150
5,750
9, 030
20, 250
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MATERIAL THICKNESS AT (°F)
(in)
_ _ _ I IRON TITANATE 0,002 <_
__2. 0.020 NEGLIGIBLEPt
_ _3. GAS GAP 0.002 16
/,_p'JZ4,__ _'_t _A,-Ho,GAPoo,o 5,5
_i r--. 7- TUNGSTEN LINER 0 0'0 NEGLIGIBLE
_8 Pm203 FUEL 82 5
i:J CAPSULE SURFACE TEMPERATURE = 2000°F
i. FUEL CENTERLINE TEMPERATURE = 2159eF
TOTAL F_)WER PER CAPSULE = 195 WATTS
Fig. 5.27. Thermal Profile of Pm203 Capsule.
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6. RADIATION SHIELDING
The basis developed for obtaining conceptual designs of shields for
phase I 238PUO2, and 244Cm203 heat sources is described below. These
sources are characteristically large but relatively low in self-attenuation
of penetrating radiation; consequently, the general approach in these
studies was to develop point-attenuation kernels for sources of radiation
and to select shields for actual sources by integrations over space. The
following subsections give the dose criteria, assumed yield and energy
distribution of radiation from the sources, calculated attenuation kernels,
and phase I conceptual shield designs. The analysis of shield weights
and results of studies to determine the effect of dose-rate criteria and
separation distance are given in Section 10.
6.1 Shieldin5 Model and Dose Criteria
The reference shield model and dose criteria used for phase I designs
are summarized in Fig. 6.1, in which a panel is removed from the side of
a vertically oriented vehicle or space station to show a typical shielded
heat source and reentry body in an equipment compartment and its relation-
ship to the manned compartment. The center of the source is located near
one side of the vehicle, 3 meters below the manned compartment.
The allowable dose rates are based on radiation that originates in
the Brayton-cycle isotope heat source and do not include contributions
from natural radiation in the space environment or from other sources of
radiation on the vehicle. The allowable dose rate at the floor of the
manned compartment is 3 mrem/hr, which corresponds to an integrated dose
of 26 rem for a one-year mission. In directions other than toward the
manned compartment the allowable dose rate is no higher than 600 mrem/hr
at a distance of 3 meters.
A low-radiation zone (60 mrem/hr) is provided on the side of the
vehicle opposite the source to permit maintenance operations. This is
not a determining criterion, however, because it is necessary to add more
than enough shielding in that direction to prevent excessive scattering
of radiation into the manned compartment by equipment in the equipment
compartment.
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Initially it was assumed that the radiation level in the vicinity
of a reentry body following ground impact should be no greater than that
directed toward space in the normal operating mode; that is, 600 mrem/hr
at a distance of 3 meters. This criterion is accommodated for the 238pu02
and 147Pm203 fuels without weight penalty and without using a neutron
shield in the reentry body. Several technical difficulties are encountered
in providing an equivalent shield for the neutrons from 244Cm203. The
shield_ 9 in. of LiH on both sides of the source block, greatly increases
the weight of the reentry body, introduces materials compatibility prob-
lems, and prohibits radiant heat transfer from the source block to the
primary radiating surface. Also, it is probable that the LiH tank would
be ruptured by ground impact, and molten LiH would flow out of the re-
entry body. The possibility of a shield of beryllium, 15 in. thick,
operating at 2000°F was discarded on the basis of materials compatibility
and its tremendous weight.
For phase 1 2_Cm203 designs, the neutron shield was omitted from
the reentry body and reliance was placed on the effect of thermal radia-
tion from the device to limit the residence time of people in dangerous
radiation zones. Unless protective equipment is worn by persons closely
approaching the device the thermal radiation will prevent neutron exposure
rates in excess of 25 rem/hr. It has been reported 43 that the highest
endurable intensity of long-wave-length heat rays on the skin is about
0.i w/cm 2 or 300 Btu/hr.ft 2. (Atmosphere-filtered solar-type radiation
could be endured at factor-of-2 greater intensity.) Such heat rays are
absorbed in the epidern_l layer, and heat is conducted into the subcuta-
neous tissues. At 300 Btu/hr.ft 2 the skin temperature approaches a steady-
state value of approximately l15°F after 5 min. For a disk heat source
with isotropic neutron emission and diffuse thermal radiation of 25 kw
from one surfa¢_o the fast-neutron dose rate at points where the radiant
heat flux is 300 Btu-hr.ft 2 would be 25 rem/hr. If the disk were 5 ft
in diameter, this dose rate and heat flux would occur at approximately
6 ft from the center of the disk.
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6.2 Sources of Penetratin_ Radiation
The three isotope fuels considered in phase I studies, 238pu02,
1 47pm203, and 244Cm203, emit penetrating radiation by several mechanisms.
Table 6.1 shows the origin of the radiations that are dominant in shields
that limit the radiation dose rate to 3 mrem/hr at a distance of 3 meters
from a 25-kw heat source. Neutrons from subcritical multiplication in
238pu and 244Cm were not considered to be significant and were omitted.
6.2.1 238Pu0_
In this study it was assumed that the 238puwas the type made by
irradiating 237Np at Savannah River, which has an isotopic purity of ap-
proximately 80% (Sect. 3). The most important impurity from the stand-
point of shielding considerations is 236pu. The 236pu is troublesome be-
cause one of the daughters in the decay chain, 2°8TI, decays with the emis-
sion of a 2.6-Mev gamma ray. The maximum intensity of this hard gamma
radiation occurs about 18 years after purification of the plutonium, but
the intensity is approximately 5% of the maximum after one year of aging.
The 236pu is formed by (n, 2n) reactions on 237Np. The concentration
of 236pu in the 238pu product assumed for this study (1.2 ppm) is the
average concentration in the present Savannah River product. It is also
about the concentration that was predicted for a typical power reactor
product. 44 If economics warrant it, the 236pu concentration could be
decreased by a factor of 2 to i0 by selective irradiation schemes, but
this is probably not necessary for the proposed application.
Photons from 238pu02 originate in decay processes, alpha interactions,
spontaneous fission, fission products from spontaneous fission, and vari-
ous neutron reactions, including capture and inelastic scattering. If
the 238pu product (1.2 ppm 2361_/) is aged no more than about two years,
the predominant gamma ray is the 0.76-Mev photon that is emitted by decay
of the 238pu isotope. For longer postseparation times the 2.62-Mev gamma
from the 236p_ decay chain is dominant.
About 108 neutrons/sec is emitted by the spontaneous fission process
in a 25-kw heat source of 238pu. If the Pu02 is made with natural oxygen,
approximately 1.8 × 109 neutrons/sec originates from neutron reactions
88
11)
4D
P_
o
I-t
g-t oH
o
o ,---t
• H (1)
-o I>
-r-t
o
4D _
°r-t
o i1)
aX
u]
• ©
_,D O
_ O
o
o
o
P_
o
(D
m
o_
o
(D
o
.H
-p
.H
(D
,--t
©
0
_0 !
-._ bD -i-)
•H _-H
O O
_o 0_ _o _Cq
O O ,-_O (D
• O
X X _ X .'--I
G,I 1::;o _10 @ o
• _ • ,o -I.D
.-I
O
O
X _
A
I I P'_
0 .,_ 0 -_ _'_
_ 0 0 _ b_ _ 0 0
•H _ _ _ .H _
_-_ _ O H r-_ I/_ O
o._-_ _ o.
o _ .H l:l 0 ,_
,4
4D
.H
",D
9
l::k f_
"_t
,-I
-_
•H O
O
O _ O
¢M I'M
_ O ",,1"
o
.H
q-I
.H
bJ3
.H
.H
U_
GI
-o
.H
4_
O
O
%
I1)
4-_
O
O
89
with 170 and 180. There are several proven processes for separating oxy-
gen isotopes, and if the 180 content were depleted by a factor of 20 and
the 170 content by a factor of 4, the intensity of neutrons from the (_,n)
reaction would be reduced to about the same intensity as that from spon-
taneous fission provided there were not significant quantities of other
contaminants with high (_,n) reaction rates. In this application, the
number of neutrons from subcritical multiplication was estimated to be
less than 25% of the neutrons from the other processes and was neglected.
Ten-group gamma source strengths for the 23SPu02 (Table 6.2) were
obtained with the data of Stoddard and Albenesius. 45 The neutron-source
energy spectrum (Fig. 6.2) for the 238pu02 product was calculated for
the composition of plutonium given by Stoddard and Albenesius, 45 a 235U
fission spectrum for the contribution from spontaneous fission, and the
21°Po-oxygen-(_,n) spectrum from Russian experiments 46 for the contribution
from (_,n) reactions. This (_,n) contribution causes the 238pu02 spectrum
to be sharply peaked at approximately 2.5 Mev. If enriched 160 is used
the peak is diminished and the 238pu02 spectrum approximates that from
thermal fission of 235U.
The efficiency of the (_,n) reaction is assumed to be 80% of theoreti-
cal; consequently the yield of neutrons from (_,n) reactions with natural
oxygen is 40,000 neutrons/sec per gram of pure 238puas compared with
2640 neutrons/sec.g from spontaneous fission.
6.2.2 147pm20 S
Promethium-147 is a fission product and the most significant impurity
is 1461_, which is formed primarily by (n, 2n) reactions on 147pmand which
has a half-life almost twice as long as that of 147pm (Sect. 3). Produc-
tion reactor 147pm contains approximately 5 × 10-_% 146pm on an activity
basis. An order-of-magnitude higher concentration is predicted in typical
power reactor fuels (Table 3.5, Sect. 3).
The 147pm203 emits bremsstrahlung radiation, as well as gammas that
accompany beta decay. The 0.75-Mev gamn_ ray from decay of the 146pm
impurity is dominant. The assumed yield and spectrum of primary gammas 47
from the production reactor and power reactor 147pm203 products are given
in Table 6.3.
9O
I I I I I
ORNL DWG 65-9422
t I _ I I
10"i
235 u
10-6
10-7 J
0 4 8 12
ENERGY (E(Mev))
16 20
Fig. 6.2. Spectrum of Neutrons from Thermal Fission of 235U and from
Spontaneous Fission Plus (_,n) Reactions in 238PUO2.
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Table 6.2. Effect of Postpurification Time on the Yield
and Spectrum of Primary Gammas from 238pu Product
Product composition:
238pu -- 80.94%
239pu-- 15.26%
240t:_. -- 2.88%
2411::5.1-- 0.79%
2421:_-- 0.12%
236pu-- 1.2 ppm
Photon
Energy (Mev)
Photons per Second per 25-kw Heat Source for
Postpurification Time of
i Day i Year 5 Years
0.3 5.53 x 1011 5.53 X 10 !1 5.54 X 1011
0.6 3.88 × i0 l° 8.29 x 108 7.06 × 109
0.76 2.05 × 1010 2.06 × lO I0 2.30 × 10 l°
1.0 1.74 x lO 8 1.91 × 108 4.38 x i08
1.5 2.93 × 108 3.04 × 108 4.62 x 108
2.62 8.56 x 107 5.25 × 108 6.78 x 109
3.5 1.68 × 107 1.68 x 107 1.68 X 107
4.5 5.62 × 106 5.62 × 106 5.62 X 106
5.5 1.43 × 106 1.43 x 106 1.43 × lO 6
6.5 3.58 × 105 3.58 x 105 3.58 x 105
Table 6.3. Assumed Spectrum and Yield of Primary Gammas
from 36.2-kw 147pm203 Heat Source
Source Photon Energy (Mev) Yield (photons/sec)
1 47pm203 with
5 x 10-5% 146pma
with
147Pm2034%5×I - 146pma
0.25 1.4 x I015
0.45 i.i x 1012
0.75 i.i x 1012
0.25 1.4 × i015
0.45 i.i X 1013
0.75 i.i X i013
aBeta activity basis.
6.2.3 244C-_20 _
Curium-244 is made by neutron irradiations starting with plutonium.
Impurities are not very significant in the Savannah River 244Cm product
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because the isotopic purity is high, 95%(Table 3.3, Sect. 3), and the
penetrating radiation from the 244Cmisotope is abundant.
Photons in the 244Cm203originate in decay processes, alpha inter-
actions, spontaneous fission, fission products from spontaneous fission,
and various neutron reactions. The dominant photons are the prompt and
delayed gammasfrom spontaneous fission, which have a broad energy spec-
trum. In 244Cm203product the neutrons from spontaneous fission are
dominant.
The assumedyield and spectrum of primary gammasfrom the 244Cm203
product (Table 6.4) are based on SavannahRiver data. I0 In the neutron
shield calculations the 235Uthermal-neutron fission spectrum (Fig. 6.2)
was used to approximate the spectrum from spontaneous fission of 24_Cm,
primarily to makethe data more widely applicable. The 244Cmspectrum
is knownto be intermediate between the 23_Ufission spectrum and that
from spoDtaneousfission in 252Cf. Based on results of moments-method
calculations with these two spectra (Fig. 6.3), we estimate that through
three one-tenth-value thicknesses of typical lightweight neutron shields
the dose from a 244Cmspectrum is only about 50%higher than that from a
235Uspectrum.
Table 6.4. AssumedSpectrum and Yield
of Primary Gammasfrom 26.6-kw
244Cm203Heat Source
Photon Energy (Mev) Yield (photons/sec)
0.30 3.3 × 1011
0.60 3.4 × 1011
1.0 1.5 × l0 II
1.5 1.2 x lO11
2.5 3.6 × i0 I°
3.5 1.3 x i0 I°
4.5 4.4 X 109
5.5 i.i X 109
6.5 2.8 x 108
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6.3 Basic Neutron Shield Studies
On a weight and materials compatibility basis, LiH clad with stain-
less steel was selected as the preferred neutron shield material for phase
I designs. These materials are compatible to a temperature of approxi-
mately 1200°F, which is well above the predicted shield operating tempera-
ture. For isotope sources where few tenth-value thicknesses are required,
a simple low-weight shield is obtained by placing a heavy gamma shield
near the source and backing it up by a light hydrogenous neutron shield
that will also suppress capture gamma radiation from the hydrogen. The
6Li content of natural lithium is sufficient to suppress the capture
gammas in the phase I designs. In the phase I designs the maximum capture-
gamma dose contributions from the tantalum gamma shield and lithium hy-
dride neutron shield were calculated to be 50% and 2%, respectively, of
the transmitted neutron dose.
Water and/or CH2 are possible alternative materials for use in low-
temperature shadow shields or for shadow shields on the gantry. The use
in the vehicle may be attractive for a dual-purpose application involving
the storage of waste water or hydrocarbon fuel in the shield tank. With
these materials, neutron-attenuation factors of approximately 50 may be
obtained without introducing an appreciable capture-gamma problem. Addi-
tional suppression of capture gammas can be provided by using boron addi-
tives. Beryllium is a possible neutron shield material for space appli-
cations, but because of its relatively large weight and incompatibility
with other materials at elevated temperatures, its use for neutron shields
is not attractive.
The fast-neutron attenuation kernel in lithium hydride was calculated
by three separate methods. The results are consistent and agree with
existing experimental data. The 05R Monte Carlo results, which are be-
lieved to be the most accurate, are compared with moments-method and SnP n
(neutron transport theory) results in Table 6.5. The RENUPAK moments-
method code is useful for inexpensive calculation of the relative effect
of various dose response functions. The DTF-II code, which uses 27 energy
groups and the SsP 3 approximation, is useful for the inexpensive calcula-
tion of sources of secondary gamma rays.
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Dose-attenuation kernels for the mrem response function and 2S5U
and 238Pu02 spectra were determined (Fig. 6.4) by normalizing the RENUPAK
and 05R results for the mrad response function and the 235U spectrum.
The 238Pu02 (natural oxygen) spectrum causes a slightly higher dose through
small LiH shield thicknesses. The crossover point in LiH is at approxi-
mately 30 cm.
The RENUPAK code was also used for calculating fast-neutron dose-
attenuation kernels for other materials of interest for use in the space-
craft, as supplementary shielding on the gantry, or in shielded cells
for fabrication of source capsules or integration of capsules with the
reentry body. The results are presented in Figs. 6.5, 6.6, 6.7, 6.8,
and 6.9. Results are also presented for gamma- and neutron-attenuation
kernels resulting from point 235U fission sources in water in Fig. 6.10,
borated CH2 in Fig. 6.11, and normal concrete in Fig. 6.12. These latter
results were calculated 48 with the RENUPAK code for fast neutrons, DTF
for thermal neutrons, SDC for primary gammas, and SAGE (Monte Carlo) for
secondary gammas.
6.4 Basic Gan_ua Shield Studies
Tantalum was chosen as the preferred gamma shield material for phase
I designs. A material is required that can be fabricated into complex
shapes and which has high density to suppress the buildup of scattered
gammas. Tungsten and uranium are difficult to fabricate. In addition,
uranium becomes badly activated by fission.
Calculations of the effect of shields on the primary gamn_ dose rate
from sources of 238Pu02 (Tables 6.6 and 6.7), 2_4Cm203, and 147pm203
(Table 6.8) were made with the SDC code. The SDC code evaluates the semi-
analytical shielding formulas for homogeneous shields and a variety of
source geometries by using stored attenuation coefficients and buildup
factors.
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Fig. 6.9. Fast-Neutron Dose Rate in Various Concretes as a Function
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Table 6.6. Effect of Source Block Density, Postpurification Time,
and Uranium Shield Thickness on Primary Gamma Dose Rate at
3 Meters from the Center of a 1-ft 3 Spherical Source
Block Containing a 25-kw 238Pu02 Heat Source
Source Block Postpuri-
Density fication
(g/cm 3) Time
Dose Rate Through Uranium Shields
of Indicated Thickness
(mrad/hr)
0.5 cm 2 cm 4 cm 6 cm 8 cm
6 i day 1.03 0.0705 0.00638 0.00116
i year 1.21 0.131 0.0208 0.00444
5 years 3.82 1.00 0.227 0.0511
4 i day 1.50 0.105 0.00971 0.00178
i year 1.78 0.198 0.0319 0.00680
5 years 5.74 1.53 0.348 0.0784
2 i day 3.56 0.238 0.0206 0.00370
i year 4.14 0.431 0.0665 0.0141
5 years 12.5 3.19 0.719 0.162
Point source i day 11.4 0.666 0.0455 0.00752
1 year 12.6 1.05 0.136 0.0281
5 years 30.3 6.54 1.43 0.321
0.000236
0.000948
0.0111
0.000360
0.00145
0.0170
0.000744
0.00300
0.0351
0.00147
0.00594
0.0696
Table 6.7. Effect of Source Block Density, Postpurification Time,
and Water Shield Thickness on Primary Gamma Dose Rate at
3 Meters from the Center of a 1-ft _ Spherical Source
Block Containing a 25-kw 238Pu02 Heat Source
Source Block Postpuri-
Density fication
(g/cm 3 ) Time
Dose Rate Through Water Shields
of Indicated Thickness
( ad/hr)
5 cm 20 cm 40 cm 60 cm 80 cm
6 i day 22.3 16.1 5.18 1.13 0.230
i year 22.6 16.3 5.29 1.18 0.258
5 years 26.4 19.1 6.85 1.99 0.657
4 i day 29.7 21.4 6.92 1.52 0.316
i year 30.1 21.7 7.09 1.61 0.358
5 years 35.9 25.9 9.45 2.83 0.968
2 1 day 74.1 53.4 17.2 3.76 0.772
i year 74.9 54.0 17.6 3.94 0.861
5 years 87.2 63.0 22.6 6.50 2.13
Point source i day 337 244 77.7 16.3 3.19
i year 339 245 78.4 16.7 3.37
5 years 368 266 89.6 22.2 5.99
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Table 6.8. Effect of Uranium and Tantalum Shield Thickness
on the Primary GammaDose Rate at 3 Meters from Nominally
25-kw Point Heat Sources of 24_Cm203and 147pm203
Shield Thickness (cm) Dose Rate (mrad/hr)
Uraniuma Tantalum b 2 4_Cm203c 147pm203 d 147pm203 e
05
07
i0
15
2O
3O
4O
5O
6.0
8.0
0.57 540 670 4400
0.80 280 2700
1.14 310 140 1400
1.7 47 470
2.3 120 16 160
3.4 47 1.7 17
4.6 20 0.18 1.8
5.7 8.3 0.019 0.19
6.8 3.6
9.1 0.73
aDensity, 18.9 g/cm 3.
bDensity, 16.6 g/cm 3.
CHeat source, 26.6 kw.
dHeat source, 36.2 kw; 5 × 10-5% 146pm contamination.
eHeat source, 36.2 kw; 5 x 10-4% 146pm contamination.
6.5 Summary of Relative Shield Thicknesses for
Point Isotropie Sources
Figure 6.13 summarizes the effect of shield thickness; tantalum and
LiH, on the primary gamma and neutron dose rates at 3 meters from point
25-kw heat sources. The two lower curves show the gamma dose rate from
238Pu02 as a function of tantalum thickness and postseparation time. If
the 238Pu02 contains 1.2 ppm 236pu, the shield thickness for a postsepara-
tion time of one year, which is the average postseparation time in a one-
year mission, is little different from that for a postseparation time of
one day. About 0.5 in. of tantalum is required for a point source to
attain the 3-mrem/hr at 3 meters dose rate. It is shown later that no
tantalum shield is required per se for the actual 238pu source conceptual
designs in this study because of the shielding obtained from intervening
structures.
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The next higher curve in Fig. 6.13 shows the effect of LiH on the
238pu02 neutron dose rate. About 12 in. is required at the 3-mrem/hr
level. The dotted curves are dose rate versus tantalum thickness for
147Pm produced in production and power reactors. Shield thicknesses are
in the range 1.5 to 2 in.; the power reactor product requires approximately
0.5 in. more tantalum. The dashed curves are primary gamma and neutron
dose rates from 244Cm. At the 3-mrem/hr level, 244Cm requires over 2 in.
of tantalum and nearly 30 in. of LiH.
6.6 Conceptual Shield Designs
The shield thicknesses that were selected for phase I designs are
listed in Table 6.9. For 23SPu02, a 1.2-ppm 236pu content and one-year
separation are assumed. With natural oxygen, 12 in. of LiH is required
in the direction of the manned compartment and 6 in. into the equipment
compartment to limit the scattered dose. With enriched 160, only 7 in.
of LiH is required in the direction of the manned compartment.
With 147pm having the expected power reactor composition, 1.7 in. of
tantalum is required toward the manned compartment, i.i in. toward the
equipment compartment, and 0.7 in. toward space. For the production
reactor composition the thicknesses are approximately 0.5 in. less.
There is no materials option with 244Cm. Table 6.9 shows the reduc-
tion in shield thickness that accrues by providing the same integrated
dose for a 90-day mission as for a 1-year mission with the basic dose-
rate criteria. With the basic criteria, equivalent to 26 rem in a one-
year mission, 2.7 in. of tantalum and 19 in. of LiH are required toward
the manned compartment, 1.3 in. of tantalum and 15 in. of LiH into the
equipment compartment, and 9 in. of LiH toward space. For a dose of 26
rem in a 90-day mission, 2 in. of tantalum and 16 in. of LiH toward the
manned compartment, and 0.7 in. of tantalum and 11.5 in. of LiH into the
equipment compartment are required. Nine inches of LiH is still required
toward space because the 600 mrem/hr at 3 meters criterion was not relaxed.
The shield thickness in the direction of the equipment compartment,
which is heavily dependent on the geometry and type of scattering materials
in the compartment, is the least accurate of these shield thickness numbers.
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To provide for phase I designs it was assumed that 4000 ib of low-atomic-
number material is located in the equipment compartment at an average
distance of 2 meters from the isotope source. A point source was assumed
and only elastic scattering was considered. Shield thicknesses were chosen
to allow the neutron dose to be the dominant contribution at the wall of
the crew compartment. The use of such a gross model for phase I studies
is justified on the basis that the weight of the shields in the direction
of the equipment compartment is no more than 25 to 30% of the total shield
weight.
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7. CRITICALITYHAZARDS
Since two of the fuels considered in this study, 244Cmand 238pu,
could, in sufficient quantity, constitute a chain-reacting critical mass,
a criticality hazards evaluation was performed to determine whether the
quantities required for a 25-kw heat source constitute criticality problems
that would impose design constraints. Previously reported calculations
performed at other installations indicated that a 70-kg 23Spuheat source
would exceed the minimumcritical mass.51-53 However, the reported cal-
culations disagree as to whether criticality is possible with a 10-kg
244Cmheat source. 52,53 In this evaluation_ multigroup nuclear cross-
section sets were compiled for 238pu and 244Cm, and these sets were used
to perform a series of multigroup transport-theory calculations to define
critical configurations and densities for both the oxides and metals of
238pu and 244Cm.
7.1 Cross-Section Evaluation
Since the results of criticality calculations depend, in the absence
of experimental data, entirely on the assumptions made in the evaluation
of the cross sections used, a brief r4sume of the high-energy nuclear
property data used in this analysis is necessary. The compilation of
cross sections for 238pu and 244Cm is hampered by the paucity of experi-
mental data, and recourse must be made to nuclear systematics and theo-
retical models.
7.1.1 238pu Cross Sections
The fission cross section of 238Pu has been measured in the energy
range from 0.1 to 1.7 Mev by Butler and Sjoblom. 54 Their results indicate
that this energy range accounts for 70_ of the fissions in a bare metallic
assembly, and practically all fissions occur at energies above 0.1 Mev.
The experimental data were used as reported. At energies above 1.7 Mev
the fission cross section was assumed to have the same energy dependence
as that of neighboring nuclides. In the kilovolt energy range the fission
cross section was assumed to have the same shape as that of 24°Pu. No
I08
experimental information is available on the mean number of neutrons emit-
ted per fission for 238pu. In lieu of experimental data_ the empirical
correlation of Gordeeva and Smirenkin _ was used; it indicated that
V = 2.78 + 0.13E .
The radiative capture cross section in the high-energy range was calculated
by nuclear systematics to be 1.75 times that of 238Uj and this relation-
ship was used.
As an experimental check on these assumptions, the set of derived
cross sections was used to calculate replacement measurements made at Los
Alamos with 238Pu samples in the "dirty Jezebel" assembly. _6 The experi-
mentally measured neutron-production cross section was reported as
_p = 3.76 ± 0.23 b ,
and the calculated value was
=425 b
This overestimate of the production cross section could lead to a i0 to
25% underestimate of the critical mass of 238pu.
7.1.2 244Cm Cross Sections
No experimental data are available for high-energy curium cross sec-
tions, and recourse must be made to nuclear systematics and theoretical
models. However, the low-energy measurements of Cot@, Barnes, and Diamond
do provide average strength functions. 57 The fission cross section of
24_Cm was assumed to have the same line shape as the even-even isotope
238pu, and the ratio of the 244Cm to 238pu fission cross sections was
calculated by nuclear systematics to be 0.85. No experimental information
is available on the mean number of neutrons emitted per fission, and again
the empirical correlation of Gordeeva and Smirenkin 55 was used. This cor-
relation predicts
V = 3.20 + O.13E neutrons/fission .
The radiative capture cross section in the high-energy range was calculated
by systematics to be 1.2 times that of 238U.
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A check of the derived 24_Cmcross sections was madeby comparing
them with experimental replacement measurementsmadeat Los Alamos.56 The
experimental neutron-production cross section was measured to be
_p = 3.32 -+ ? b ,
in contrast to a calculated value of
The experimental uncertainty in the neutron-production cross section is
unknown. This large, possibly 35%, overestimate of the production cross
section is unresolved, and point measurementsare planned to pinpoint the
difficulty. If it is assumedthat the 3.32 b is correct, the large cal-
culated production cross section could lead to a 55%underestimate of
the critical mass of 244Cm.
7.2 Criticality Calculations
The criticality calculations were performed with the multigroup SnP n
transport-theory code ADTF. 58 They were performed in a 15-group $4P3
approximation. The 15-group constants were obtained from a 99-group B3
calculation performed with GAM-II. 59
7.2.1 Bare Assemblies
Calculations were performed to determine the minimum critical masses
of bare spheres of the oxides and metals of 238Pu and 244Cm as functions
of density. The assumed isotopic compositions were approximately 81%
238Pu and 98% 2 44Cm" In the calculation of the curium systems all even
isotopes were treated as 244Cmand all odd isotopes as 241Pu. Figure 7.1
summarizes the results of these calculations and presents the results of
calculations performed elsewhere for comparison. The calculated critical
masses of the oxides and the metals differ only slightly and are repre-
sented by a single line. Complete tabulations of the calculational results
is presented in Table 7.1.
The 238Pu02 fuel form used for the Brayton-cycle heat source designs
has a density of 9.12 g/cm 3, which corresponds to a calculated critical
mass of 29.5 kg in a bare spherical configuration. Calculations reported
ii0
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Fig. 7.1. Critical Masses of 238pu02 and 244Cm203 as Functions of
Density. (Atomics International data from Ref. 53; General Electric
Company data from Ref. 52.)
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Table 7. i. Results of Critical Mass Calculations
Critical Mass Equations
Pu Mc = 2450 p-2
Pu02 Mc = 2460 O-2
Cm Mc = 2450 63-2
Cm203 _ = 2370 p-2
Core Reflector Critical Critical
Mass Radius
Density Thickness (kg) (cm)
Mixture (g/cm3) MixZ_re (cm)
Pu a ii. 60 Bare 18.2 7. 2064
Pu02 a ii. 40 Bare 18.9 7. 3434
Pu02 9.12 Bare 29.5 9.1776
Pu02 6.84 Bare 52.6 12. 2465
Pu02 9.12 H20 15.0 20.2 8. 0846
_._- o 19 _2 O 7.5 20.4 8.1178
Pu02 9.12 H20 2.5 23.5 8.5026
Cmb 14.0 Bare 12.5 5.97
Cm203 b I0.60 Bare 21.1 7. 8031
Cm203 9.01 Bare 29.2 9.1803
Cm203 10.60 Au-H20 4.0-15.0 11.9 6.4540
Cm203 10.60 Au-H20 2.0--7.5 13.5 6.7188
Cm203 I0.60 Au-H20 0.5--2.0 16.5 7.1966
a80.95 wt % 238pu, 15.26 wt % 239pu, 2.88 wt % 24°pu, 0.79 wt
% 241pu, and 0.12 wt % 242191/.
b98.07 wt % 24_Cm and 1.93 wt % 24Zpu.
by General Electric _2 yield approximately the same value, but calculations
reported by Atomics International 53 yield a value 35% greater. As noted
previously, the comparison of the cross-section set calculated for this
analysis with the Los Alamos experiments indicated that possibly a 25%
underestimate of the critical mass might be expected. Hence, the regions
of uncertainty in the 23SPu02 critical masses as calculated by 0RNL and
AI overlap, and based on the Los Alamos experiment the ORNL calculation is
conservative. On the basis of these calculations a 70-kg 238Pu02 mission
load for a 25-kw heat source represents between two and three critical
masses in the bare spherical configuration.
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There are large differences between the calculated critical masses
reported for 244Cm203by 0RNL,AI, and GE. The value calculated in this
study is 21.1 kg at the design density of 10.6 g/cm3, in contrast to a
value 30%lower calculated by GE52 and 2.6 times greater calculated by AI. _3
The major difference between the 0RNLand GEcalculations is the value used
for the meannumberof neutrons per fission, for which no experimental data
are available. However, based on the Los Alamos experiments the 0RNLdata
are conservative. The factor of 2.6 difference between the ORNLand AI
calculations exceeds the possible 55%conservatism of the 0RNLcalculation
deduced from the Los Alamos experiments. However, in the bare spherical
configuration all estimates of the minimumcritical massat the design
density of 10.6 g/cm3 exceed the approximately 12 kg of 244Cm203needed
for a 25-kwBrayton-cycle heat source.
7.2.2 Reflected Assemblies
Calculations were performed to determine the reduction in critical
mass due to reflection. The results of these calculations are presented
in Fig. 7.2. At a density of 9.12 g/cm 3 the critical mass of 238pu02 may
be reduced by one-third by reflecting the sphere with water. The critical
mass decreases with increasing reflector thickness from 29.5 to 20.2 kg.
With a thick water reflector the 25-kw mission load of 238pu02 represents
approximately four critical masses.
Because of the rapid decreases in the fission cross sections of 238pu
and 2_4Cm with decreasing neutron energy, some metals make better reflect-
ing materials than water. At a density of 10.6 g/cm 3 the critical mass
of 244Cm203 may be reduced 44% by combining an inner reflector of gold
with an outer reflector of water. The calculated critical mass decreases
from a bare value of 21.1 to 11.9 kg for a 4-cm gold inner reflector and
15-cm water outer reflector, which represents a limiting case. However,
even in this idealized situation the conservative critical mass of 11.9 kg
just barely equals the 25-kw design start-of-life mission load of 12 kg
of 244Cm203. On the basis of these calculations and the conservatism
indicated by the Los Alamos experiment, it is concluded that no criticality
problem exists for a 244Cm203 isotopic fuel power source so long as the
weight of the radioisotope fuel does not significantly exceed 12 kg.
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7.2.3 Mixed Tantalum and Plutonium Assemblies
Since the 238Pu02 25-kw design heat source exceeds the minimum criti-
cal mass several times over, a series of calculations was performed to
determine the type of assembly that could result in criticality. An infi-
nite medium calculation performed for the design capsule shown in Fig. 5.1
(Sect. 5) yielded a multiplication factor of 0.60. This represents an
upper limit on the multiplication factor that might be obtained with any
possible array of intact capsules.
Calculations were performed to determine the dependence of the multi-
plication factor on the tantalum-to-plutonium ratio since the alloy used
in the conceptual capsule design is largely composed of tantalum. The
calculation model assumed 80 kg of 238Pu02 fuel uniformly mixed with suffi-
cient tantalum to achieve the desired tantalum-to-plutonium ratio. Spheri-
cal geometry was used with a 20-cm iron reflector. Table 7.2 and Fig. 7.3
present the results of these calculations. The critical (kef f = i) tanta-
lum_to_plutonium ratio was calculated to be approximately 3.2, in contrast
to a design value of approximately 9.
Table 7.2. Effective Multiplication
Factors for Mixed TantalZumand
Plutonium Assemblies
Mixture Composition keff
Design Pu02 capsule (infinite)
80-kg Pu02 (20-cm Fe reflector) mixed
with tantalum to give the following
tantalum-to-plutonium ratio
i
15
20
25
3O
3 5
4O
95
0.60
1.3355
i. 2408
i. 1586
i. 0876
i. 0244
0. 9686
0. 9210
0. 5925
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It is highly improbable that mechanical reassembly alone could result
in a tantalum-to-plutonium ratio less than the critical value of 3.2. For
example, in order to achieve a ratio less than this it would be necessary
to assumethat 70%of the fuel in every capsule puddled in one of the hemi-
spherical end caps of the capsule and then, selectively, only end caps
containing fuel were mechanically compressedinto a sphere. This would
yield a tantalum-to-plutonium ratio of approximately 3.20 and a marginally
critical system if reflected with a reflector equivalent to 20 cm of iron.
Any other less favorable mechanical reassembly of the capsules would result
in a subcritical system.
It is concluded on the basis of these calculations that the only
credible mechanism that could produce criticality in a 25-kw 238pu02heat
source with a capsule design of the type used in this study would be a
massive meltdown of the fuel capsules and subsequent reassembly of the
_ in some_un_a±_z- _ucm_s the reentry body. in that event it is
probable that criticality would only introduce another heat-generation
mechanismthat would increase the rate of fuel vaporization. Since the
design criteria require that the fuel be contained in the capsules and
that there be no meltdown, criticality problems impose no design con-
straints.
In summary,on the basis of these calculations, it was concluded
that
i. The conceptual designs for the curium heat source pose no criti-
cality problems.
2. No possible array of the intact plutonium capsules used in the
conceptual design could achieve criticality.
3. Mechanical deformation of the design mission load of plutonium
capsules could not produce criticality.
4. Criticality of the plutonium capsules could be achieved only
by massive meltdown and reassembly of about one-fourth the fuel.
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8. REENTRYSTUDIES
The normal operating procedure for the return of the heat source to
the earth at the completion of its required mission life assumesthe use
of a controlled ferry vehicle. However, in the event of a mission abort,
either during the launch phase or after the orbit is established, the
radioisotope heat source will enter the earth's atmosphere in an uncon-
trolled fashion. Becauseof the large quantity of radioactive material
in a 25-kw heat source, the conceptual system designs developed in this
study are all based on an intact reentry of the fuel capsules under all
normal and accident conditions to insure a maximumdegree of safety. There
are no prescribed conditions under which this emergency reentry could hap-
pen; therefore_ the initial conditions were assumedto be random. For
study purposes the "worst" conditions were used in selecting the final
design criteria. This portion of the study was concerned with the ex-
pected range of aerodynamic heating and the necessary protection, impact
velocity on the surface, cratering depths at impaction, and a broad view
of the aerodynamic stability of the fuel capsules and the reentry body.
The analysis presented here is broken into two main parts: the first part
is a consideration of an unprotected fuel capsule and its behavior under
reentry conditions, and the second part discusses a single reentry body
containing and protecting the fuel capsule array.
8.1 Unprotected Fuel Capsule Reentry
f, 1'
The fuel capsule design, described in Section 5, is unprotected
in the sense of thermal protection for the reentry. Ablative materials,
such as graphite, ceramics, and impregnated sponge metals_ for protecting
individual fuel capsules during reentry may be available in the future,
but at this time none of these materials are known to be able to survive
a continual temperature of 2000°F (operating temperature of the capsule)
in vacuum for a period of one year and maintain their reentry thermal
protection properties. For the analysis, therefore, the assumption was
made that the bare capsule would undergo the reentry. A schematic dia-
gram of the fuel capsule studied and the nomenclature used in this first
portion of the study are shown in Fig. 8.1
ll7
0RNLDWG66-12255
Fig. 8.1. Fuel Capsule Shape.
The impact velocity of a body on the earth's surface is given, in
fps_ by the relation_
V AcT : CD, '
when it is assumed that the body strikes perpendicular to the surface.
The terms used in this relation are
go = acceleration of gravity at surface_ ft/sec2_
PO = atmosphere density at surface, lb/ft3_
W = body weight, lb_
AD = drag area, ft2,
CD,0 = drag coefficient at sarface conditions and impact velocity.
The motion of the fuel capsule could be random tumbling, but the most
severe impaction would occur if the capsule descended end-on so that the
drag was a minimum for that shape, and thus the ballistic coefficient was
a maximum. The drag of the capsule is considered to be comprised of the
drag of a sphere of diameter D plus the skin friction drag of a cylinder
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of length L and diameter D. Figure 8.2 is a plot of sphere drag coeffi-
cient versus sphere Reynolds number at subsonic conditions. 60 From the
data showna minimumvalue of the subsonic drag coefficient CD, defined
as
DRAG
cD- i__pv2 '
2g
would be a constant, 0.4, for a Reynolds number range of 104 to 2.5 × l05.
In this expressionV is the velocity (fps), g is the acceleration of gravity
(ft/sec2), and p is density (ib/ft3). At a Reynolds number of 2.5 × l05
the drag coefficient drops rapidly. For the purposes of this calculation
the drag coefficient for Reynolds numbers (Re) greater than this critical
Reynolds number is taken to be given by
CD =3.x4 10-4h/"_e : 0.0422"]/Re X 10- 5
with
pVD
Re =_,
P
where _ is the coefficient of viscosity, ib/ft, sec.
The skin-friction drag coefficient for the cylinder is taken to be
the relation, for turbulent flow,
CF = 0.074 (Rec)-°'2 : 0.0074 (Re C X 10-5) -o.2
where the cylinder Reynolds number, Rec, is given by
Re c = D__VL = Re (L/D)P
and satisfies 5 x 105 _ Re C. For Re C < 5 × 105 the laminar resistance
relation is
CF = 1.328 (Rec)-°'5 = 0.00416 (Re c X 10-5) -0.5
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The impact velocity was computed for assumed values of the ballistic
coefficient. The results of this computation, shown in Fig. 8.3, indicate
that the impact velocity can reach rather severe values for nominal values
of the ballistic coefficient at sea-level conditions.
Computations of W/C_,0AD__ and impact velocity, VIMPACT , were made for
a range of diameters, fuel capsule densities, and L/D ratios. The re-
sults of this computation are given for a range of parameters in Table 8.1.
For some configurations the impact velocity is better than i000 fps, with
a minimum calculated impact velocity of 411 fps, and it seems highly un-
likely that the capsules could survive impaction upon rock at these ve-
locities.
The heat transfer to the capsule, based on a constant wall temperature
of 2000°F and only convective aerodynamic heating, was determined for the
stagnation point by means of approximate relations for cold-wall heating
and then corrected by the factor
i 2gCpTw
V 2
where
Tw = capsule wall temperature, 2460°R,
Cp = heat capacity of air, ft.lb/ib.°R,
V = velocity of reentry, fps.
This correction factor is an approximation to the temperature differential
T --T
a,w w
T
a,w
where Ta, w represents the adiabatic wall temperature. At these flight
velocities T is nearly equal to the free-stream stagnation temperature,
a,w
which in turn is approximated by V2/2gCp.
The cold-wall heating is given in the form of a nomogram for laminar
convective heating and is shown in Fig. 8.4. This nomogramwas developed
from data from Ref. 61.
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At the time of maximum heating rate, the reentry velocity would not
be significantly different (_85%) from the initial velocity; that is,
nearly 26,000 fps. For this velocity the correction factor would be 0.95.
For the capsule descending end-on (maximum W/CDA) , an estimate of the
hypersonic (W/CDA) of 50% of the subsonic value, and a 0° angle of attack,
the maximum heat input is determined from the nomogram. Over the signifi-
cant heating portion of the trajectory the angle of flight is constant
and therefore equal to the initial reentry angle.
It is difficult to picture any accident abort, from an orbit, that
would give the fuel element an initial entry angle of more than 4 to 5°,
and the angle would probably be less. The maximum heating pulse would
not be very large, but the total amount of heat acquired by the capsule
would be high. This total amount of heat can be estimated by means of
the relation
iii,000 qmax
Q - V sin eE A
A ,
where
Q = total heat input, Btu,
A = frontal area, ft 2,
cE = reentry angle.
The values of qmax/A and Q listed in Table 8.1 are overestimates.
The temperature rise of the capsule, with the internal heat genera-
tion and the heat radiation to space ignored (these are in the direction
of being compensating factors), is calculated from
Q-%
T = 2460 +
w WmC t '
where
= heat lost by conduction, radiation, etc.,
W = weight of the metal in the fuel capsule,
m
Ct = average thermal capacity of capsule materials.
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For a particular capsule, with a length of 10.564 in., a diameter of
2.696 in., and a metal weight of 15 lb, the WmCt values are approximately
0.57 Btu/°R at 2000°F and 0.84 Btu/°R at 4940°F.
From Table 8.1 at an L/D of 4.0 and a diameter of 1.750 in., the
total heat input, Q, is 4240 Btu. If there were no heat losses, an esti-
mate of temperature rise, is given by
£T = Q/WmCt = 4240/0.84 = 5000°F .
However, at 4400°F the heat loss by radiation to space is estimated to be
equal to the maximumheating rate of 86.6 Btu/sec (Table 8.1), so the cap-
sule surface temperature cannot rise above about 4400°F.
From the above analysis the conclusion can be drawn that unprotected
individual fuel capsules of reasonable design cannot be expected to survive
reentry and impaction and remain intact. As noted previously, future de-
velopments mayprovide a protective material that can be applied directly
to individual fuel capsules without introducing large weight and tempera-
ture-drop penalties and which will maintain its integrity over long pe-
riods at high temperature in a space vacuum. However, such materials are
not now available, and the use of a single reentry body to contain the
entire heat source seemsmuchmore attractive at this time from a reli-
ability and safety standpoint.
8.2 Reentry Body Analysis
The reentry body in the final emergency mode must be functionally
passive to provide maximum assurance that the fuel block contained in the
reentry body will remain intact. No final dependence of safe operation
during an anomaly should be placed in an active device such as the opening
of a parachute. The normal mode of operation calls for a controlled vehi-
cle to return the heat source to earth, and the following discussion per-
tains only to an abort condition where the heat sink returns to the sur-
face without active control.
Two main protection features must exist in such a body:
1. It must protect the heat source and itself from the aerodynamic
effects of reentry.
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2. It must allow the fuel block to survive impaction upon the earth's
surface.
It must have, therefore, a low ballistic coefficient, adequate thermal
protection, a high degree of inherent aerodynamic stability (any initial
body orientation is possible), and sufficient energy absorption and low
terminal velocity to alleviate impact conditions. These are also the con-
ditions that any Mars' mission package must satisfy. Of the published
studies on a Mars' mission 62 a concensus of results shows that, of the
various shapes imaginable for a reentry body, the most promising are the
blunted cone, 63 the spherical dish, and the tension shell concept. The
spherical dish is a special case of the blunted cone and was not con-
sidered separately in this initial study. Exploratory aerodynamic testing
of the tension shell 64 has shown that it has a larger total surface heat
input than an equivalent blunted cone and that it is subject to erratic
shock behavior that leads to instability problems. Thus the blunted cone
was chosen as the reentry body shape for the conceptual design study.
For purposes of initial design effort, a cone angle of 60 ° and a cone
nose radius of 15 in. were chosen. These values are to be used in the
phase II study as the first step in an iterative design process for the
selection of the optimum blunted cone. This parametric study thus pro-
vides guidance for the conceptual heat source system designs.
The impact velocity expected can be determined from Fig. 8.3. Initial
estimates of the subsonic ballistic coefficient for the reentry body based
on the fuel block layout shown in Section 9 place it in the range of 60 to
100; this gives impact velocities in the range of 240 to 300 fps. It is
probable that the problem of structural integrity at impaction can be
solved for this range of velocities.
The depth of cratering upon impact was analyzed with the empirical
Petry formula: 65
( 2 1K W VIMPACT
P = i-_ _ log 1 + 215,0001 '
127
where
P = penetration depth, ft,
W = reentry body weight, lb,
A = frontal area, ft2,
and K is a coefficient dependent upon soil characteristics and missile
nose geometry. The usual range is 1.0 to 7.0; the smaller the K value,
the harder the surface and the broader the missile nose.
Figure 8.5 is a graph of the cratering depth of the reentry body for
a range of ballistic coefficients and cone angle. The effect of the cone
angle enters through the variation in subsonic drag coefficient_ as shown
in Fig. 8.6, and by rearrangement of the Petry formula to the form
P = _--ITCn_log + 4_-_ x 10- .
In Fig. 8.5 the variations of cratering depth for constant frontal loading
at a drag coefficient equivalent to an 80° cone angle are also given. This
graph clearly showsthat low ballistic coefficients are desired, but even
more important is the fact that the penetration depth for a K value of 7.0
and maximumW/CDAof i00 is less than 1 ft. It was therefore concluded
that the reentry body used in the conceptual designs will not bury itself
under impaction, and the nonburial criterion for maximumsafety is satis-
fied.
The next portion of the analysis was to determine the amount of abla-
tive material needed to protect the reentry body from thermal heating
during a high altitude or orbital altitude abort reentry. This calcula-
tion consisted of determining the maximumheating rate per unit area and
total heat input per unit area at the stagnation point of the body for
various assumedinitial entry angles and an initial entry velocity of
26,000 fps. These calculations were performed by NASA-LangleyResearch
Center (P. J. Bobbitt) for a range of hypersonic ballistic coefficients
and the 60 ° blunted cone used in the conceptual system designs. The re-
sults are listed in Table 8.2 and shown in Figs. 8.7 and 8.8. A hyper-
sonic drag coefficien_ CD_H, of 1.50 was used in this investigation.
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Table 8.2. Trajectory Calculations at Stagnation Point
Nose radius = 1.0 ft
Maximum MaximumInitial MaximumHeat- Total Heat Decel- DynamicW/CDA Angle ing Rate Input erat ion Pressure
(deg) (Btu/sec. ft 2) (Btu/ft 2) (ft/sec 2) (ib/ft 2)
50 20 641 8,305 1950 3027
15 560 9,545 2292
i0 456 11,656 990 1536
6 380 13,929 1081
3 238 21,573 314 497
2 184 27,264 257 403
1 156 54,094a 264 404
75 20 787 10,191 1950 4550
i0 559 14,310 990 2305
3 290 26,623 315 741
2 222 33,952 257 600
1 192 75,257a 264 607
90 20 867 11,177 1950 5470
i0 613 15,696 990 2772
6 467 20,700 597 1680
3 318 29,273 315 887
2 242 37,496 257 722
i 212 84,654a 264 734
120 20 999 12,908 1950 7260
lO 708 18,133 990 3670
6 543 23,464 597 2225
3 365 33,950 315 1174
2 276 43,806 257 956
i 243 105,794a 264 985
aReentry body "skips" at this initial entry angle_ Total heat in-
put includes the amount during the skip portion of the trajectory.
At orbital altitudes and velocities it is assumedthat there is in-
sufficient fuel to permit an abort impulse that would lead to a reentry
angle greater than 4 to 5° (as in the case of the fuel capsule). The maxi-
mumheating rate is relatively low at these angles but the total heat in-
put is large. Estimates of thermal protection weight (as supplied by NASA-
Langley) are given in Table 8.3.
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Table 8.3. Ablative Protection
Requirements
Charring ablators assumed
Total
W/CDA Weight
(ib)
Weight of Ablative
Protection Required
(ib/ft2)
At At End
Nose of Flare
120 145 8.5 4.3
90 118 7.5 3.5
75 105 6.9 3.0
50 83 5.5 2.4
These thermal protection weights can be compared with protection re-
quirements estimated by Swann, 66 as shown in Fig. 8.9 (except for the
Langley computed line_ this figure is a reproduction from Ref. 66). The
rates of heating and total quantities of heat experienced at an entry
angle of i° are shown on Fig. 8.9. The comparison is favorable and in-
dicates that progress has been made in reducing thermal protection weights
required for a given mission. It is also clear from the graph that the
protection required for the large total heat input can also adequately
safeguard the vehicle from the higher heating rates but smaller total heat
loads that are obtained at larger entry angles if the ablator can remain
intact under the higher dynamic loads.
In summary, for purposes of maximum safety during an emergency abort
of the heat source the fuel capsules can be embodied in a reentry shape
that provides impaction integrity and protection from the aerodynamic
forces and heating of hypersonic reentry.
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9. HEAT TRANSFER
The design approaches to methods for transferring heat from the fuel
block to the Brayton-cycle working fluid were largely determined by the
following criteria:
1. The fuel capsule surface temperature was not to exceed 2000°F.
2. In the event of a mission abort, the fuel block was to be ejected
from the spacecraft and reenter in a package that was separate from the
rest of Brayton-cycle power system.
3. In the event the Brayton-cycle power conversion system became
inoperative, the fuel block was to be able to dissipate all its heat to
space without exceeding the 2000°F capsule temperature limitation.
4. The fuel block and reentry body combination was to have a low
enough ballistic coefficient and frontal loading to preclude the possi-
bility of burial upon impact in a medium lik_ dry sand in the event of a
random reentry.
The following methods of transferring heat from the fuel to the
Brayton-cycle working fluid were considered:
1. liquid metal heat exchange loop,
2. direct cooling with Brayton-cycle working fluid (argon),
3. radiant heat transfer,
4. heat pipe, and
5. conduction by mechanical contact of heat exchanger and fuel block.
Preliminary evaluations for complexity, fabricability, operational
simplicity, handling, and reliability led to the general conclusions that
1. Schemes involving liquid metals, except as evaporative material
in a heat pipe concept, offered no advantage over simpler methods in the
temperature range of interest (1500--2000°F), and the introduction of a
secondary heat transfer loop would reduce the overall system reliability.
2. Any method of conduction through mechanical contact would have
to be treated as radiant heat transfer because of the difficulty in as-
sessing the amount of area in good thermal contact and guaranteeing that
this contact would be maintained throughout the mission.
3. The use of a heat pipe for the normal operating mode offered no
large advantage in the way of making a more compact fuel block because
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the fuel block area requirements for maintaining a 2000°F or less capsule
temperature are dictated by the temperature drop between the back side
and front operating side of the capsulej as well as by the temperature
drop between the operating surface and the heat exchanger. In addition_
the total fuel block and reentry body volume was determined by the need
for a ballistic coefficient of i00 or less and not by heat exchanger area
requirements.
The concept of using a modified form of the heat pipe for dumping
the entire heat load of the source to space in the event the Brayton-cycle
power conversion system becameinoperative offered system reliability
advantages; it is described in Section i0. The above phase I preliminary
evaluation and conclusions left direct cooling and radiant heat transfer
as the methods of most interest for fuel block--heat exchanger arrangements.
Direct cooling would provide a small-volume light-weight system and mini-
mumcapsule surface temperatures; however_ it might be operationally ob-
jectionable because of disconnect problems. Heat transfer calculations
were carried out in enough detail to insure that the conceptual system
designs developed in the phase I portion of the study would not_ upon more
rigorous analysis in phase II_ result in excessive capsule temperatures
or unachievable heat exchanger designs.
9.1 Heat Transfer Calculational Models
A general analysis of heat transfer and fluid flow for the argon
coolant was developed for cooling the fuel capsules by direct contact with
the fuel block or indirect cooling through an intermediate heat exchanger 3
as would be the case with radiant heat transfer. Both cooling methods
have the same gas-film behavior_ and therefore a common solution was gen-
erated with the following basic assumptions:
i. Reynolds number greater than i0_000_
2. specific heat constant,
3. Fanning friction inversely proportional to 5th root of the Reynolds
number_
4. combined inlet and exit pressure losses I0_ of the total allowable
pressure drop across the heat exchangerj
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5. a mass flow rate of 1080 ib/hr,
6. a meangas pressure of 1900 ib/ft 2.
The analytical expressions for the Reynolds number, heat transfer
coefficient, and gas flow path length were determined to be
4320Re =_
_ '
h _ o.75oo.2 .2 o.Ac
4.1_× lO6 A3 (AP/P)
L = c ,
_i. 0.22WB
where
Re = Reynolds number,
= viscosity, ibm/ft.hr ,
= wetted perimeter of flow area, ft,
h = heat transfer coefficient, Btu/hr. ft2.°F_
T = absolute temperature, °R,
A = area, ft 2,
L = gas flow path length, ft,
ZkP = allowable pressure drop across component, ibf/ft 3,
P = mean absolute pressure in component, Ibf/ft 2.
The subscript B indicates bulk temperature properties; subscript S, sur-
face temperature properties; and the subscript c, cross-sectional value.
A ealculational model heat exchanger design that was analyzed had a
radiantly heated surface and internal gas coolant passages. The total
wetted perimeter of the gas passages was utilized to transfer 25 kw of
heat to the argon gas with an inlet temperature of approximately 900°F
and an outlet temperature of 1500°F. It was assumed that no temperature
gradient existed between the heat deposition surface and the internal
passage surface area. A parametric examination of possible gas flow pass-
age configurations was made, and the results are given in Table 9.1. The
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Table 9.1. Gas-Side Heat Exchanger Arrangement
q = 25 kw
Exit temperature = 1500°F
Type of
Coolant
Passage
Passage
Dimensions
(in.)
Heat ExchangerNumber Number Mean Fractional Flow
Surface
of of Surface Pressure Passage (ft)
Parallel Coolant Temperature Loss Pitch
Passages Passes (°R) (2_P/P) (in.) Width Length
Rectangular
Rectangular
Square
Circular
Circular
Circular
Circular
Circular
Circular
Circular
1 3/4 × 7/8 5 3 2037 0.0484
5 3 2037 0.0565
7/8 × 1 3/4 5 3 2037 0.0673
7/8 x 7/8 10 3 2037 0.0600
1/2 (ips) 20 5 2120 0.0573
20 3 2120 0.0465
20 i 2120 0.0357
20 i 2043 0.0600
3/4 (ips) 16 i 2046 0.03
16 1 2046 0.03
15 1 2016 0.04
i0 3 2000 0.0635
5/8 (BWG-20) 24 1 2080 0.0568
24 1 2080 0.0568
24 1 2065 0.0600
24 i 2065 0.0600
5/8 (BWG-I8) 25 i 2102 0.0600
25 1 2102 0.0600
3/4 (BWG-14) 22 i 2057 0.0600
22 1 2057 0.0600
22 I 2080 0.0555
22 1 2080 0.0555
7/8 (BWG-I8) 17 i 2040 0.0347
17 i 2040 0.0347
14 1 2024 0.0600
14 1 2024 0.0600
17 1 2075 0.0300
17 1 2075 0.0300
16 i 2112 0.0300
16 1 2112 0.0300
7/8 (BWG-12) 20 i 2092 0.0400
20 i 2092 0.0400
20 i 2092 0.0400
2.38 3.13 4.99
1.88 2.50 5.01
1.00 1.66 4.97
1.19 3.28 3.54
1.20 i0.0 0.97
1.20 6.00 1.45
1.00 2.0 4.065
i. 00 2.0 6.83
1.05 1.40 8.95
i. 30 i. 73 8.95
1.30 1.63 10.63
1.05 3.15 3.93
0.625 1.25 5.28
0.875 1.75 5.28
0.825 1.25 5.58
0.875 1.75 5.58
0.625 1.29 4.68
0.875 1.81 4.68
0.750 1.38 6.10
1.000 1.83 6.10
0.750 1.38 5.59
1.000 1.83 5.59
0.875 1.24 8.72
1.125 1.59 8.72
0.875 1.02 10.63
1.125 1.31 10.63
0.875 1.24 7.54
1.125 1.59 7.54
0.875 1.24 6.76
1.125 1.59 6.76
0.875 1.46 6.02
1.125 1.87 6.02
1.375 2.29 6.02
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mean surface temperatures range from 350 to 500°F above the mean gas tem-
perature of 1200°F. The friction losses as a function of pressure drop
vary from 3 to 7%, as specified in the heat exchanger design guidelines
(Sect. 1). A compromise between friction loss, mean surface temperature,
and gas flow path length governs the selection of the particular heat
exchanger configuration. Generally, a heat exchanger of ten parallel pass-
ages with three coolant passes was selected as the design. This selection
gave 4 ft of tubing per pass, a fractional pressure drop of about 0.06,
and a mean surface temperature of approximately 1540°F. The selected heat
exchanger combination was integrated with heat block designs to form com-
ponents of the system designs discussed in Section 10.
Since 244Cm was expected to have the highest temperature drop through
the capsule because of its higher power density, it was used in the calcu-
lational model to determine the fuel block temperature profile. The model
was an infinite-length curium fuel capsule inserted in a tubular capsule
holder. The fuel capsule had the standard multiple-layer construction,
as described in Section 5, with an outside diameter of 1.598 in. The aver-
age heat generation rate was assumed to be 10% greater than the minimum
requirements for a beginning-of-life capsule to compensate for expected
heat losses, and this rate existed over the entire capsule length. The
problem was thus reduced to a two-dimensional heat transfer problem, which
was solved by relaxation techniques on an IBM 7090 computer. The tubular
capsule holder was assumed to be made of a superalloy with a 1/16-in. wall
thickness. The tube radiated from one-half the holder surface, and the
remaining surface was insulated. The radiative surface was assumed to
see an average receiver temperature of 1350°F, and the surface emissivities
and/or absorptivities were assumed to be 0.8, which is consistent with the
properties of the iron titanate coating used in the conceptual capsule de-
signs. Average geometry factors were assumed, and no area amplification
(finning) was used in the temperature distribution calculation. The re-
sults obtained with this model are shown in Fig. 9.1. The radiating sur-
face temperature range was 1740 to 1850°F, whereas the T-222 alloy con-
tainment shell maximum temperature was 1924°F. The pressed oxide pellet
temperatures were in the neighborhood of 1900 to 1930°F at the metal-oxide
interfaces.
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INSULATll 1807 (HEAT SINK TEMP.=I350°F)
Fig. 9.1. Temperature Profile of Typical Curium Capsule. Tempera-
tures are in °F.
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Most of the heat would be transferred by conduction from the vicinity
of the capsule opposite the radiating surface. A small fraction of the
heat would be radiated across the internal gas storage volume, but it would
not be significant. A check was madeby filling the void in the model with
metal, and the analysis showedapproximately 10°F less for the maximum
T-222 containment shell temperature.
Radiation heat transfer of 25 kwwas first estimated for average
black-body radiating and receiver temperatures. Then, an all inclusive
interchange efficiency factor was introduced as a combined variable for
the geometrical factor, emissivities, absorptivities, reflection, and re-
radiation from inactive surfaces. The results are shownin Fig. 9.2 for
the mutual influence of the parameters. Based on values determined from
the previous models for average gas side and fuel block temperatures, Fig.
9.2 shows that at a receiver (gas side heat exchanger) temperature of
1550°F3 a radiator (fuel block) temperature of 1800°F_ and an interchange
factor of 0.7, approximately 7 ft 2 of fuel block area would be required
to transfer 25 kwto the gas heat exchanger. At an average fuel block
temperature of 1700°F, approximately 13 ft 2 would be required for the same
conditions. This analysis gave assurance that there would be sufficient
fuel block heat exchange area because of the large number of capsules in-
volved to stay within the 2000°F capsule temperature limitation without
resorting to extended-surface fuel block designs.
9.2 Fuel Block and Capsule Arrangements
The capsule design investigations provided a table of suitable cap-
sule dimensions and number of capsules to fulfill stated criteria. The
various combinations of size and number of capsules were made into layout
drawings to establish physical dimensions of the fuel block. In the final
system concepts (Sect. 10) the fuel block had to be incorporated into a
reentry body design so that emergency reentry modes could be accommodated,
and this was considered in arriving at acceptable arrangements. It was
assumed for the purpose of the layouts that all capsules were to be in-
stalled in superalloy tubular holders with a 1/16-in. wall thickness and
a 3/32-in. diametrical clearance. It was decided to use tubular holders
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because, at operating temperatures, the outer platinum layer of the cap-
sule would not have sufficient strength to permit a direct clamping ar-
rangement. The holders would also facilitate assembly of the source and
would be expected to provide adequate reentry heating protection on the
backside of the reentry body where the heating rate is low. The support-
ing structure for these holders to withstand reentry forces was not in-
cluded in the layouts or weight summaries discussed later.
The configuration of capsules and holders was incorporated into a
reentry body shape of a blunted cone with a spherical nose having a 1-ft
radius (Sect. 8). The various layouts obtained for the tubular capsule
holder concepts were reviewed, and the vehicles with minimum projected
diameter were determined for each fuel form by an iterative process, as
indicated in Table 9.2. The minimum diameter reentry bodies were expected
to give minimum volume systems for which nuclear radiation shields would
have to be provided. Consequently, the total lift-off weight (reentry
body plus shield) was anticipated to be a minimum when the reentry body
diameter was a minimum.
The minimum reentry body sizes were analyzed, and weights were cal-
culated for the following items:
i. capsule,
2. capsule holder,
3. ablative protection, based on 8 lb/ft 2 (Sect. 8) of frontal surface
area,
4. insulation, based on i in. of Superinsulation with a density of
20 ib/ft 3 (Sect. 9.3) between the reentry body shell and the capsule
tube sheet,
5. reentry body structure, based on 20 ib/ft 2 of projected area (NASA-
Langley estimate), and
6. heat sink (i00 ib BeO for all reentry bodies).
The corresponding weights and projected diameters were combined with
an estimated thermal drag coefficient of 0.89 to obtain the terminal bal-
listic coefficient (W/CDA) for the various reentry body designs.
The first capsule configuration that was investigated was a linear
array of adjacent rows of capsule holders at the base of the conical sec-
tion of the reentry body_ as shown in Fig. 9.3. A cone angle of 60 ° was
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Fig. 9.3. Reentry Body for a Plane Fuel Array.
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tentatively selected (Sect. 8), as indicated in the figure. The essential
componentsare listed as the ablative coating, structural shell, insula-
tion, tubular capsule holders, and fuel capsules. Also included are refer-
ences to conceptual systems discussed in Section 10.
A summary(Table 9.2) for a 238Pu02capsule stress-rate safety factor
of 2.5 illustrates the variations in the diameter, weight, and terminal
ballistic coefficient found in these typical investigations. The weight
of the fuel capsules would be approximately 1400 lb, which is approximately
60%of the total reentry body weight. The column of remarks in the table
refers to Fig. 5.19 in Section 5. Generally_ the minimumvolume of cap-
sules provided the reentry vehicle with the minimumprojected diameter
but gave the largest terminal ballistic coefficient for any constant cap-
sule stress-rate safety factor.
Table 9.2. 238Pu02 Fuel Reentry Body Design for a Plane Fuel Array
Stress-rate safety factor: 2.5
Capsule Size Reentry
(in.) Capsules Body Reentry TerminalBody Ballistic
Outside Required ProjectedDiameter Weight Coeffi-
Diameter Length (in.) (!b) cient
Remarks
2.580 10.13 108 68 2300 105 Minimum volume
of capsules
2.934 11.55 88 72 2330 88
3.580 14.13 70 76 2380 84 Minimum weight
of capsules
A similar treatment of the 24_Cm203 fuel form resulted in the sum-
mary given in Table 9.3 for a capsule stress-rate reduction (rupture
stress-rate safety factor) of 7. The capsules would weigh approximately
500 lb, which is about 45% of the total weights given. For this particu-
lar case, the reentry body of minimum projected diameter had the minimum
volume of capsules, like the 238Pu02 capsules previously discussed. How-
ever, the design selected varied slightly from the minimum volume capsule
Table 9.3.
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244Cm203Fuel Reentry BodyDesign for a Plane Fuel Array
Capsule Size Reentry Reentry TerminalBody(in.) Capsules Projected Body Ballistic
Outside Required Diameter Weight Coeffi- Remarks
Diameter Length (in.) (lb) cient
2.048 8.00 134 58 1170 72 Minimumweight
of capsules
1.598 6.20 172 52 1040 79 Selected de-
sign
1.416 5.47 212 52 1150 87 Minimumvolume
of capsules
design to give the minimumreentry body weight. This coincidence of mini-
mumcapsule volume and minimumreentry body diameter was not a general
rule with the curium fuel form for other safety factors. However, in all
cases the minimumreentry body dimension always occurred with a fuel cap-
sule volume that was nearly the minimumvalue for each stress-rate safety
factor.
The sameexamination of other capsule stress-rate safety factors re-
sulted in Fig. 9.4 for reentry body diameter and Fig. 9.5 for reentry body
weight for the curium and plutonium fuel forms. Also included is the
147pm203fuel form, which has no helium pressure buildup and therefore is
not influenced by stress-rate safety factors in the optimized capsule de-
sign. The slope of the 23SPucurve is 1.5 times the slope of the 244Cm
curve in both figures. Although the 147pmreentry body diameter is the
sameas that for one 244Cmdesign3 the weight of the reentry body is 250 lb
more than that of the corresponding 244Cmreentry body because the weight
of the promethium fuel and capsules is greater.
Another capsule arrangement, shownin Fig. 9.6, has the capsules
nested on the inside conical surface of the reentry body. The samegen-
eral information is supplied on the drawing as in the previous fuel ar-
rangement, except for the reference to use in different system concepts.
The slopes of the plutonium and curium weight and diameter curves for the
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plane fuel array just discussed were normalized to calculated points for
this configuration. The samegeneral trend was expected to prevail for
this configuration as for the plane fuel array for changes in the capsule
stress-rate safety factor, and it was expected that the extrapolation
would be adequate for the conceptual design phase of the study. The re-
sults of the extrapolation are shownin Fig. 9.7. As before_ the prome-
thium curve is given for reference. A comparison of the conical fuel ar-
rangement with the plane fuel array revealed that the conical array weighs
approximately 200 ib more. This weight penalty was a direct result of a
larger reentry body diameter. The diameter increase was brought about
by the inefficient use of the conical area in contrast to the efficiently
used plane area.
An attempt to more effectively utilize the internal volume of the
reentry body for capsule placement gave the configuration shownin Fig.
9.8. Although the parallel rows of capsules with the heat exchanger tubes
fitting between the rows of fuel slugs provided better heat removal con-
ditions, the reentry body had a projected diameter that fell between those
of the plane fuel array and the conical fuel array. Use of this arrange-
ment did not appear to offer any weight savings.
Another conceptual arrangement to accomplish the last objective was
tried with the concentric capsule arrangement shown in Fig. 9.9. The
fuel slugs were stacked so that a blunted cone with a cylindrical exten-
sion would result in a small projected diameter. However, the protrusion
of the cylinder behind the blunted cone in all probability would upset
the stability of the reentry body during reentry by disturbing the correct
relationship between center of gravity and center of pressure for proper
orientation. If the sides of the cone are extended to a cone diameter
where the fuel is approximately contained within the cone volume_ the fuel
arrangement falls into the samecategory as the previously mentioned par-
allel rows design; that is, it is an in-between design that does not offer
any outstanding advantages.
The range of terminal ballistic coefficients for the fuel block and
reentry body concepts for the three fuels is given below:
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Fuel
Terminal Ballistic
Coefficient Range
238pu02 80-110
Z47Pm203 90-100
244Cm203 70-90
These values show that the desired value of approximately 100 for impact
considerations is a reasonable objective for an isotopic heat source in
this size range.
9.3 Thermal Insulation
Part of the thermal insulation for the heat source would be contained
within the reentry body and should be as light a weight as possible so
that it does not add significantly to the reentry body weight. It should
also be highly efficient to minimize the amount of excess fuel required
in the heat source to compensate for heat losses.
A review of conventional insulation indicated that one of the most
promising materials is Superinsulation manufactured by Linde Division of
Union Carbide Corporation. Superinsulation, a multiple-layer system con-
sisting of highly reflective shields and low-conductivity fillers in
vacuum_ has been successfully used for insulating cryogenic liquids in
storage. Although the normal materials of construction are not suitable
for the high temperatures encountered in the Brayton-cycle isotopic power
system 3 discussions with the Linde Laboratories at Tonawanda, New York,
indicated that a new multilayer composite has been designed for long ser-
vice life in a 2000°F environment. The new composite_ a system of 1-mil-
thick layers of tantalum and 15-mil-thick quartz spacers, consists of
approximately 60 layers of each material per inch of insulation thickness.
The estimated thermal conductivity of the composite system was 2.4 X l0 -3
Btu-ft/hr. ft2.°F with one surface at 2000°F and the other surface at 100°F.
The use of quartz spacers in intimate contact with tantalum at high tem-
peratures for long periods of time may introduce compatibility problems;
however, it is expected that other ceramic spacer materials can be sub-
stituted for the quartz if necessary.
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A comparison of this estimate was madewith data for someother high-
temperature Superinsulations currently available at Linde. These materials
have the thermal characteristics given in Fig. 9.10. The estimated tan-
talum-quartz value appeared to be conservative because tantalum has a lower
absorptivity and a higher reflectivity for the temperature range of in-
terest whencomparedwith the metals used to generate the data in the fig-
ure. The significance of such low-thermal-conductivity insulation was
evaluated for the conceptual systems with i in. of insulation and a ther-
mal conductivity of 2.4 × 10-3 Btu-ft/hr. ft2.°F. The inner surface tem-
peratures were assumedto be 2000°F_ and the outside skin temperature was
calculated to be 67°F with an effective sink temperature of --20°F. The
heat flux was determined to be 56 Btu/hr. ft 2, and this heat flux resulted
in the heat-loss percentages given in Table 9.4. Figure 9.10 does not
include any losses due to conduction along metal supports that might pene-
trate the insulation for support purposes.
Table 9.4. Estimated Heat Losses for
Conceptual Systems
Fuel
Rangeof Surface Area
for Shielded Volume
(ft 2)
Rangeof
Heat Loss
(%)
23 SPu02 90-150 6-9.5
•4 ?pro203 60-90 4-$
244Cm203 50-100 3.5-7.0
Normally, Superinsulation units are maintained at a pressure of i to
i0 W Hg.\ The insulation sections employed on the conceptual systems would
not be sealed, so the laminated composite could communicate directly with
the space vacuum of 10 -8 _ (at 380 miles altitude) or less. The value
of the space vacuum pressure is immaterial because the insulating quality
is essentially unchanged at pressures below i0 _. The unsealed insulation
would lose its superinsulating value when it returned to the earth's atmo-
sphere; this is a desirable feature in helping to prevent excessive fuel
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block temperatures in the event of randomreentry. Also_ the tantalum
would rapidly oxidize and disintegrate after reentry; this is also con-
sidered to be beneficial.
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i0. HEATSOURCESYSTEMCONCEPTUALDESIGNS
Nine heat source concepts were studied, and each was examined for use
with two or more of the fuels. The layouts of the components, including
the shield configurations are described in the following sections. The
capsule design for each fuel is described in Section 5. All the concepts
employ a blunted-cone-shaped reentry body, as described in Sections 8 and
9. Each concept is examined for the normal modeof operation and emer-
gency heat rejection. The reentry body diameters for various fuel capsule
arrangements are given in Section 9; they range between 40 and 100 in.
depending on the concept, fuel form, and stress-rate safety factor employed.
The system conceptual designs were detailed only to the extent neces-
sary to obtain and compareapproximate weights and volumes. The calculated
weights include the fuel, fuel capsules, fuel capsule mounting structure,
reentry bo _L_±±, _±_w _J_±, ._. _±_, _,_ gamma _
All these weights, except those for the neutron and gamma shields, were
combined to give a reentry body weight that is the total weight of that
part of the system which would reenter the earth's atmosphere in the event
of a mission abort that utilized the passive reentry body. This weight
was used to calculate the ballistic coefficient of the reentry portion
of the system. Support structure for the reentry body, latches, ejection
mechanisms, and similar items were not included in the system weight.
In Section i0.i the reference shielding model supplied by NASA is
used. The weight reduction study in Section 10.2 makes comparisons that
result from the use of other dose level criteria and variations in heat
source to crew compartment separation distance.
i0.i Conceptual Design Descriptions
I0.I.i Foldin_ Heat Exchanser for a Plane Fuel Reentry Body
The equipment layout for the plane fuel reentry body with a folding
heat exchanger is given in Fig. i0.i. The fuel block, a plane fuel array
in a blunted-cone reentry body, is located adjacent to the heat exchanger,
which was put next to the spacecraft skin. A redundant heat exchanger
is included in the equipment layout. The two heat exchangers were
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integrated into a disk array by making the tubes into involutes of a cir-
cle. The tubes were then nested together to form a continuous heat re-
ceiver plane from which either set of tubes would remove the heat in the
normal modeof operation. The emergencymodeof operation would be ini-
tiated if the Brayton-cycle system failed to operate by opening a door in
the spacecraft and folding the heat exchanger disk out of the way. The
exposed fuel capsule holders would thenbe able to radiate to a space
environment heat sink. The ability to fold the exchanger out of the way
required both the inlet and outlet coolant lines to be flexible. This
was accomplished with the foldable tubes developed at Lewis Research Cen-
ter 68 (shown in Fig. 10.2). The hinging action is obtained by first col-
lapsing the tube and then bending it around a pivot point. Tests at Lewis
have shownthat the foldable tube can withstand repeated flexing action
without failure.
The thermal path in normal operation would be radiation from the fuel
capsules to the capsule holder tubes, conduction in the tubular walls,
and then radiation to the active heat exchanger. The emergencymodeis
essentially the sameexcept that the tube holders are exposed to the
space heat sink when the heat exchangers are folded out of the thermal
path.
The shielding configuration for the foldable heat exchanger concept
is shownin Fig. 10.3. The shield was designed as a 4_ solid angle unit.
The figure is an expandedview of the shield for the 244Cm203fuel form.
There are three distinct thicknesses of shield, with the thinnest section
corresponding to an enveloping shield that provides for a radiation dose
rate of 600 mrem/hr at 3 meters. The intermediate thickness was needed
to reduce the scattered radiation dose rate at the crew-compartmentbulk-
head to the design level of 3 mrem/hr. Scattering collisions can occur
at any point in the equipment module; and consequently a large solid angle
had to be shielded to protect against this contribution to the dose rate
in the crew compartment. The additional thin layer over part of the
scattered-radiation shield was added to bring the uncollided dose rate
down to a level that was acceptable in the crew compartment.
A breakdown of shield weights for this concept follows the general
outline of the solid angle that the shield protects. The scattered,
16 0 
( a )  Side view. 
‘ 7  
- 
PHOTO 73128 
L-zlMb 24 
( b l  Oblique view of end showing closeup of cross section. 
Fig. 10.2. Foldable-Tube Specimen Equiva len t  to 3 - i n .  -ID Tube. 
( c )  Specimen i n  collapsed and bent position. 
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uncollided, and 4_ solid angle contributions are included with the fuel
forms, shield materials, and total shield weights in Table i0.i.
Table i0.i. Shield Weights for One-Year Occupancyof a System
with a Plane Fuel Array and a Folding Heat Exchanger
Stress-rate safety factor: 2.5
Crew Shield
Weight 4mSolid Total
Fuel Shielding (ib) Angle Shield Shield
Weight Weight
Material For For (ib) (ib)Scattered Direct
Radiation Radiation
238Puo2a LiH 0 950 0 950
238PuO2b LiH 300 1810 0 2110
147Pm203c,d Tantalum 550 2620 380 3550
l_TPm203d,e Tantalum 900 3530 1070 5500
244Cm203 LiH 700 1960 420 3080
Tantalum 430 3340 0 3770
Total 1130 5300 420 6850
a0xygen-18 depleted by a factor of 20 in fuel compound.
bNatural oxygen in fuel compound.
c5 × 10-5%146pmcontamination.
d147pm203capsules independent of stress-rate reduction.
e5 × 10-4%1_6pmcontamination.
The breakdownhas two 238Pu02entries. The first corresponds to
the fuel compounddepleted in 180 and the second is for fuel containing
natural oxygen if it is assumedthat (_,n)neutrons from other impurities
are insignificant. Isotopic purification of the oxygen to deplete 180
by a factor of 20 reduced the nuclear radiation source intensity by a
factor of i0 below that associated with the use of natural oxygen in the
fuel compound. Neither of the plutonium fuel forms required a 4F shield,
and only a shadowshield is required when depleted oxygen is used in the
fuel compound.
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Twocases are also considered for the i%7pm203fuel form. Promethium-
147 obtained from production reactor fuel reprocessing typically has ap-
proximately 10-5%146pm, while 147pmfrom power reactor fuels is expected
to have approximately 10-4%146pm. The effect on the shield weight of
this factor of l0 in 146pmconcentration is significant even at these very
low contamination levels.
The 2aaCm203fuel has both tantalum and LiH shielding requirements
in contrast to only LiH for the plutonium fuels and tantalum for the
promethium fuels. As a result the curium concepts are the heaviest, ir-
respective of the stress-rate safety factor used in the capsule design.
This is shownin Fig. 10.%, where the lift-off weights (reentry body plus
fuel and total shield weight) for the plutonium and curium fuels are
plotted against the stress-rate safety factor. Whenthe stress-rate safety
factor is varied from 2.5 to 7, the plutonium fuels exhibit a factor of
approximately 2 change in weights, whereas the curium fuels have a factor
of approximately 1.5. The promethium fuel designs that have a plane fuel
array have a lift-off weight of 5000 lb for production reactor material
and 7000 lb if power reactor material is used.
10.1.2 Foldin_ Heat Exchanger for a 60 ° Conical Fuel Reentry Body
The plane fuel array concept was next modified to a conical fuel ar-
ray in the reentry body. The modification permitted the heat exchangers
to nest within the reentry body, as shown in Fig. 10.5. There are both
an active heat exchanger and an inactive one. The energy transmission
encounters consecutive radiation, conduction, and radiation resistances
in the thermal path. The heat exchanger complex folds out of the thermal
path so that the capsule holders are exposed to space through a door when
emergency or passive heat rejection is required. The heat exchangers
must have hinged joints in the coolant lines like those of the foldable
tube that was described for the previous concept (Sect. 10.1.1).
The shielding configuration, shown in Fig. 10.6, is only slightly
different from that for the previous concept. The shield weights, shown
in Table 10.2, reflect an increase in reentry body diameter for the conical
fuel array over the plane fuel array. The weights are greater than for
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Table 10.2. Shield Weights for 0ne-Year Occupancyof a System
With a 60° Conical Fuel Array and a Folding Heat Exchanger
Fuel ShieldingMaterial
Crew Shield Weight
(lb)
For For
Scattered Direct
Radiation Radiation
4m Solid Total
Angle Shield Shield
Weight Weight
(lb) (ib)
2 44Cm203a
238pu.o2b , c
238pu02C, d
147pm203e
147-o,.,_^A f
LiH 1480 3230 1140 5,850
Tantalum Ii00 6190 0 7,290
Total 2580 9420 1140 13,140
LiH 490 2930 0 3,420
LiH 0 1150 0_ i, 150
Tantalum 1720 3740 750 6,210
Tanta!_ 500 3050 700 4, 250
astress-rate safety factor of 7.
bNatural oxygen in fuel compound.
Cstress-rate safety factor of 2.5.
d0xygen-18 depleted by a factor of 20 in fuel compound.
e5 x 10-4% 1461_qI contamination.
f5 X 10-5% i46pm contamination
the previous concept, as would be expected because of the larger shielded
volume.
10.1.3 Deployed 60 ° Conical Fuel Reentry Body
Equipment identical with that for the previous concept was used for
the deployed reentry body, but the roles of the heat exchangers and re-
entry body were inverted in the passive heat rejection mode. The emer-
gency mode would consist of deploying the reentry body through a door in
the spacecraft by a translation and rotation to expose the fuel capsule
holders to the heat sink. The equipment shown in Fig. 10.7 presents the
slightly different shielding configuration shown in Fig. 10.8. The shield
weights in Table 10.3 show that there is not a significant weight advantage
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Table 10.3. Shield Weights for 0ne-Year Occupancyof a System
With a 60° Conical Fuel Array and a Deployed Reentry Body
ShieldingFuel Material
Crew Shield Weight
(ib) 4m Solid Total
Angle Shield Shield
For For Weight Weight
Scattered Direct (ib) (ib)
Radiation Radiation
244Cm203a f.iH 1690 3,770 670 6,130
Tantalum 1780 7,180 0 8, 960
Total 3470 i0, 950 670 15,090
238puo2b, c LiH 690 2,980 0 3,670
238pu02 c,d LiH 0 1,590 0 1,590
147Pm203e Tantalum 1980 4, 060 270 6,310
147pm203 f Tantalum 1200 3,010 i00 4,310
astress-rate safety factor of 7.
bNatural oxygen in fuel compound.
CStress-rate safety factor of 2.5.
d0xygen-18 depleted by a factor of 20 in fuel compound.
e5 × 10-4% 146Pm contamination.
f5 × i0-5% 14_Pm contamination.
between this and the previous concept. The advantage-of either concept
would be in the reliability of the devices required to produce the neces-
sary motion for emergency heat rejection.
10.1.4 Inclined Plane Fuel Reentry Body
An arrangement of the disk-shaped heat exchangers and the plane fuel
array reentry body so that the plane surfaces are inclined to each other
is shown in Fig. 10.9. The normal mode of operation provides a direct
view of the active heat exchanger tubes by the fuel holders for direct
radiant energy transfer. Also heat transmission occurs by reflection
and radiation from the inactive walls surrounding the system. Consecutive
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radiation, conduction, and radiation is the manner in which the energy
travels from the fuel capsules to the heat exchanger.
The passive heat rejection modeis initiated whena door in the space-
craft opens to allow the fuel holders to have a direct view toward space.
The view angle toward space is sufficient to cool the fuel capsules with-
out exceeding the temperature limitation.
The shielding arrangement is given in Fig. I0.i0 for the inclined
reentry body concept. The isometric is distorted by the inclination of
the surfaces, but the breakdown in Table 10.4 establishes that these
weights are essentially the sameas those for the deployed reentry body
concept.
Table 10.4. Shield Weights for One-Year Occupancyof a System
With an Inclined Plane Fuel Reentry Body
Stress-rate safety factor: 7
Fuel ShieldingMaterial
Crew Shield Weight
(ib)
For For
Scattered Direct
Radiation Radiation
244Cm203
4_ Solid Total
Angle Shield Shield
Weight Weight
(lb) (lb)
LiH 3050 2360 1710 7,120
Tantalum 3980 3910 0 7,890
Total 7030 6270 1710 15,010
10.1.5 Directly Cooled Plane Fuel Reentry Body
A directly cooled body is shown in Fig. i0.ii. The fuel capsules
are inserted in holes with separate internal coolant passagesnear each
line of capsules. One set of coolant passages is the active heat ex-
changer, whereas the other set provides the redundant coolant system.
The thermal path is by radiation from the capsules to the tubesheet and
then by conduction to the coolant passages.
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The placement of the reentry body has the tubesheet adjacent to the
spacecraft wall. This location permits a door in the craft to open for
heat rejection to space if coolant flow stops.
Emergencyejection of the reentry body for return to the earth's
atmosphere is hamperedby the coolant lines. These connections would
have to be severed before the body could be separated from the craft.
Quick disconnects would present problems in coolant leakage, in addition
to the delay needed to break the connentions during a suddenabort situa-
tion.
The shielding configuration is muchthe sameas for the previous
concepts. The shield shown in Fig. 10.12 has the weight breakdown given
in Table 10.5.
Table 10.5. Shield Weights for 0ne-Year Occupancyof a System
Stress_rate safety factor: 7
Fuel ShieldingMaterial
Crew Shield Weight
For For
Scattered Direct
Radiation Radiation
4_ Solid Total
Angle Shield Shield
Weight Weight
(ib) (lb)
244Cm203 LiH 1610 3,820 870 6,300
Tantalum 920 6,410 0 7,330
Total 2530 10,230 870 13,630
10.1.6 Rotatin_ Plane Fuel Reentry Body
The equipment layout (Fig. 10.13) for a rotating plane fuel reentry
body includes a mechanism with which the reentry body could be rotated to
see space through a door in the spacecraft for passive heat rejection.
Normal heat removal would be quite similar to that previously discussed,
but the separation distance between the heat exchanger disk and the re=
entry body would have to be increased to provide clearance for the reentry
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body during its rotation to see space. The added volume for the clearance
space is reflected in the shield configuration given in Fig. 10.14. The
shield is elongated and distorted due to the turning mechanism and these
perturbations are reflected in the shield weights given in Table 10.6.
The table also shows the drastically increased shield weights due to added
system volume.
Table 10.6. Shield Weights for One-Year Occupancy of a System
With a Rotating Plane Fuel Reentry Body
Crew Shield Weight
(ib) 4_ Solid Total
Fuel Shielding Angle Shield Shield
Material For For Weight Weight
Scattered Direct (ib) (ib)
Radiation Radiation
244Cm203_
238puo2b, c
238pu02 c, d
147pm203 e
147pm203 f
LiH 2110 6,290 1410 9, 810
Tantalum 770 12,320 0 13,090
Total 2880 18,610 1410 22,900
LiH 1700 4,180 0 5,880
LiH 0 2,190 0 2,190
Tantalum 3470 7,660 750 ii, 880
Tantalum 2110 5,830 270 8,210
astress-rate safety factor of 7.
bNatural oxygen in fuel compound.
Cstress-rate safety factor of 2.5.
doxygen-18 depleted by a factor of 20 in fuel compound.
e5 × i0-_% 146pm contamination.
f5 × 10-5% 146pm contamination.
10.1.7 Refluxin5 Condenser With Surface Tension Forces
A heat pipe concept to eliminate doors, mechanism, and flow-sensing
elements led to the equipment arrangement shown in Fig. 10.15. For normal
operation the disk heat exchangers and plane fuel reentry body function
in the scheme as similar concepts already discussed. The basic
179
ORNL-DWG 66-2877
\
Fig. 10.14. Shielding Configuration for a Rotating Plane Fuel Reentry
Body with a Disk Heat Exchanger.
180
ORNL-DWG 66-2874
NO. I CYCLE i
>
L
CAPSULE
FUEL BLOCK
CONDENSER
TYPICAL
INVOLUTE
TUBE.
EITHER
> /Z ,DERoF
HEADER OF
NO. 2
REENTRY
BODY
FUEL
2 CYCLE
EVAPORATIVE
SURFACE
-HEADER
NO. 2 CYCLE
HEAOEMOF
"NO.I
LIQIJID
RETURN PASSAGE
INSULATION /PASSAGE
Fig. 10.15. Equipment Arrangement for a Plane Fuel Reentry Body and
a Refluxing Condenser with Surface Tension Forces.
181
difference from the other concepts lies in the passive heat rejection
mode.
The passive condition would be activated upon failure of the normal
mode by the temperature increasing on the grooved surface located above
the heat exchanger tubes. Liquid lithium would begin to evaporate from
the surface, and the driving force developed because of differential vapor
pressure would force the vapor to the cooler condensing surface. The
vapor would condense and the surface tension forces, in the absence of
effective gravitational forces, would draw the liquid through the annular
return passage and back to the evaporative surface. This is analogous
to a simple reflux condenser in which gravity, instead of surface tension,
is used to return the liquid to the hot surface, and vapor pressure is
used to move the vapor from the hot surface to the condensing section.
Both systems have limiting heat fluxes that are determined by vapor bind-
ing of the heated surface, in the case of the industrial reflux condenser,
buoyancy is used to move the vapor bubbles away from the hot surface to
the surface of the liquid. Since in a space application the necessary
buoyant forces are absent, surface tension forces would be used to pre-
vent vapor blanketing of the hot surface. The use of the triangular
grooves for the capillary distribution system in this heat pipe concept
enhances vapor movement from the apex of the grooves to the surface of
the liquid. Directional movement results from unequal vapor bubble cur-
vatures that drive the bubble toward the enlarged section of the groove
because of the unequal surface tension force. The average heat flux in
this heat pipe concept is approximately 5000 Btu/hr.ft 2, and it is expected
that this is low enough to avoid vapor blanketing problems. With lithium
as the heat transfer fluid, a rise in temperature of approximately 300°F
above the normal operating temperature would be sufficient to remove the
entire heat output of the radioisotope source.
The passive heat rejection would be stopped and normal operation re-
established by starting the argon coolant flow to reduce the temperature
on the vaporizing surface. Even at the reduced normal operating tempera-
ture at this surface (NI500°F) and the correspondingly low (N2 mm Hg)
vapor pressure at the evaporative surface, there would be a small continu-
ous mass transport that would be a disadvantage in this design. However_
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it is a completely passive temperature control method that operates in-
dependently of controls and orientation, and the intrinsic value of such
a self-regulating temperature control circuit could outweigh the dis-
advantage of the additional builtin energy losses. The development of
alloys with a steeper vapor pressure-temperature curve in the range of
interest would reduce the heat loss.
The system has a larger volume to be shielded, as shownin Fig. 10.16.
Also, the shield must overlap to form a 4m shield arrangement, which
further increases the shield weight over that needed for just a large
volume. The shield weights shown in Table 10.7 reflect both of these
weight increases. The size and location of the flow passages would have
a large effect on the shield weight, and it might be possible to reduce
their effect on the system weight in a more detailed design study.
Table 10.7. Shield Weights for One-Year Occupancyof a System
With a Plane Fuel Reentry Body and a Refluxing Condenser
With Surface Tension Forces
Crew Shield Weight(ib) 4m Solid Total
Fuel Shielding Angle Shield Shield
Material For For Weight Weight
Scattered Direct (ib) (ib)
Radiation Radiation
244Cm203a
238puO2b,c
238puO2C,d
147pm203e
147pm203f
LiH 1240 5,180 1550 7,970
Tantalum 2470 14, 580 0 17,050
Total 3710 19,760 1550 25,020
LiH 870 2,560 0 3,430
LiH 0 i, 070 0 i, 070
Tantalum 990 7,210 2630 i0, 830
Tantalum 6O0 5, 3O0 940 6,840
astress-rate safety factor of 7.
bNatural oxygen in fuel compound.
CStress-rate safety factor of 2.5.
doxygen-18 depleted by a factor of 20 in fuel compound.
e5 × 10-4%146pmcontamination.
f5 x 10-5% 146pm contamination.
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10.1.8 Fuel in Parallel Rows
An attempt to minimize the shielded volume led to the concept of
stacking the fuel capsules in rows_ as shown in Fig. 10.17. The entire
surface area of the fuel holders would radiate to either active heat
exchanger of the redundant pair that penetrate into the heat block. The
thermal path would encounter radiation, conduction_ and radiation resis-
tances as the heat traveled from the fuel capsules to the working heat
exchanger.
The emergency mode of operation would require a door to open, the
exchanger to fold out of the way, and radiative heat rejection to space.
The capsule holders and heat exchanger tubes are arranged so that the
tubes would easily swing out and expose the holders to space. The capsules
and holders located the deepest in the fuel block would have high tempera-
tures that would have to be investigated further. It might be necessary
to use capsules with a lower heat generation rate per unit surface area
toward the center of the array.
Another drawback to this arrangement of fuel and coolant tubes in-
volves the number of heat exchanger tubes in the area of abundant cap-
sules. Although it would be possible to adequately place the required
number of tubes in the region of closely spaced capsules, there would be
surplus heat exchanger area where the capsules were sparse.
The shielding configuration is shown in Fig. 10.18. The weights
would be essentially the same as for some of the previous concepts, as
indicated in Table 10.8. This concept has a relatively light weight when
compared with the two large-volume concepts (rotating reentry body and
reflux condenser with surface tension effects).
10.1.9 Concentric Fuel Array
The concentric stacking of fuel capsules in Fig. 10.19 is another
arrangement for a minimum volume system. The comments in Section 10.1.8
about fuel in parallel rows apply equally to this concept. The only
change is the method of emergency heat rejection. The roles of the re-
entry body and heat exchangers would be inverted so that the reentry body
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Table 10.8. Shield Weights for 0ne-Year Occupancy of a System
With Fuel in Parallel Rows
Crew Shield Weight
(ib) 4_ Solid Total
Fuel Shielding Angle Shield Shield
Material For For Weight Weight
Scattered Direct (ib) (ib)
Radiation Radiation
244Urn203a
147pm203 b
147pm203 C
LiH 1480 3230 1140 5,850
Tantalum ii00 6190 0 7,290
Total 2580 9420 1140 13,140
Tantalum 1720 3740 750 6,210
Tantalum 700 3050 500 4,250
astress-rate safety factor of 7.
b5 × I0-4% 146pm contamination.
c5 × 10-5% 146pm contamination.
would translate and rotate through a door in the spacecraft. The move-
ment would position the fuel capsules for heat rejection to a space
environment.
The shield configuration and shield weights are given in Fig. 10.20
and Table 10.9, respectively, for the concentric fuel array. These weights
are in the same range as those for some of the previous concepts.
i0.i.i0 Summary of Weight Estimates for Conceptual Designs
The system weights for the three fuels are summarized in Tables i0.i0
through 10.14 for the concepts that were investigated. The tables give
the shield weight, reentry body weight, including fuel capsules, and the
sum of these, which is called the lift-off weight. Each table permits
a fuel form to be compared for all the concepts for which it was studied.
The summary for the 238Pu02 compound depleted in 180 is given in
Table i0.i0 and the effects of the stress-rate safety factor on system
weight are shown for the lightest lift-off weight concept. The weight
of this system increased from 3250 to 6550 ib, a factor of 2, as the
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Table 10.9. Shield Weights for One-Year Occupancyof a System
With a Concentric Fuel Array
Crew Shield Weight
(ib) 4_ Solid Total
Fuel Shielding Angle Shield ShieldMaterial For For Weight Weight
Scattered Direct (ib) (ib)
Radiation Radiation
2 44Cm203a
1 47pm203b
1 47 pro203 C
LiH 1690 3,770 670 6,130
Tantalum 1780 7,180 0 8,960
Total 3470 i0, 950 670 15,090
Tantalum 1980 4, 060 270 6,310
Tantalum 1200 3,010 i00 4,310
astress-rate safety factor of 7.
b5 × 10-4% 146pm contamination.
c5 × 10-5% 146pm contamination.
Table i0.i0 Weight Summary for System With 238pu02 Fuel
Designed for One-Year Occupancy
180 depleted by a factor of 20 in fuel compound
Concept
Stress-Rate Shield Reentry Lift-Off
Safety Weight Body Weight Weight
Factor (ib) (ib) (ib)
Plane fuel reentry body with
folding heat exchanger
60 ° conical fuel reentry body
with folding heat exchanger
Plane fuel reentry body and
refluxing condenser with sur-
face tension forces
Deployed 60 ° conical fuel
reentry body
Rotating plane fuel reentry
body with disk heat exchanger
2.5 950 2300 3250
4.0 ii00 3150 4250
7.0 1750 4800 6550
2.5 1150 2500 3650
2.5 1070 2300 3370
2.5 1590 2500 4090
2.5 2190 2300 4490
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Table i0.ii. Weight Summaryfor System with 238Pu02Fuel
Designed for One-Year Occupancy
Natural oxygen in fuel compound
Concept
Stress -Rate Shield Reentry Lift-0ff
Safety Weight BodyWeight Weight
Factor (lb ) (lb ) (lb )
Plane fuel reentry body with
folding heat exchanger
60° conical fuel reentry body
with folding heat exchanger
Plane fuel reentry body and 2.5
refluxing condenser with sur-
face tension forces
Deployed 60° conical fuel 2.5
reentry body
Rotating plane fuel reentry 2.5
body with disk heat exchanger
2.5 2110 2300 4410
4.0 2450 3150 5600
7.0 3500 4800 8300
2.5 3420 2500 5920
3430 2300 5730
3670 2500 6170
5880 2300 8180
safety factor changed from 2.5 to 7. The weight variation between con-
cepts, at a constant safety factor, is only approximately 40% from the
lightest to the heaviest.
Natural oxygen in the 238pu02 fuel compound is considered in Table
10.11. The weights show almost a factor of 2 in the effect of the stress-
rate safety factor and in comparison of concepts.
Weights for systems with 147Pm203 fuel are summarized in Table 10.12
for production reactor feed material and in Table 10.13 for power reactor
feed material. Both tables indicate that the choice of concept can change
the lift-off weight by a factor of approximately 2 from the lightest
weight to the heaviest weight systems.
The weight summary for systems with 2_4Cm203 fuel is given in Table
lO.14. A stress-rate safety factor change from 2.5 to 7 for the lightest
weight concept (folding heat exchanger) caused a 50% increase in weight.
The conceptual choices have over a factor of 2 variation in lift-off
weight. The curium fuel with the reference shielding model exhibits an
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Table 10.12. Weight Summaryfor System with i_7pm203Fuel
Designed for 0ne-Year Occupancy
5 × 10-5%146pm203contamination
Concept
Shield Reentry Lift-0ff
Weight Body Weight Weight
(lb) (lb) (lb)
Plane fuel reentry body with 3550
folding heat exchanger
Fuel in parallel rows 4250
Concentric fuel 4310
60° conical fuel reentry body 4250
with folding heat exchanger
Deployed 60° conical fuel re- 4310
entry body with conical heat
exchanger
Plane fuel reentry body and 6840
refluxing condenser with sur-
face tension forces
Rotating plane fuel reentry 8210
body with disk heat exchanger
1390 4940
1460 5710
1460 5770
1550 5800
1550 5860
1390 8230
1390 9600
obvious weight disadvantage that is directly related to the double shield-
ing (gammaand neutron) requirement, which is not fully compensatedby
the smaller volume of fuel required for curium concepts.
10.2 Weisht Reduction Prosram
A brief investigation was made to indicate the conditions under which
244Cm203 would become competitive with 238pu02 on a system weight basis.
Since the shield is the system component that makes the 2_4Cm203 fuel
concepts heavier than the 238pu02, varying the location of the heat source
with respect to the manned compartment and changing the dose criteria
were considered.
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Table i0.13. Weight Summaryfor System with 1471°m203 Fuel
Designed for 0ne-Year Occupancy
5 X 10-4% 146pm203 contamination
Concept
Shield Reentry Lift-Off
Weight Body Weight Weight
(lb) (ib) (lb)
Plane fuel reentry body with
folding heat exchanger
Fuel in parallel rows
60 ° conical fuel reentry body
with folding heat exchanger
Concentric fuel
Deployed 60 ° conical fuel re-
entry body with conical heat
exchanger
Plane fuel reentry body and
refluxing condenser with sur-
face tension forces
Rotating plane fuel reentry
body with disk heat exchanger
5,500 1390 6, 890
6,210 1460 7,670
6,210 1550 7,760
6,310 1460 7,770
6,310 1550 7,860
i0, 830 1390 12, 220
ii, 880 1390 13,270
10.2.1 Dose Rate Increase
The allowable dose rate was increased by a factor of 4 while retain-
ing the same total accumulated dose by assuming a mission duration for
the crew of 90 days rather than one year. The effect of making this as-
sumption on the total system weight for the lightest weight concept (plane
fuel array with folding heat exchanger and stress-rate safety factor of
2.5) is shown in Table 10.15. Comparing these weights with those given
in Tables lO.10 through 10.14, which are for one-year occupancy, shows
that the total system lift-off weight reduction varies from approximately
12% in the case of 238PUO 2 fuel depleted in 180 to 40% in the case of
244Cm203 fuel.
The curium fuel form received the greatest benefit from a dose rate
increase because of the relatively heavy shield and light-weight reentry
body. Systems with 147pm show the same trend but to a lesser degree
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Table 10.14. Weight Summary for System with 244Cm203 Fuel
Designed for 0ne-Year Occupancy
Concept
Stress-Rate Shield Reentry Lift-Off
Safety Weight Body Weight Weight
Factor (Ib) (ib) (ib)
Plane fuel reentry body with
folding heat exchanger
Fuel in parallel rows
60 ° conical fuel reentry body
with folding heat exchanger
Directly cooled plane fuel re-
entry body
Inclined plane fuel reentry
body with disk heat exchanger
Concentric fuel
Deployed 60 ° conical fuel
reentry body
Rotating plane fuel reentry
body with disk heat exchanger
Plane fuel reentry hody and
refluxing condenser with sur-
face tension forces
2.5 6,850 650
4.0 7,900 800
7.0 i0, i00 1040
7.0 13,140 1120
7.0 13,140 1210
7.0 13,630 2050
7.0 15,010 1040
7.0 15,090 1120
7.0 15,090 1210
7.0 22,900 1040
7.0 25,020 1040
7,500
8, 7 O0
ii, 140
14, 260
14,350
15,680
16,050
16,210
16,300
23,940
26_ 060
Table 10.15. Extimated Weight Summary for
90-Day Occupancy of System with Plane
Fuel Array and Folding Heat Exchanger
Stress-rate safety factor: 2.5
Fuel
Shield Reentry Body Lift-0ff
Weight Weight Weight
(lb) (lb) (lb)
238pu02 a 540 2300 2840
238puo2b 1360 2300 3660
i_7pm203 c 2230 1390 3620
244Cm203 4000 650 4650
aOxygen-18 depleted by a factor of 20 in
fuel compound.
bNatural oxygen in fuel compound.
c5 × 10-5% i_6pm203 contamination.
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because the reentry body weight is greater than that for the curium
fuel.
The fuel with the heaviest lift-off weight, 244Cm203, was examined
for the effect of variations in the heat source concept on shield weights
and lift-off weights under this higher dose rate. A stress-rate safety
factor of 7 was chosen for the comparison. The shield weight breakdowns
given in Table 10.16 show total shield weight decreases of approximately
30% for all concepts. The smaller reduction, 30% for these heat source
concept variations compared with 40% for the plane fuel array previously
discussed, is caused by the different stress-rate safety factor. The
trend follows expectation; that is, the fractional savings in shield
weight are reduced as the stress-rate safety factor increases. The lift-
off weights in Table lO.17 show the reduction to be approximately 27%,
as would be anticipated.
10.2.2 Location
The shadow shield model shown in Fig. 10.21 was used to give a pre-
liminary indication of the effect of location on lift-off weight. The
effect of heat source to manned compartment separation distance on lift-
off weight is given in Figs. 10.22, 10.23, and 10.24 for stress-rate
safety factors of 2.5, 4, and 7, respectively, for 244Cm203 and I80-de-
pleted 238Pu02.
The shadow shield model does not include the contribution from scat-
tering collisions or the 4m shield requirement, which were included in
the original shield model. In the case of i80-depleted 23SPu02, a 4m
shield was not required in the original conceptual design model to meet
the dose rate criteria, so the shadow shield model approximates the
actual model. This is not true in the case of 244Cm, and therefore a
4m shield model for the folding heat exchanger concept with 244Cm203 as
the fuel was evaluated for different separation distances. The results
are plotted along with those for the shadow shield model in the figures
to compare with the shadow shield model results. The plots show that
the curium system weights decrease very rapidly with heat source to
manned compartment separation distance and that points will be reached
where the 238pu and 244Cm system weights will be equal. Figures 10.22
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Table i0.16. Shield Weight Breakdown for a System with 2_4Cm20 S Fuel
Designed for 90-Day Occupancy
Stress rate safety factor: 7
Concept
Crew Shield Weight
(lb) 4_ Solid
Shielding Angle Shield
Material For For Weight
Scattered Direct (lb)
Radiation Radiation
Total
Shield
Weight
(lh)
Plane fuel array with folding
heat exchanger
60 ° conical fuel reentry body
with folding heat exchanger
Fuel in parallel rows
Directly cooled plane fuel re-
entry body
Inclined plane fuel reentry body
with disk heat exchanger
Concentric fuel
Deployed 60 ° conical fuel re-
entry body
Rotating plane fuel reentry body
with disk heat exchanger
Plane fuel reentry body and re-
fluxing condenser with surface
tension forces
LiH 1020 2,150 i000 4,170
Tantalum 300 3,430 0 3,730
Total 1320 53580 i000 7,900
LiH 830 2,060 i140 4,030
Tantalum 590 4,590 0 5,180
Total 1420 6,650 ll40 9,210
LiH 830 2,060 ll40 4,030
Tantalum 590 4,590 0 5,180
Total 1420 6,650 ll40 9,210
LiH 990 2,150 870 4,010
Tantalum 490 4,750 0 5,240
Total 1480 6,900 870 9,250
LiH 1790 1,600 1710 5,100
Tantalum 2600 2,400 0 5,000
Total 4390 4,000 1710 10,100
LiH 1080 2,670 670 4,420
Tantalum 920 4,950 0 5,870
Total 2000 7,620 670 10,290
LiH 1080 2,670 670 4,420
Tantalum 920 4,950 0 5,870
Total 2000 7,620 670 10,290
LiH 1460 4,740 1410 7,610
Tantalum 410 9,150 0 9,560
Total 1870 13,890 1410 17,170
LiH 980 3,450 1550 5,980
Tantalum 1330 10,800 0 12,130
Total 2310 14,250 1550 18,110
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Table i0.17.
2OO
Weight Summary for System with 244Cm203 Fuel
Designed for 90-Day Occupancy
Stress-rate safety factor: 7
Concept
Shield Reentry Lift-0ff
Weight Body Weight Weight
( lb ) ( lb ) ( lb )
Plane fuel array with folding
heat exchanger
Fuel in parallel rows
60 ° conical fuel reentry body
with folding heat exchanger
Inclined plane fuel reentry
body with disk heat exchanger
Directly cooled plane fuel re-
entry body
Concentric fuel
Deployed 60 ° conical fuel re-
entry body
Rotating plane fuel reentry
body with disk heat exchanger
Plane fuel reentry body and
refluxing condenser with
surface tension forces
7,900 1040 8, 940
9, 210 1120 i0, 330
9, 210 1210 i0, 420
i0, i00 1040 ii, 140
9, 250 2050 ii, 300
lO, 290 I120 ii, 410
i0,290 1210 ii, 500
17,170 1040 18, 210
18, ii0 1040 19,150
through 10.24 indicate these locations for both the 4m shield model and
the shadow shield model for stress-rate safety factors from 2.5 to 7. The
locations for the 4m shield model have separation distances that exceed
reasonable values, except possibly in the case of a concept with a de-
ployable power generation system. However, as the distance increases, the
weight penalty for using 244Cm203 rather than Pu02 with depleted oxygen
becomes less significant and may be justifiable on the basis of the fuel
availability or safety considerations. A comparison is given in Fig. 10.25
for separation distances of 3 and 9 meters so that the penalty assessment
can be evaluated for different capsule stress-rate safety factors. The
Pu02 lift-off weight is included in the figure for reference.
201
ORNL-DWG 66-2855
= 2440m203 Fuel Lift Off
0
Weight Penalty m
E
o 7000 2.4
P_
Q)
LL
t-
-J
%
6000 \ /
\
\
o , Iseparation __/
L _ SOOO_Oistanc.of / J_
_ 3 Meters
0 .I
"
4000 (
.1
3000
o 0j7 Stance of
9 Meters
2000 ....
o 2 3 4 5 6 7
Stress Rate Safety Factor
n4J
o) N-
2.2_= "-O
0J LI-
"_
--J
2.0o
03 _'_
__e t-
C °1.8
-_ E
O. O
03 ¢-_
1.6_ _0_
1.4o
O
1.2
¢t} L
O O
IE o
0_ _1. u.
Fig. 10.25. Comparison of Lift-Off Weights for 238_U02 and 24&Cm203
Fuels as Functions of Separation Distance and Stress-Rate Safety Factor.
202
ACKNOWLEDGMEITr
In addition to the assistance, previously noted, given by L. I. Shure
of the NASA-Lewis Research Center, and P. J. Bobbitt of the NASA-Langley
Research Center, the authors are also indebted for the assistance given
by Mrs. Susan C. Keith of the ORNL Isotopes Development Center who pre-
pared the draft of this report and who offered many valuable suggestions
on the arrangement of figures, references, and sections in the report.
2O3
REFERENCES
13.._ECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FIL_/,ED.
205
i. G. R. Grove et al., Plutonium-238 Isotopic Power Sources: A Summary
Report, USAEC Report MLM-1270_ Monsanto Research Corporation, Mound
Laboratory, Aug. 19, 1965.
2. Monsanto Research Corporation, Mound Laboratory, Plutonium-238 Fuel
Data Sheets, Nov. 15, 1965. Classified
3. L. M. Atlas, G. J. Schlehman, Katharometric and Resistivity Studies
of Pu02_ x Equilibria, USAEC Report ANL-6960, Argonne National Labo-
ratory, March 1965.
4. A. D. Feith, Thermal Conductivities of Several CeramicMaterials to
2500°C, USAEC Report TM-64-I0-4, General Electric Company, NMPO,
October 1964.
5. R. M. Dell and M. Allbutt, The Nitrides and Sulphides of Uranium,
Thorium, and Plutonium: A Review of Present Knowledge, British
Report AERE-R-4253, March 1963.
6. T. Vasilos and W. D. Kingery, Thermal Conductivity: xl, uonductivity
of Some Refractory Carbides and Nitrides, J. Amer. Ceramo Soc._ 37(9):
409-414 (September 1965).
7. D. L. McElroy, unpublished data_ Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
8. J. C. Posey et al., The Influence of Temperature and Oxygen Pressure
on the Composition of Curium Oxide, Paper presented at 150th Meeting
of the American Chemica_ Society, Atlantic City_ Sept. 13--17, 1965,
Abstract 26R-64.
9. H. S. Hilborn, SRL Isotopic Power and Heat Sources Monthly Progress
Report, USAEC Report DPST-66-102-9_ Savannah River Laboratory,
September 1966.
10. D. H. Stoddard (Comp.), Radiation Properties of 244Cm Produced for
Isotopic Power Generators, USAEC Report DP-939, Savannah River Labo-
ratory, 1964.
ll. R. E. McHenry et al., unpublished data, Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
12. T. Ih Butler and R° E. McHenry (Comps.), Curium-244 Status Report,
USAEC Report ORNL-TM-1036_ Oak Ridge National Laboratory, February
1965. Classified
13. H. H. Van Tuyl (Comp.), Promethium Isotopic Power Data Sheets, USAEC
Report NNWC-45, Battelle-Northwest, Mar. 15, 1965.
206
14. R. K. Williams and D. L. McElroy, Estimated Thermal Conductivity
Values for Solid and Liquid Promethium, USAEC Report ORNL-TM-1424,
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, March 1966.
15. Isotopic Power Fuels Data, Division of Isotopes Development, U.S.
Atomic Energy Commission, March 1966.
16. E. J. Hennelly and R. R. Hood, Radioisotope Production Capabilities
of U.S. Power Reactors 3 USAEC Report DP-1015, Savannah River Labo-
ratory, November 1965.
17. W. Luoma and R. C. Emanuelson, Semi-Annual Progress Report on Deter-
mination of the Emissivity of Materials, Report NASA-CR-54891,
Pratt &Whitney, December 1965.
18. J. S. Hill and H. J. Albert, Loss of Weight of Plutonium, Rhodium,
and Palladium at High Temperatures, Englehardt Industires, Inc.,
Technical Bulletin No. 2, Vol. IV, pp 59-63, September 1963.
19. C. A. Krier and R. I. Jaffee 3 Oxidation of the Platium Group Metals,
J. Less Common Metals, 5:411-431 (1963).
20. E. D. Zysk, Effect of Environment on Bare Platinum vs 90 Pt--10 Rh
and Platinum vs 87 Pt--13 Rh Thermocouples, Englehardt Industries,
Inc., memorandum dated April 12, 1960.
21. He H. Uhlig, The Corrosion Handbook, p. 449, Wiley, 1948.
22. D. B. Ander, International Nickel Company, personal communication to
R. J. Beaver, letter dated December 13, 1965, with attachment.
23. Union Carbide Corporation, Stellite Division, Compilation of Seawater
Corrosion Data for Hastelloy C, Report F-30,322, December 1965.
24. D. Bo Anderson and R. F. Vines, Anodic Corrosion of Platinum in
Seawater, paper presented at Second International Congress on Metallic
Corrosion, New York, March 11--15, 1963.
25. R. E. Seebold and L. S. Birks, Elevated Temperature Diffusion in the
Systems Nb-Pt, Nb-Se, Nb-Zn, Nb-Co, Ni-Ta, and Fe-Mo, Report NRL-
5520, Naval Research Laboratory, Sept. 19, 1960.
26. J. J. English, Binary and Ternary Phase Diagrams of Columbium, Molyb-
denum, Tantalum, and Tungsten, DMIC Report 183, Battelle Memorial
Institute Defense Metals Information Center 3 Feb. 73 1963.
2O7
27. E. M. Passmoreet al., Diffusion Barriers for Tantalum and Columbium,
ASM Trans., 57:760-765 (1964).
28. G. G. Lessman and D. R. Stoner, Welding Refractory Metal Alloys for
Space Power System Application, Report WANL-SP-009, Westinghouse
Electric Corporation, Astronuclear Laboratory, Nov. 15_ 1965.
29. G. G. Lessman and D. R. Stoner, Determination of the Weldability
and Elevated Temperature Stability of Refractory Metal Alloys, Ninth
Quarterly Report, Report NASA-CR-54923, Westinghouse Electric Corpo-
ration, Astronuclear Laboratory, September 1965.
30. Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Metals and Ceramics Division Annual
Progress Report for Period Ending May 31_ 1962, USAEC Report 0RNL-
3313, Aug. 16, 1962.
31. Unpublished 0RNLdata.
32. J. C. Sawyer and E. A. Steigerwald, Generation of Long Time Creep
Data of Refractory _A!oys at Elevated Temperatures, Eleventh Quarterly
Progress Report, Report NASA-CR-54973_ TRW Inc._ April 1966.
33. R. W. Buckman and R. C. Goodspeed_ Development of Dispersion Strength-
ened Tantalum Base Alloy, Eighth Quarterly Progress Report_ Report
NASA-CR-54935_ Westinghouse Electric Corporation_ Astronuclear Labo-
ratory_ November 1965.
34. Bureau of Mines Bulletin 542.
35. A. Glassner_ The Thermochemical Properties of the Oxides_ Fluorides_
and Chlorides to 2500°K_ USAEC Report ANL-5750_ Argonne National
Laboratory_ 1957.
36. T. D. Chikalla_ Plutonium Refractory Compounds, Chapter 6 of an un-
published book.
37. L. E. Russell et al., Pervoskite Type Compounds Based on Plutonium,
British Report AERE-R-3044, 1959.
38. J. J. Granger et al., Uranium Dioxide Compatibility with Refractory
Metals, Carbides, Borides_ Nitrides, and Oxides Between 3500°F and
5000°F, Report NASA-TN-D-262, National Aeronautical and Space Admin-
istration, February 1960.
39. Reference 39 deleted.
208
40. R. G. Gilliland, Brazing Alloy Development, in Metals and Ceramics
Division Annual Progress Report for Period Ending June 30, 1965,
USAECReport 0RNL-3870_OakRidge National Laboratory_ November1965.
41. General Electric Company,AdvancedTechnology Services, High Tempera-
ture Materials and Reactor ComponentDevelopmentPrograms, Fourth
Annual Report, Vol. I, Materials, Report GEMP-B34A,Feb. 26, 1965.
42. C. W. Youndj C. E. Stoneking, and J. L. Colp, Containment Capsule
Impact Safety Study, Phase A, Progress Report, Report SC-RR-65-9,
Sandia Corporation, July 1965.
43. H. Laurens, The Physiological Effects of Radiant Energy, p. 104, The
Chemical Catalog Company, Inc., 1933.
44. B. Manowitz and L. Epel, Brookhaven National Laboratory, personal
communication, January 1966.
45. D. H. Stoddard and E. L. Albenesius, Radiation Properties of 238Pu
Produced for Isotopic Power Generators, USAEC Report DP-984, Savannah
River Laboratory, July 1965o
46. A. G. Khabakhpashev, The Neutron Spectrum of a Po-_-0 Source, Atomnaya
Energiya, 7:71 (1959).
47. E. D. Arnold, Handbook of Shielding Requirements and Radiation Char-
acteristics of Isotopic Power Sources for Terrestrial, Marine, and
Space Applications, USAEC Report 0RNL-3576, Oak Ridge National Labo-
ratory_ April 1964.
48. Jo P. Nichols, Calculations of Concrete Shields for Fission Sources,
USAEC Report 0RNL-TM-II67, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, June 1965.
49. B. J. Henderson, Conversion of Neutron or Gamma-Ray Flux to Absorbed
Dose Rate, USAEC Report XDC-59-8-179, General Electric Company, Air-
craft Nuclear Propulsion Department 3 Aug. 14, 1959.
50. U.S. National Committee on Radiation Protection and Measurements,
Protection Against Neutron Radiation up to 30 Million Electron Volts,
NBS Handbook 63, National Bureau of Standards, 1957.
51. L. L. Carter, Unreflected Critical Mass of 238pu Metal, p. 53 in
Physics Research Quarterly Report, July-September 1964, USAEC Report
HW-84369, General Electric Company_ Hanford Atomic Products Opera-
tion, Oct. 15, 1964.
209
52. General Electric Company, Missile and Space Division, Preliminary
Design and Safety Studies of Large Radioisotope Heat Sources for
Space Power, Report GE-65SD4508-2A, App. B, 1966.
53. Atomics International, Large Radioisotope Heat Source Study -- Final
Report, Report AI-65-221, Vol. II, 1965.
54. D. K. Butler and R. K. Sjoblom, Fission Cross Section of Pu 238 Bull.
Amer. Phys. Soc., 8:369 (1963).
55. L. D. Gordeeva and G. N. Smirenkin, An Empirical Formula for the Mean
Number of Fission Neutrons, AERE Trans., 956 (1962).
56. D. M. Barton, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, personal communication
to C. W. Craven, Jr., Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 1966.
57. R. E. Cote" et al., Total Neutron Cross Section of 244Cm, Phys. Rev.,
135B: 1281 (1964).
58. C. W. Craven, Jr., Inscattering Approximations in Discrete Variable
Transport Theory, USAEC ORNL Report to be issued.
59. G. D. Joanou and J. S. Dudek, GAM-II: A B 3 Code for the Calculation
of Fast-Neutron Spectra and Associated Multigroup Constants, USAEC
Report GA-4265, General Atomic, 1963.
60. S. Goldstein (Ed.), Modern Developments in Fluid Dynamics, ist ed.,
Oxford, 1938.
61. H. H. Koelle (Ed.), Handbook of Astronautical Engineering, _ _S _ ed. ,
McGraw-Hill, New York, 1961.
62. P. Levine, T. R. Ellis, and S. Georgiev, Factors Influencing the De-
sign and Performance of Mars Entry Vehicles, J. Spacecraft, 2(2):
130-146 (1965).
63. F. J. Centolanzi, Heat Transfer to Blunt Conical Bodies Having
Cavities to Promote Separation, Report NASA-TN-D-1975, National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration, July 1963.
64. J. C. Robinson and A. W. Jordan, Exploratory Experimental Aerodynamic
Investigation of Tension Shell Shapes at Mach 7, Report NASA-TN-D-
2994, September 1965.
65. Letter on Petry Formula, Sandia Corporation to T. G. Chapman, Oak
Ridge National Laboratory, dated Nov. 2, 1965.
210
66. R. T. Swann,Composite Thermal Protection Systems for MannedRe-Entry
Vehicles, J. Amer. Rocket Soc., 221--226 (February 1962).
67. D. I.-J. Wang, Multiple Layer Instulations, in Aerodynamically Heated
Structures, edited by P. E. Glaser, Prentice Hall, 1962.
68. L. W. Gertsma, J. H. Dunn, and E. E. Kempke, Jr., Evaluation of One
Type of Foldable Tube, Report NASA-TM-X-ll87, Lewis Research Center,
December 1965.
69. Fansteel Metallurgical Corporation, A Tantalum-Base Alloy - Fansteel
222 Metal, Data Sheet.
70. W. H. McAdams, Heat Transmission, p. 25, 3rd ed., McGraw-Hill, New
York, 1954.
71. F. D. Kite et al., Launch Hazards Assessment Program. Report on
Atlas/Centaur Abort, Report SC-RR-65-3333 Sandia Corporation, October
1965.
72. Op. cit. Ref. 70, pp. 165-183.
211
APPENDICES
PP_ECED!F_G PA_ _!.,A_--!K i'.]OT F!Li_,AED.
23.3
Appendix A
FUEL CAPSULE BURIAL-TEMPERATURE CALCULATION
At the completion of a normal mission, it is anticipated that the
heat source would be ferried back to earth in order that the valuable
radioisotope fuel could be recovered and reprocessed. In the event of
a mission abort that resulted in random reentry, the heat source would
be protected inside a reentry body with a shape and ballistic coefficient
that would limit the terminal velocity and prevent earth burial of the
entire source on impact. Earth burial of individual capsules would be a
possibility in the event of a mission abort if the reentry body broke up
on impact and scattered individual fuel capsules, which could then become
covered, over a period of time, by drifting sand. The primary fuel cap-
sule design is based on the criterion that the temperature of the capsule
material (T-222 alloy 69) not exceed 2000°F in the case of 238pu and 244Cm
fuels and 2500°F in the case of z47pm fuel in the event of random reentry
from space. Calculations were made to determine the allowable thermal
power and dimensions of capsules consistent with this requirement.
The effect of submergence below an air-earth interface on a heat
transfer parameter 7° for various isothermal surfaces that approximate cap-
sules or blocks of capsules is shown in Fig. A.I. These data lead to two
pertinent conclusions:
i. The maximum allowable thermal power, which is determined by in-
finitely deep burial, is closely approached if the source is only about
two diameters below the earth-air interface. Therefore, it is not unduly
conservative to assume infinitely deep burial in designing capsules.
2. If the parameter is evaluated for the assumed conductivity of
dry sand of 0.2 Btu/hr.ft.°F and an allowable surface temperature of
2000°F, it is found that a disk source 50 ft in diameter is required to
dissipate 25 kw of heat. Similarly, if 25 kw is proportioned in 200 buried
capsules 3 several feet of separation between capsules is required to assure
that individual capsule temperatures will not exceed 2000°F.
These numbers reveal that it is practically impossible to provide
for limited-temperature burial of a compact, integrated 25-kw heat source,
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air-earth interface.
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but designs can be provided for the burial of separated individual cap-
sules.
Figure A. 2 shows the effect of negative submergence. The average
heat flux at the surface of spheres 2200°F above ambient temperature is
shown as a function of position both above and below the air-earth inter-
face. This shows that for the range of parameters of interest it is pos-
sible to transfer more heat in air than in sand.
The unsteady-state condition was evaluated for cylinders deeply buried
in dry sand by using the CDC 1604-A program, ONE LINE, which was written
by R. L. Bradshaw and J. J. Perona of 0RNL. If the thermal diffusivity
of sand is assumed to be 0.01 ft2/hr, the time in days to attain 90_ of
the steady-state capsule surface temperature is found to be approximately
I00 D s, where D is the capsule diameter in feet. For capsules of diameter
less than I ft, the steady-state temperatures are attained in a time that
is short compared with the half-lives of imterest.
An equation was derived for determining the allowable thermal power
of a cylindrical capsule with constant heat generation per unit of length
as a function of the maximum surface temperature and configuration after
deep burial:
where
2w-kL (T s -- T a)
sinh- i (L/D)
q = thermal power; Btu/hr;
k = thermal conductivity of the earth and capsule; Btu/hr. ft.°F,
L = length of capsule_ ft,
D = diameter of capsule_ ft;
T = maximum capsule surface temperature, °F,
S
Ta = ambient earth temperature, °F.
A parametric plot of this equation is shown in Fig. A. 3. Data for
spheres are shown for comparison. For a given diameter of the fueled cap-
sule the allowable power increases with increasing length-to-diameter
ratio; but in a diminishing way.
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Figure A. 4 is a typical plot of the allowable power in a buried cy-
lindrical capsule as a function of diameter and temperature. The L/D is
4, which is the ratio that is assumed in the conceptual capsule designs
for impact resistance. An ambient temperature of 100°F and the conduc-
tivity of dry sand were assumed. Corresponding to an outside diameter
of 1.5 in., the allowable power in a capsule is in the range of 150 to
200 w for allowable surface temperatures in the range of 2000 to 2500°F.
Heat Storage Requirements
In phase I designs, two criteria were applied in studying methods
for storing heat in the isotope source reentry body during the launch
phase or in the event of a launch-pad fire:
i. During the launch phase it is necessary to maintain capsule sur-
face temperatures below the normal operating temperature of 2000°F. It
is assumed that this requires heat storage for a period of 20 min between
disconnection of the launch-pad refrigeration system and active operation
of the Brayton cycle in orbit.
2. In the event of a launch-pad fire it is necessary to maintain cap-
sule integrity for i hr, based on the assumption that remedial measures
can be instituted in that time. A capsule surface temperature of 3000°F
is consistent with this requirement because of the low helium pressure
at lift-off time.
It was assumed that the launch pad conflagration would consist of
prompt H2/LOX explosions that would tend to crush, eject, or bury the
reentry body in debris, and this would be followed by a long-term RP-I/LOX
deflagration that would maintain a high-temperature environment. It was
assumed that the long-term fire temperature would be 2000°F (apparently
the characteristic reaction temperature) after the initial high-tempera-
ture spike, which was observed in the RP-I/LOX fire following the Atlas-
Centaur abort. 71
The relatively minimal effect of these constraints on phase I designs
can be appreciated by assuming one of the smallest low-heat-capacity re-
entry bodies. A typical 244Cm design has 480 ib of Cm203_ tantalum, and
platinum in the capsules, 120 ib of Nb-l% Zr in the capsule holder or
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source block, 375 ib of Haynes-25 or Nb-l% Zr for structure, and 150 ib
of insulation and ablative material. For such a device the launch phase
and launch-pad fire heat storage criteria are satisfied by placing ap-
proximately i00 ib of BeO in the reentry body and cooling the entire heat
source approximately 200°F below the normal steady-state heat source oper-
ating temperature before launch by means of an active, recirculating gas-
cooling system. The connection to the reentry body compartment would be
broken and plugged a few minutes before launch.
The BeO was chosen for its high sensible heat capacity and relative
chemical inertness at high temperatures. Silicon and beryllium were con-
sidered because they have large heats of fusion between the fire tempera-
ture and the allowable temperature of a capsule in a fire. They were re-
jected because they are not compatible with the capsule materials for long
periods at high temperature, and in the present design concepts the heat
sink cannot be located in a position that would permit it to be jettisoned
after orbit was achieved°
In the event of a launch-pad fire it is probable that capsule integ-
rity could be maintained for 1 hr if the BeO and the structure of the
reentry body remained in proximity with the capsules, even if the enclosed
volume became insulated after attaining the fire temperature. If capsules
were separated from the reentry body they would not attain excessively
high temperatures if they could radiate directly to the fire.
Fuel Block Temperature in Water and Air
The temperature of the heat source submerged in water is of importance
because the heat source would very likely impact in water in the event of
a mission abort during the launch phase and might impact in water if there
were a random reentry from orbit. In the case of water submersion, the
predicted containment life time of the primary capsule would be greatly
increased because the capsule temperature would be much lower than that
used in the design; however, the outer platinum cladding would have to
remain intact to prevent corrosion of the primary capsule° With natural
convection alone as the mechanism of heat transfer between the fuel block
and the water, the calculated heat transfer coefficient 72 is approximately
22O
50 Btu/hr. ft2-°F. The fuel block heat flux varies among the various de-
sign concepts but does not exceed 5000 Btu/hr. ft 2, which gives a tempera-
ture difference of IO0°F between the bulk water temperature and the sur-
face of the fuel capsules. As noted in Section 4, seawater corrosion data
on platinum were obtained at essentially ambient temperature; however,
it is not expected that the rates will change very significantly with only
a IO0°F increase in temperature. The long-term effect of the gradual
growth of scale and plant life on the corrosion resistance of the platinum
cladding is not known. Qualitative information suggests that such growths
may be helpful from a corrosion standpoint, since there are numerous in-
stances in which brass, copper, and gold artifacts protected by thick
encrustations of animal and plant organisms have been recovered essentially
intact after 300 years or more in the sea. The temperature at the sur-
face of the platinum would increase as scale built up on the capsule; how-
ever, in no case would it approach the design temperature, which is based
on earth burial.
The calculated heat transfer coefficient for the case where the fuel
block is on the surface of the ground is approximately 5 Btu/hr. ft2.°F
for both natural convection and radiant heat transfer. This gives a tem-
perature drop of 1000°F between the capsule surface and the air for a
heat flux of 5000 Btu/hr. ft 2. The oxidation-rate data for platinum given
in Section 4 show that the 20-mil platinum capsule cladding is more than
adequate for this temperature in air.
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Appendix B
CALCULATIONOFTHETEMPERATURE-COMPENSATEDTR SS-RATECURVE
The basis and use of a temperature-compensated stress-rate curve to
determine capsule wall thickness requirements are described in Section 4.2.
The following example illustrates the calculations required to obtain one
point on the curve. This particular example uses stress-rupture data for
the T-ill alloy; however, the samemethod is equally applicable for stress
to somepercent creep. The basis for calculation is
Material data
Isotope
Half-life (_I/2)
Initial capsule temperature
Base (ambient) temperature
Stress-rupture data for T-ill alloy
2440m203
18.1 y
2000°F (I093°C)
212°F (i00° C)
Step i
Pick a value of time in the region of interest and calculate the cap-
sule temperature at this time. For this example choose 1297 hr (0.14796
year), and let
T = (T 0- Ta) exp (-0.693t/_i12) + Ta ,
where
t = time,
T = capsule temperature at time t,
T O = initial capsule temperature,
Ta = base temperature,
TI/2 = half-life of fuel.
When evaluated,
T = (1093- i00)exp [--(0.693)(0.14796)/18.1] + lO0
= 1087°0.
Thus the temperature of the capsule after 1297 hr is I087°C.
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Step 2
With the temperature calculated in step i, calculate the Larson-
Miller parameters for two arbitrary times. In this example the times are
i0 and i000 hr, and
Pt = (T + 273)(C + log t) ,
where
Pt = Larson-Miller parameter for time t,
T = temperature, °C,
t = time, hr,
C = constant of the Larson-Miller equation based on material and
temperature range.
For i0 hr,
PIO = (1087 + 273)(12.5 + log i0)
= 18,360.
For i000 hr,
Plooo = (1087 + 273)(12.5 + log i000)
= 21,080.
Step 3
From the Larson-Miller stress rupture plot for T_lll alloy (Fig. B.I)
pick off the stress values corresponding to the two parameter values cal-
culated in step 2:
_I0 = 50,000 psi,
C_O00 = 25,850 psi,
where _io and _i0o0 are the stresses to cause rupture in i0 and i000 hr,
respectively. The two stresses with their respective times are the coor-
dinates of two points on a stress-rupture curve for T-ill alloy at i087°C.
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Step 4
With the two coordinates obtained in step 3, determine the values
of the constants in the general equation of a stress-rupture curve:
t = (A/_t)n ,
where
t = time, hr,
A, n = constants,
_t = stress to cause rupture at time t, psi.
Rearranging gives
log t = n log A--n log _t '
and solving simultaneously gives
1 = n log A- 4.69897 n ,
3 = n log A-- 4.41322 n ,
n = 6.9991 ,
A = 69,450 .
Step 5
With the values of the constants determined in step 4, determine the
rate of stress increase that will cause rupture in the originally assumed
time (1297 hr) from the stress-rate equation
An @n t (n+l) ]
= n _Y] '
where @ is the stress rate that will result in rupture at time t. Rear-
ranging gives
n log A-- [(n + i) log t -- log (n + I)]
log _ =
n
(6. 9991) (4. 8418) -- [7. 9991 (3. 1129) -- O. 9031]
6. 9991
= 1.4265
22.5
and
= 25.8 psi/hr.
This value of stress rate, 25.8 psi/hr, and the corresponding time, 1297
hr, are the coordinates of one point on the temperature-compensated stress-
rate curve for a T-ill alloy capsule containing 244Cm203. The process is
repeated for a range of times to define the entire curve.
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Appendix C
BASIS FOR COMPUTER PROGRAM FOR CALCULATION
OF STRESS-RATE-LIMITED CAPSULE DESIGN
Calculations for Determining Capsule Design
A computer program was developed for the capsule design study to be
used with the CDC 1604-A computer at ORNL. The program made it possible
to select capsule designs for minimum capsule weight and for minimum cap-
sule volume. By using known properties for both the radioisotope fuel
and the encapsulating material 3 along with several basic formulas_ a range
of sizes and number of capsules that meet the strength requirements was
determined for several stress-rate safety factors. To reduce the large
number of variables, several initial assumptions were made:
i. The temperature at the outer surface of the fuel was assumed to
be 2150°F, which allows a conservative 150°F temperature drop across the
various capsule layers between the fuel and the capsule outer surface.
2. The outer platinum capsule was assumed to provide no additional
strength for internal pressure buildup, and the thickness of the platinum
was assumed to be 0.020 in. in all cases.
3. The maximum allowable hoop stress was selected as the limiting
allowable stress in the capsule wall for internal pressure buildup.
4. The maximum allowable rate at which pressure would increase in
the capsule was based on the rate that would occur during the first i hr
after encapsulation if the capsule were at the maximum normal operating
temperature (2000°F surface). This assumption is conservative because
the pressure rate would decrease with time due to the continual decrease
of the amount of the radioisotope fuel in the capsule.
5. The temperature of the helium generated was assumed to be uniform
and equal to 2150°F plus one half the temperature drop across the fuel
compound.
6. The value of thermal conductivity at 2192°F was used for each
fuel because the calculated value is approximately a minimum at this tem-
perature. The thermal conductivity was assumed to be constant regardless
of temperature.
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7. No provision was madein the computer code to analyze capsule
irregularities, such as the screw-type joint inside the capsule. For the
computer code it was assumedthat the capsule shape was a smoothcylinder
with perfect hemispherical end caps. To compensatefor the irregularities
the following allowances were provided in the input data: (a) The allow-
able stress rate for each safety factor was reduced by 10%to compensate
for an assumedreduction of 10%in the void volume available because of
spacers, screw-type joints, etc. (b) An additional 10%was added to the
total weight of each capsule to compensatefor the weight of the internal
spacers and thickened section at the screw joint.
Calculations were madeonly for capsules having inside diameters be-
tween the values of 0.5 and 4.0 in., and the length-to-diameter ratio (L/D)
of the primary capsule was kept constant for all capsule diameters in each
series of calculations. As discussed in Section 5, an L/D of 4 was used
in the final conceptual designs. The allowable stress rate for each fuel
was obtained from the temperature-compensated stress-rate curves (Section
4), and after applying stress-rate safety factors of 2.5, 4, and 7, the
pressure rate inside the capsule wasvaried to determine its effect on
void volume, primary capsule wall thickness, and capsule weight for cap-
sules in the 0.5- to 4.0-in.-ID range.
The first step in the computer program was to determine the primary
capsule wall thickness required for a specified allowable pressure rate,
allowable stress rate, and capsule inside diameter. This was determined
with the following equation for thick cylindrical shells:
Xc = r2(Z_/2 -- i) , (i)
where
X = minimumrequired thickness of primary capsule, in._c
r 2 = inside radius of capsule_ in.,
SE+>
Z -
SE--_
and
S = allowable stress rate value, psi/hr,
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E = joint efficiency,
= allowable design pressure rate, psi/hr, based on the first hour
after encapsulation.
In the computer program P was varied for each selected capsule diameter
to provide a series of acceptable wall thickness values.
The total length of the primary capsule was then determined from the
L/D ratio. The inner radius of the platinum outer capsule was determined
by adding 0.012 in. to the outer radius of the primary capsule to allow
for a 0.010-in. layer of ThO 2 and a 0.002-in. gas gap. The outer platinum
capsule thickness was maintained a constant 0.020 in. throughout the pro-
gram. The total volume inside the capsule was determined from the equation
VT = lrr_(Lcy 1 + 1.33r 2) , (2)
where VT is the total volume inside the capsule, in. 3 and L is the
' cyl
length of the cylindrical section of capsule, in.
The maximum allowable amount of fuel in each capsule for each value
of pressure rate (P) used to determine wall thickness was then determined
by differentiating the ideal gas law with respect to time at constant tem-
perature and volume:
(vT-vf) (3)
where
Vf fuel volume, in. 3
= rate of helium generation, moles/hr,
R = universal gas constant,
T = average temperature of the helium, °R.
Equation 3 was solved for the same series of pressure rate values (P) that
were used in obtaining the capsule wall thickness values and the values
of VT as determined by Eq. (2). The remaining variables in Eq. (3), Vf,
N, and T, were all expressed in terms of the quantity of fuel in the cap-
sule (C). The fuel volume was determined from
Vf = C/16.390f ,
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where C is the weight of fuel compound in each capsule, g, and pf is the
density of fuel compound, g/cm 3. The rate of helium generation was then
= HC he_ht
N-
where
H = fractional part of fuel compound that is the active alpha emitter,
M = atomic weight of the alpha emitters,
= decay constant of the alpha emitters,
t = elapsed time.
As noted previously the elapsed time, t, was set at i hr to obtain the
helium generation rate at the beginning of life. The average temperature
of the helium was obtained from
T = T + (qxf/2 m) ,1
where
T_ = temperature at the outer surface of the fuel compound, °R,
k = thermal conductivity of fuel compound, Btu/hr'in.'°R_
q = heat flow rate, Btu/hr,
= 3.415BC, where B is power density of fuel compound, w/g, and C is
weight of fuel compound, g,
Xf = thickness of fuel, in.
= r2 -- rl, where
rl = [r22 -- (Vf/_Lcy I) ]I12
Vf = C/16.39pf
= log mean fuel area, in. 2
= 2_(r2Lcyl -- riLcy I)
Zn (r2/rl)
Making the appropriate substitutions for N, Vf, and T in Eq. (3) and rear-
ranging then gave
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0.136BC
=TI +
(1- e-ht)
(4)
Equation (4) was solved for C (total allowable weight of fuel com-
pound per capsule) by using the same series of pressure-rate values (P)
and capsule inside diameters as was used to obtain the capsule wall thick-
ness values in Eq. (1). The total number of capsules required was deter-
mined by dividing the total weight of fuel compound required for a 25-kw
heat source at the end of a one-year mission by the weight of fuel com-
pound allowed per capsule. The total weights of the inner and Outer cap-
sules, including fuel, were then determined, multiplied by the number of
capsules, and divided into the total initial power (w) required for the
heat source to obtain the specific power in w/lb. Typical results of these
calculations for several stress-rate safety factors, capsule diameters
ranging from 0.5 to 4.0 in. ID, and variable allowable pressure rates for
each safety factor are given in Section 5. As may be seen from the typi-
cal curves shown in Section 5 (Figs. 5.19 through 5.24), there is one
combination of wall thickness, fuel volume, and void volume that gives
the minimum weight of capsules for a particular allowable stress rate.
Likewise, there is another combination that gives the minimum volume of
capsules for the heat source.
Calculation for Checking Capsule Integrity in Elastic Range
The capsule design study described above was based on the assumption
that the limiting factor in the capsule design was that the maximum allow-
able stress rate would not exceed the creep-rupture strength of the cap-
sule. However, the creep mode of failure ceases to be a dominant factor
after approximately 0°7 times the half-life for each fuel for an initial
surface temperature of 2000°F, but the pressure inside the capsule keeps
increasing until it reaches a peak pressure at approximately 1.5 times
the fuel half-life. This region between 0.7 and 1.5 times the half-life
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was therefore checked on an elastic strength basis to insure that there
were adequate safety factors for yield strength (factor of 3) and for
ultimate strength (factor of 4).
The first step was to determine the maximum pressure that the capsule
would be subjected to during a ten half-life period. Since the rate at
which helium would be generated and the average temperature of the helium
would be constantly decreasing due to the decay of the radioisotope fuel,
this point of maximum pressure would be reached relatively early in the
ten half-life period. The pressure at any time, t_ after encapsulation
of the fuel is given by
I}_of (i -- e-ht )
P R
where
P = pressure, in atm_
[TA +
(TH-- TA) e-ht]l 'VM
r
(5)
t = elapsed time since encapsulation of the fuel, hr,
pf = density of fuel compound, g/cm3_
TA = ambient temperature_ °K_
T H = initial temperature of helium_ °K_
Vr = void volume-to-fuel volume ratio,
M = atomic weight of active alpha emitter_ g.
This equation was solved for various times in the ten half-life period, and
the results were plotted to give a curve of the equation. The temperature
of the helium at any time during the period was also determined and plot-
ted in the same program. A typical set of curves is shown in Fig. C.I.
Since the available mechanical strength properties of the T-222 alloy
being used as the encapsulating material are of a preliminary nature, a
conservative approach was taken in obtaining the allowable stress in the
elastic range by using ultimate and yield strength values based on the
capsule temperature at the time creep stength stops being a significant
factor (1425°F) rather than at the temperature at which the maximum cap-
sule pressure occurs (_800°F). The maximum allowable capsule pressure,
calculated according to the ASME Unfired Pressure Vessel Code_ was
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determined by using an allowable stress value that corresponded to this
higher capsule temperature. The allowable pressure was then divided by
the actual peak pressure obtained from Eq. (5) to give the design safety
factor. A typical example of this calculation follows.
In the case of the selected 244Cm203capsule design with an allowable
stress-rate safety factor of 7, there would be a total of 170 w in a 1.25-
in.-ID capsule with a void volume-to-fuel volume ratio of 14. By applying
Eq. (5) to this conceptual design, the pressure-temperature-time history
was determined, as shownin Fig. C.1.
As shownin the figure, the maximumpressure attained is 1482 psi
at slightly over 27 years. The temperature of the helium at approximately
0.6 times the half-life (Nll y) is 1425°F. At this temperature the ten-
sile strength of T-222 alloy in a recrystallized condition (1 hr at 3000°F)
is, as follows: 69
Ultimate tensile strength at 1425°F, psi
Yield strength at 1425°F, psi
~80,000
~50,000
Based on these data the maximumallowable capsule pressure (P) for each
cas% as determined by the ASMEUnfired Pressure Vessel Code, was the
following:
Ultimate Strength Basis
where
P= SE Z--i
S = ultimate strength
= 80,000 psi,
E = joint efficiency
= 0.85,
I Ir 2 + X cZ = wherel r2
r2 = capsule inside radius
= 0.625 in.,
Xe = capsule wall thickness
= 0.142 in.,
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0.142_ 2
Io.625 = 1o5t
= O. 625 f "
Thus
P : (8o,0o0)(0.85)1.5 7
= 13,600 psi.
Yield Strength Basis
With the same equation but the yield strength of T-222 alloy at 1425°F
substituted in place of the ultimate strength_ the allowable capsule pres-
sure is
P = (50,000)(0.85)(0.5/2.5)
= 8,500 psi.
The safety factors in each case are
Ultimate-strength safety factor = 13,600/1482 = 9.17
Yield-strength safety factor = 8_500/1482 = 5.73.
Thus it is evident that in both cases the actual safety factors are well
above the required safety factors of 4 and 3_ respectively_ for the re-
gion.
These calculations were repeated for all conceptual capsule designs.
In all cases the required safety factors for the elastic strength region
were met or exceeded.
